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Abstract 
Water Distribution Network (WDN) is an important component of municipal 
infrastructure. Many municipal water distribution systems are exposed to harsh 
environment and subjected to corrosion with age. Many of the water mains in North 
America are close to or have exceeded their design life and are experiencing a number of 
issues associated with leaks and breakage of the water mains. Maintaining structural 
integrity of the water infrastructure with the limited municipal budget has been a challenge. 
Under this circumstance, the municipalities are focusing on prioritizing their infrastructure 
for maintenance with optimum utilization of the resources. In this regard, an effective 
method for prioritizing is required for optimally maintaining the infrastructure integrity. 
The proposed research focuses on developing risk/reliability based prioritizing methods for 
water main infrastructure maintenance. 
Historic water main break data (i.e. number of breaks per km) is often used to identify 
breakage patterns in the attempts to reliability assessments of deteriorating water mains. 
This statistical modelling approach is unable to identify the failure mechanism and have 
limited use. Physical/mechanistic models are therefore desired for better understanding of 
the failure mechanisms and reliability assessment of WDN. In the proposed research, 
mechanics-based model is developed for the reliability assessment of water mains. Existing 
models for remaining strength assessment of the deteriorating pipelines are first examined 
to develop improved models. Pipe stress analysis is then performed for the reliability 
assessment of the pipes based on a stochastic analysis using Monte Carlo simulation.  
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For prioritizing water mains, system reliability and risk assessment methods are 
employed. For small WDN, the system failure of the pipeline network is modeled using 
Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA). The FTA is however tedious for large complex network. For 
large WDN, a complex network analysis method is employed to determine the potential of 
network disconnection due to water main break. Algebraic Connectivity (AC) of a complex 
network analysis is found to effectively represent the robustness and redundancy of WDN. 
The fluctuation in AC due to water main break could be used to assess the criticality of 
each pipe segment to the overall structure of the network. The AC then used as a part of 
overall consequence of the network due to water main breaks. A Fuzzy Inference System 
is proposed to combine network consequence with other consequence for risk assessment 
of complex WDN.  
In summary, a novel risk/reliability-based method for maintenance of water 
distribution system is developed in this thesis. In developing this method, mechanics-based 
failure is considered for reliability assessment and AC from graph theory is used for the 
consequence assessment of water main break on the overall network. A framework is 
developed for risk assessment considering the reliability and various consequences. 
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Contributions from this research 
The major contributions of the research in this thesis are listed below: 
- A framework has been developed for mechanics-based failure probability/ risk 
assessment of water distribution network for maintenance prioritization; 
- For the mechanics-based failure assessment to use in the above framework, a new 
stress -based failure assessment model has been developed for Cast Iron watermains using 
finite element analysis; 
- A method has been developed for assessing effect of water main break on the overall 
network by using the Algebraic Connectivity, a parameter of complex network analysis 
using graph theory; 
- A risk assessment method has been developed aggregating different consequences 
using a fuzzy inference system and an overall maintenance prioritization framework for 
water distribution network has been developed considering reliability and risk. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Municipal water mains are essential infrastructure in modern society, which have 
been used to supply portable water to city dwellers. Historically, many different pipe 
materials were developed and used to transport drinking water. Ductile iron and cast iron 
pipe cover a significant volume of current municipal distribution network. Cast iron pipes 
and ductile iron pipes account for 56% of total pipe length in US and Canada, which were 
mostly installed more than 50 years ago (Folkman, 2018). The water distribution systems 
are aging and subjected to deterioration, causing water main breaks. Cast iron and ductile 
iron pipes have highest break rates compared to other pipe materials (Folkman, 2018). This 
led to the use of alternative pipe material such as PVC pipes. 
While the alternative materials, which have better resistance properties against 
corrosion, are gradually used for replacing existing deteriorated pipe or for new 
installation, most of existing cast iron pipes are in danger because of their high corrosion 
rate. Municipal investments to maintain the integrity of these water mains are very 
significant. In this regard, a risk/reliability-based prioritizing of water mains can provide 
effective utilization of municipal budget for maintaining integrity of WDNs. The 
risk/reliability-based prioritization process faces various challenges as briefly outlined 
below.    
1. There is lack of data for development of risk and reliability assessment models. 
Many of the municipalities do not have data collection program. Although the municipality 
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can keep record of incidents using modern computational system, the leakage or breakage 
only recorded from a given time, when the incidents are reported or observed. Many 
technical metrics such as soil resistivity for predicting corrosion are not available in the 
database. 
2. Widely acceptable models are not available for reliability and risk assessment of 
water mains. 
3. WDN failures can lead to different types of consequences such as economic, safety 
or environment. A proper method is not available to combine these consequences for risk 
assessment.  
4. A pipe failure is commonly considered as an independent event, however, there 
are interactions between pipe failure events. An acceptable method is currently not 
available to describe the interaction between the pipe failure events. 
5. Even though the risk can sometime be estimated, an acceptable prioritizing plan is 
difficult to obtain because of it requires a hybrid subjective-objective decision process. 
Decision makers thus need various tools for helping them to obtain an acceptable 
maintenance plan.  
1.2. Reliability of Water Mains 
The reliability or failure probability of infrastructure with age can be represented by 
the well-known bathtub curve (Fig.1.1) where the failure rate initially decreases as the 
handing and installation errors are overcome, followed by a constant rate of random 
3 
 
failures during the service life and then an increase of failure rate at the wear out period. 
The decreasing failure rate period could be ignored for the service life of pipes. The failure 
process during the constant failure rate period can be assumed as a time-independent 
Poisson process (Watson et al., 2004). However, the failure process in the wear out period 
depends on the deterioration of the pipe and the resulting failure mechanisms. Corrosion is 
considered as the major form of water main deterioration for ductile iron and cast iron 
water mains that cover majority of water distribution pipes (Folkman, 2018). 
 
Figure 1.1. The bathtub curve hazard functions of the pipe  
(After Watson et al., 2004) 
The degradation of water pipe due to corrosion is generally modelled using statistical 
approach based on prior break data (Kleiner and Rajani 2010). However, the statistical 
modelling approach does not account for the mechanism of failure of the pipe and have 
very limited use (Nishiyama and Filion, 2013). Nishiyama and Filion (2013) recommended 
considering physical/mechanics-based models. Several mechanical models have been 
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available in literature. Sadiq et al. (2004) and Tee et al (2013) developed models for 
corroded water mains considering pipe wall stresses. Ji et al (2016) applied fracture 
mechanics model for probabilistic analysis of pipe with corrosion defects. Fahimi et al. 
(2016) also conducted fracture mechanics analysis for establishing interaction diagram of 
buried piped under complex bending condition. The mechanics-based model development 
requires a proper corrosion propagation model based on long-term observation data and a 
stress assessment method for corroded pipe. Currently, no simplified method is available 
for the stress and failure assessment of corroded municipal water main. On the other hand, 
municipalities often lack resources to collect data that are required for the development of 
the corrosion models. A combination of mechanics-based and statistic-based techniques 
along with the Bayesian updating process could be used to deal with municipal water 
mains.   
1.3.  Risk Assessment of Water Distribution Network 
Various risk assessment methods are available in literature, which can be classified 
as matrix, probabilistic and indexing approaches, Muhlbauer (2004). The risk models can 
be either overly simplified or overly complicated. While using less available inputs may 
result in missing of important information, a model with unnecessary variables may lead 
to a too complicated model and repeating information. An acceptable model is the one that 
can thoroughly mine all the data available but use as less inputs as possible.  
The risk of overall WDN is sometimes estimated by system reliability (Tung, 1985), 
which provides a metric to generally evaluate the condition of the network. This metric can 
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be used for comparison of the conditions of a network with the others. However, it is 
complicated to calculate system reliability without a proper simplification. Furthermore, 
prioritizing planning, a major focus of the stakeholder, cannot be performed with the 
system risk only.  
1.4. Motivation of the Research 
Due to widespread concerns with the aging municipal water mains, municipalities 
are moving toward adoption of an advanced reliability/risk-based management practice. 
The reliability of the overall system can be calculated from the component failure 
probabilities as a combinatorial problem. The difficulties of defining system failure 
probability or reliability for real water main network is however well-recognized due to the 
complexity of the problem. A balance is therefore sought for the reliability assessment that 
is practical to compute with the one that is expected (Wagner et al., 1988). Several 
techniques including Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), minimal cut sets, and conditional 
probability approach were used to examine the pipeline networks references. However, for 
large networks, these require complex calculation process, huge computational time and 
idealizing assumptions. In this regard, complex network analysis of graph theory could be 
used to avoid the large computation while assessing the robustness and redundancy of the 
networks (Phan et al., 2018a).  
Furthermore, consequence estimation for risk assessment is a challenging task for 
WDN. Amongst the various types of consequences such as economic, environment, etc., 
the important level of a particular pipe to the well-connectedness of the system is rarely 
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discussed in literature. There are individual or combination of pipes in the network whose 
failure may lead to severe disconnection of a part of the network from the water source, or 
to the reduction of the redundancy of the network. These pipes needed to be identified for 
effectively maintaining the water mains in WDN. However, no method is currently 
available for prioritizing pipe in WDN considering the combined effects of network well-
connectedness and other consequences of water main break. The author is motivated to 
address the limitations of the reliability and risk assessment methods and develop improved 
methods for maintenance of municipal water main infrastructure. 
1.5. Research Objectives and Scope 
The municipalities commonly employ a reactive approach for maintaining the aging 
water main infrastructure where a component of the infrastructure is repaired or replaced 
after failure of the component. This reactive maintenance approach results in an expensive 
solution as it requires emergency mobilization of crews, causes loss of water due to the 
water main breaks and may damage nearby facilities by the flowing water. Environment 
Canada revealed that proactive actions to prevent failure of water mains can provide 
significant benefits estimated as $3 of saving for every $1 on the proactive actions (Harvey, 
2015). For a rational basis of infrastructure maintenance, the Canadian Network of Asset 
Managers recommends an Asset Management Plan (AMP) that includes a recommendation 
for establishment of 10 year and long-term renewal plans and strategies to reduce the cost 
of rehabilitation (Harvey, 2015). In this regard, a risk method is employed through 
evaluating the risks associated with the failure of infrastructure components. However, it 
recognizes the considerable uncertainty in quantifying both the probability of failure and 
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the consequence of water main failure for the risk assessment. With the limitations in mind, 
a risk-based screening tool is developed with support from Water Research Foundation 
(WRF), Water Environment Research Foundation (WERF) and U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) (Grigg et al. 2013). This tool employs an overall likelihood index 
of failure and an overall consequence score for the risk assessment. It does not account for 
physical deterioration of the water mains in the failure likelihood (probability of failure) 
assessment. The effect of water main failure on overall network is not considered for the 
failure consequence assessment. Therefore, the developed tool is only applicable for 
investment planning and is not suitable for maintenance planning of aging infrastructure 
components. 
This research focuses on developing a risk-based method for maintenance of water 
main infrastructure through addressing the limitations in existing methods of failure 
probability and consequence assessments. A mechanics-based failure assessment model is 
developed to account for the physical deterioration of the water mains for failure 
probability assessment. A method of complex network analysis is developed for the 
assessment of the consequence of water main failure on the overall network. 
The following present the specific objectives and scopes of the research. 
1. Develop a framework for mechanics-based reliability/risk assessment method for 
reliability and risk-based maintenance prioritization of WDN. 
2. Develop a mechanics-based failure assessment model for reliability assessment of 
water mains stated in the above objective. 
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3. Develop a method for the assessment of the effects of water main failure on the 
overall WDN.  
4. Develop risk based prioritizing planning techniques for water main inspection and 
maintenance combining the effects on overall network with other consequences.  
 
Figure 1.2. Framework of proposed prioritizing plan for WDN 
This research develops to advance the risk-based method for maintenance 
prioritization planning of water distribution network through developing improved 
methods of failure probability and consequence assessments. The methodology of using 
the developed failure probability and consequence assessment methods is demonstrated 
through application to hypothetical and a real water distribution system. The overall risk-
based method for maintenance prioritization using the developed methodology is 
illustrated in Figure 1.2.  
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As seen in Figure 1.2, a mechanics-based reliability/risk assessment framework is 
first developed in Objective 1. For the mechanics-based reliability assessment, a failure 
assessment model for corroded pipes, available for energy pipelines, is employed since a 
failure assessment model for corroded water main is not available. In Objective 2, a failure 
assessment model for corroded cast iron water main is developed through a detailed finite 
element analysis. The research in Objective 3 focuses on developing a method for 
assessment of consequence on overall water distribution system due to water main breaks. 
Then, a framework is developed in Objective 4 to combine the consequence on overall 
water distribution system with other consequences for risk assessment for a reliability/risk-
based maintenance program of water distribution system. 
1.6. Outline of the Research Methodology 
The following presents a brief outline of the methodologies undertaken to achieve 
the above objectives.  A more detail discussion on the research methodologies and results 
are provided in the subsequent chapters. 
Develop a framework for mechanics-based reliability/risk assessment for WDN 
(Objective 1):  
A framework for mechanics-based failure probability assessment is developed 
through calculation of pipe wall stresses and stochastic degradation. Pipe stress due to 
external load is calculated using the recommendation of AWWA M45 (2014). The stress 
due to internal pressure of corroded pipe is calculated using burst pressure model in 
modified ASME B31G equation (ASME B31G, 2012). It is however recognized that the 
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modified ASME B31G equation was developed for steel energy pipelines. A burst pressure 
model applicable for water mains is later developed. The proposed framework is 
demonstrated through application to reliability and risk assessment of small WDN using 
conventional Fault Tree Analysis, FTA, for maintenance prioritization. A version of the 
work has been published in ASCE journal of pipeline system engineering and practice 
(Phan et al., 2018b).  
Development of a mechanics-based failure assessment model for water mains 
(Objective 2):  
As discussed above, the mechanic-based failure assessment of water mains requires 
stress calculation due to external loads and internal pressure. Currently, no simplified 
method exists for calculation of stress for corroded pipes. A number of different design 
equations exists for failure assessment for energy pipeline under internal pressure. 
However, the equations were reported to be unsuccessful in predicting the burst pressure 
for energy pipeline. In the current study, the existing burst pressure models for energy 
pipelines is first revisited using data from Finite Element Analysis (FEA) with application 
for Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm. The study is then extended through detailed 
FEA for cast iron water mains to develop simplified equation for burst pressure prediction. 
A portion of the work has been published in Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering (Phan 
et al., 2017b). 
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Effects of water main breaks on overall network (Objective 3):  
Considering that the application of conventional FTA method for overall impact 
assessment on the network is difficult for large WDN, the method of complex network 
analysis is examined for reliability assessment of WDN. Algebraic Connectivity (AC) of 
Complex Network Analysis is found to successfully define the network disconnection and 
robustness. A methodology is developed for reliability assessment of WDN using AC and 
identifying the critical pipes in the network. The work has been published in Journal of 
Water supply: Research and Technology (Aqua), Phan et al. (2018a) and in 2017 CSCE 
annual conference (Phan et al., 2017a). 
Risk assessment of WDN due to water main breaks (Objective 4):  
Risk assessment for WDN requires quantification of consequence of water main 
breaks. Water main break results in different economic, environment and social 
consequences. A Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is proposed to aggregate different 
consequences for risk assessment of WDN for maintenance prioritization. The properties 
of AC are used to assess the topological consequence accounting for the change in 
redundancy of the network. It is proposed to use consequence parameters for other 
consequences. This work has been submitted for publication in a journal.  
1.7. Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized in seven chapters.  
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Chapter 1 provides a discussion on the research background, objectives of the 
research and an outline of the methodology. 
Chapter 2 provides a discussion on the literature review relevant to the research. 
Chapter 3 presents a framework developed for reliability and risk-based 
prioritization of considering physical deterioration of pipes.  
Chapter 4 presents the development of failure assessment model for using in the 
mechanics-based failure probability assessment of water mains to be used in the framework 
developed in Chapter 3.   
Chapter 5 presents a method for considering the effects of water main breaks on 
overall WDN. 
Chapter 6 introduces a method for risk-based prioritizing of WDN combining 
difference consequences.  
Chapter 7 presents the overall conclusion of the thesis and the recommendations for 
future work.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Maintaining integrity for WDN has been a concern for the municipalities as water 
main breaks are increasing with aging water distribution system. Over the last few decades, 
a number of different approaches were developed for effectively assessing the effects of 
water main breaks in an attempt to develop a maintenance plan for WDN. Many studies 
(e.g. Ross, 1985; Cullinane, 1986; Cullinane et al., 1992; Zhuang et al., 2012; 
Yannopoulos, and Spiliotis, 2013) focused on reliability assessment based on hydraulic 
availability of the network which is defined as the percentage of time a system can supply 
water with sufficient hydraulic pressure. The other studies estimated reliability in terms of 
structural failure probability (e.g. Tung, 1985; Bao and Mays,1990; Sadiq et al., 2004; 
Deuerlein et al., 2009; Tee and Khan., 2012; Gheisi and Naser., 2013; Barone and 
Frangopol, 2014). In these approaches, reliability of the overall network distribution 
system (system reliability) was used to evaluate the well connectedness of the network 
(Tung, 1985; Cullinane et al., 1992 Lindhe 2008; Yannopoulos and Spiliotis, 2013). It is 
however difficult to assess reliability of large WDN which contains loops and large number 
of pipes. Other approach employed is the development of risk/failure probability model for 
each individual pipe and then total risk/failure probability is obtained using a summation 
(Kleiner and Rajani 2010, Rogers, 2011). In this approach, pipe failures are assumed to be 
independent events. 
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Prior water main break data are often used to develop reliability model for different 
groups of water mains. However, sufficient data is generally not available to the 
municipalities to develop the model. The limitations of the pipe break data for statistical 
model are well recognized, as discussed in more detail in Nishiyama and Filion (2013). A 
mechanics-based failure modelling approach is recommended to overcome the break data-
based model. 
2.2. Mechanics-based Failure Modeling 
Failure models of water mains are generally developed by using statistical or physical 
approaches. The statistical approach attempts to mine the break records and other inputs 
(e.g. age, length, diameter, freezing index, corrosion resistance, soil type etc.) to establish 
a model based on statistics models. The physical approach employs the mechanism of 
failure considering the type of loads and the corrosion propagation process. Rajani and 
Kleiner (2001) suggested that physical models have not been fully developed due to the 
lack of knowledge of the physical mechanism and limitation of the available data. 
However, physical or mechanics-based model provides a rational method of failure 
modelling through understanding the failure mechanisms of pipe.  
2.2.1. Physical Failure Mechanisms 
Physical failure of pipeline occurs when the wall stress exceeds the capacity of pipe 
material. Fig.2.1 shows the failure modes of water pipe summarized in Rajani and Kleiner 
(2001). It can be seen that water pipes suffer from various failure mechanisms depending 
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on the types of loads and effects such as internal pressure, soil weight, frost load, thermal 
change, etc.  
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Figure 2.1. Failure modes for buried pipes (After Rajani and Kleiner, 2001) 
AWWA (2014) recommends assessing the pipe wall stresses due to the internal 
pressure and external loads. The combined stress, σc, is thus calculated as: 
0c b  = +  (2.1) 
Where: σo is the wall stress due to internal pressure and σb is the wall stress caused 
by ring bending due to external loads. 
The pipe wall stress calculated using Eq.2.1 provides the maximum circumferential 
stress, which would lead to longitudinal cracking on the wall. The equations for pipe wall 
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stresses in the design code (e.g. Eq. 2.1) are based on uniform thickness of the pipe wall. 
A uniform corrosion depth over the entire length and the circumference of the pipe is 
therefore commonly assumed for the failure probability assessment of water mains using 
the equation for wall stresses (Sadiq et al., 2004, Tee et al., 2013). The remaining thickness 
of the wall, calculated as the difference between the pipe wall thickness and the corrosion 
depth, is used in calculation of the pipe wall stress. However, corrosion generally causes 
thickness reduction within localized (corroded) areas, resulting in the non-uniform wall 
thickness. The effect of localized wall thickness reduction on the failure probability 
assessment is considered in the current study. 
Fig.2.2 shows localized corrosion defects on the exterior surface of a water main 
exhumed from the city of Mount Pearl in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador in 
Canada. The localized corroded area causes stress concentration, resulting in higher stress 
in vicinity of corrosion that cannot be predicted using the equations proposed in AWWA 
M45 (2014). However, design codes for energy pipelines (i.e. DNV, 2010, ASME, 2012) 
account for the stress concentration due to corrosion under internal pressure and provides 
equation for burst pressure of corroded pipes. The burst pressure models for energy pipes 
are developed for high strength steel pipes subjected to high internal pressure and therefore 
may not be applicable for cast iron and ductile iron water pipes having much lower strength 
than high strength steel. The internal pressures for water mains are also less. 
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Figure 2.2. Pipe sample exhumed from the city of Mount Pearl showing multiple 
corroded defects 
However, researchers have identified some limitations of the existing burst pressure 
models for energy pipeline. Hasan et al. (2011) demonstrated through a probabilistic 
assessment of the remaining strength of corroded pipes that different burst pressure models 
available in the literature (e.g. ASME B31G, 2012; CSA Z662, 2015 and DNV RP-F101, 
2010) provided significantly different failure strengths even with the same defect sizes for 
particular pipes. Swankie et al. (2012) found the modified ASME (2012) method to provide 
overestimation of the burst pressure for 35% of the pipes and underestimation for 50% of 
the pipes they tested. The model error in several existing models was found to affect the 
burst probability assessment by several order of magnitudes (Zhou and Zhang, 2015). An 
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improved burst pressure model is therefore desired for accurate failure assessment of the 
pipelines. 
As oil and gas pipelines are operated at high internal pressure, the bursting may occur 
before the corrosion propagates too deep. For water main, the corrosion depth can be 
significant before bursting of the pipe occurs since the operating pressure is less. However, 
if pipe wall is too thin, the minor load from on pipe as concentration load from surrounding 
soil (e.g. rock pieces) could lead to leakage. The AWWA (2014) standard thus defines the 
wall thickness less than 20% of original thickness as failure. For assessment of both types 
of failure the corrosion propagation model is required. 
2.2.2. Corrosion Propagation Models 
Prediction of the propagation of corrosion with age is required for consideration of 
the wall thickness reduction for failure probability assessment of pipelines. Rossum (1969) 
proposed power function models for the prediction of corrosion depth and corrosion rate 
with time (Eq.2.2 and 2.3, respectively).  
𝑑(𝑡) = 𝐾𝑡𝑛    (2.2) 
𝐶𝑟(𝑡) = 𝐾𝑛𝑡𝑛−1    (2.3) 
Where d(t) is corrosion depth at time t; Cr(t) is corrosion rate at time t; K and n are 
constants. 
These equations model a fade-out process which has high value magnitude initially 
and slows down gradually. Corrosion process is generally slowed down with time due to 
formation of a micro film that acts as a protection layer for the metal. Rossum (1969) has 
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developed the basic model in Eq.2.3 with the effect of cell potential (E), pH and soil 
resistivity () as in Eq.2.4. 
𝑑(𝑡) = 𝐾 [
(10−𝑝𝐻)𝑡

]
𝑛
   (2.4) 
The self-inhibiting characteristic of corrosion in Rossum (1969) is widely accepted 
and developed in literature (Mughabghab and Sullivan 1989). Mughabghab and Sullivan 
(1989) demonstrated that the environment surrounding metal influences the corrosion 
process. For example, the presence of oxygen accelerates the corrosion rate initially, 
however, the corrosion rate slows down with time due to formation of Fe(OH)3. They 
defined the parameters in Eq.2.2 as below: 
𝐾𝑎 = 5.75(9.87 − 𝑝𝐻)  For acidic pH value  (2.5) 
𝐾𝑏 = 5.05(2𝑝𝐻 − 10.26)   For basic pH value (2.6) 
𝑛 = 𝐴1+ 𝐴2𝐶𝐿 + 𝐴3   (2.7) 
Where: Ka and Kb are the K constants in Eq.2.3,  is the moisture content in soil, CL 
is the clay content in soil, A1, A2, A3 are constant depends on the aeration (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. Value of A1, A2, A3 in Eq.2.7 (After Mughabghab and Sullivan, 1989). 
Aeration A1 A2 A3 
Good 0.57 -0.22 0.02 
Fair 2.4 -1.66 0.24 
Poor 0.22 -0.48 0.57 
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Rajani et al (2000 and 2007) proposed two-phase model where the first phase refers 
to the exponential growing of the defects and the second phase refers to the self-inhibiting 
of the corrosion process, as in Eq.2.8 and Eq.2.9.  Corrosion parameters for the two-phase 
model are provided in Table 2.2. 
𝑑𝑡(𝑡) = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑘(1 − 𝑒−𝑐𝑡)  (2.8) 
𝐶𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑎 + 𝑘𝑐𝑒−𝑐𝑡    (2.9) 
Where: a is the minimum constant rate, c is the inhibition factor, and (a+kc) is the 
maximum corrosion rate 
Table 2.2. Corrosion parameters for two-phase model (After Rajani, 2007) 
Soil corrosivity 
Corrosion parameter for two-phase model 
a 
(mm/year) 
k  
(mm) 
c 
(1/year) 
a+kc 
(mm/year) 
Very low (VLC) 0.0042 1.95 0.058 0.1173 
Low (LC) 0.0210 9.75 0.058 0.5856 
Moderate (MC) 0.0252 11.7 0.058 0.7038 
High (HC) 0.0294 13.65 0.058 0.8211 
Very high (VHC) 0.0336 15.60 0.058 0.9384 
 
Velazquez et al (2009) allowed a corrosion-free period of time t0 and defined the 
corrosion process using Eqs (2.10) and (2.11). The initial time, t0, is reported to be 3 years, 
meaning that within the first 3 years, no corrosion will occur.  
𝑑𝑡(𝑡) = 𝑘(𝑡 − 𝑡0)
𝑛  (2.10) 
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𝐶𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑘𝑛(𝑡)𝑛−1   (2.11)  
The constants K and n depend on soil type such as clay, clay loam or sandy clay 
loam. Pipes in clay and sandy clay loam appeared to have the highest and lowest corrosion 
rate, respectively. The constants proposed in Velazquez et al (2009) are included in Table 
2.3. 
Table 2.3. Corrosion parameters (After Velazquez et al., 2009) 
Soil type K n t0 
Clay 0.178 0.829 3 
Sandy clay loam 0.144 0.734 2.6 
Clay loam 0.163 0.793 3.1 
 
Doyle et al (2003) proposed a constant corrosion rate, Cr, depending on the soil 
characteristics (Eq.2.12). Though soil characteristics (i.e. resistivity, pH, Redox potential, 
sulfides and moisture) are considered in the analysis, only pH and soil resistivity are found 
to influence significantly. The constant corrosion rate is commonly considered when long 
term observation data is not available (Mohebbi and Li, 2011). 
𝐶𝑟 = 0.6874 − 0.037𝑝𝐻 − 0.0887   (2.12)  
Although models were developed for corrosion assessment, as discussed above, it is 
difficult to obtain a general model applicable for all area because the corrosion process is 
unique for a particular area corresponding to unique environment. A practical approach is 
to establish corrosion model for each area or community using the break records within the 
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area to adjust the parameters in existing models. This process is well-known as Bayesian 
updating where the posterior distribution of interest (i.e. parameters of corrosion model in 
this case) is updated based on the prior belief using collected data from WDN.  
The Bayesian updating process has been widely applied for various fields including 
water distribution system (e.g. Watson et al., 2004; Bromley et al., 2005; Wang et al., 
2010). Thodi et al. (2010) employed a simplifying approach of estimating the normalizing 
factor in the basic Bayes’s theorem and provided alternative solutions using a Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method and the Metropolis–Hastings (M-H) algorithm to 
obtain the posterior distribution of the input variables. Kabir et al. (2016) developed 
Bayesian Weibull Propositional Hazard Model by periodically using posterior distribution 
of the previous period as the prior for the next. The updating process is conducted after 
four periods and then compared with the Cox proportional hazard and Poisson model. The 
Bayesian inference is commonly incorporated with an optimization algorithm to obtain 
posterior distribution and the coefficients for the model (Scheidegger et al., 2015).  
2.3. Reliability Evaluation of Overall Network 
Reliability and risk of WDN system are of great interests for risk and reliability-
based maintenance prioritization. However, municipal WDN is a complex system 
containing thousands of nodes and pipes, leading to the difficulties in evaluating system 
reliability. The complexity arises from large number of demand nodes, multiple-sources, 
complex connectivity and inter-dependent components. Consequently, the WDN reliability 
analyses are commonly performed through simplification incorporating certain basic 
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assumptions. A common assumption is to ignore the interaction and dependency of the 
components. Thus, the network failures can be estimated through the failure assessment of 
individual pipes (e.g. Moglia et al., 2006; Kleiner et al., 2010; Rogers, 2011). Even though 
this assumption eases the computational process, it may overly simplify the high-density 
network which contains loops and provides redundancy of supplying water to a given 
demand node or ignore the important of crucial pipes that their failure can lead to the 
disconnection of many other pipes.    
To model the interaction among pipes, Complex Network Analysis (CNA) of graph 
theory can be conducted. Complex network analysis was applied in various areas including 
WDNs for reliability assessment of overall system (Yazdani and Jeffrey, 2010, 2011a, 
2011b; Nazempour et al., 2016). Yazdani and Jeffrey (2010) observed metrics of the CNA 
to evaluate the robustness and vulnerable characteristic of WDN. Nazempour et al. (2016) 
employed CNA method for optimizing the contaminated sensor locations. Among several 
metrics provided by CNA, an Algebraic Connectivity (AC) is found to describe network 
connectivity. The AC is a well-known measure for evaluating the well-connectedness of 
the graph (Fiedler, 1973; Capocci et al., 2005; Ghosh and Boyd, 2006; Newman, 2006, 
Yazdani and Jeffrey, 2011a, b). The network with higher AC is more robust or more 
tolerant to the breakage of links.  
2.4. Consequence of Water Main Break 
Different approaches are employed to identify the consequence of water main break. 
NIPP (2013) divided the consequences in to four categories: i) public health and safety, ii) 
24 
 
economic, iii) psychological, and iv) governance/mission impacts. St. Clair and Sinha 
(2014) pointed out that there are 8 groups of impacts arise from a breakage of a water main. 
These are environmental, traffic flow, service disruption, time, financial, financial on 
private property, public health, and other impacts. Baah et al. (2015) employed the 
relationship of consequences to 11 detailed factors such as road way type, intersecting a 
railway track, pipe size, pipe burial depth, located downtown, proximity to hospital, 
distance to building, proximity to river, proximity to park or recreation areas, proximity to 
bad storm water pipe.  
To quantify the failure consequence, both objective and subjective based approaches 
are used. The subjective approach is carried out based on the evaluation of expert 
knowledge to score impact factors and then normalize them to have an overall consequence 
of a pipe failure (Baah et al. 2015, Alidoosti et al. 2012). The objective approach focuses 
on evaluating specific consequence of the failure. The overall consequence of failure is 
generally expressed in term of costs. The component costs may vary depending on the 
purpose of assessment. Sahraoui et al. (2013) and Tee and Khan (2012) modelled the 
consequence as the cost for inspection, repair and cost of monetary loss if failures occur. 
Barone and Frangopol (2014) considered consequence as a combination of direct and 
indirect costs.  
In most of the approaches for assessing consequence, the relative topological 
importance of pipes is not considered. However, the topological important level of a pipe 
in a network should be considered for the consequence assessment for water main break. 
If a pipe is broken, it affects the surrounding pipes, demand nodes and to the overall 
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network. Severity of the effects depends on the location of pipe in the network. Walski 
(1993) employed hydraulic approach to investigate the effect of water main break on 
neighboring pipes. To account for the hydraulic effect on neighboring pipes due to water 
main break, researchers suggest of using hydraulic importance factor for reliability analysis 
of WDN by topologically decomposing the network (Jun et al., 2008, Yoo et al., 2014, 
Deuerlein et al., 2009). The topological importance of a pipe is discussed with conducting 
CNA in Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011) by highlighting the bridge pipes connecting water 
mains of two communities of a city. Phan et al. (2017a) has observed the critical properties 
of AC from CNA and then discussed the relationship of importance level with the change 
of AC due to failure of a particular pipe. They demonstrated that the change in AC can be 
effectively used for topological importance or topological consequence of water main 
break, which requires further development. 
2.5. Risk Assessment and Decision Planning 
Risk is a measure of the probability and the consequence of undesired events to 
represent human, environmental or economic values. It is commonly expressed as the 
probability of occurrence times the consequence. In a system, the risk could be for each 
component, and for the overall system. The system risk can be calculated as the sum of the 
component risks when the system components behave independently. Due to the 
complexity with dependent system components, it is a common practice to idealize the 
components in water main networks to be statistically independent (Tung, 1985; Wagner 
et al, 1988; Quimpo and Shamsi, 1991).  
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Muhlbauer (2004) summarized that there are three types of risk models, which are 
(1) matrix (2) probabilistic and (3) indexing models. The matrix model breakdown risk 
problem into probability and consequence. A matrix is created with rows and columns 
corresponding to occurrence probability and consequence of the failure. Then each cell in 
the matrix is assigned to have a risk evaluation level such as low, medium or high according 
to its location in the matrix. This approach is overly subjective and not appropriate if there 
are various factors related to the risk. However, the advantage of this approach is the 
separation of risk into consequence and probability (Muhlbauer, 2004). This method is 
being adjusted by incorporating fuzzy techniques. For instance, Tchorzewska-Cieslak 
(2011) and Wu et al. (2013) developed the traditional risk matrix model by using the Fuzzy 
Inference System to obtain the risk aggregated from consequence and likelihood.  
The probabilistic models attempt to assess all possible failure events through rigorous 
mathematical and statistical models. This approach requires intensive data and depends 
heavily on event-tree or fault-tree results, which can be affected by human perception 
(Muhlbauer, 2004). However, these drawbacks can be improved with the development of 
data mining techniques, the application of fuzzy method to deal with uncertainty and 
development of understanding of the failure mechanism. Sadiq et al., (2008) evaluated the 
risk (e.g. likelihood of failure) of water quality failure by FTA. Hu et al. (2018) used FTA 
with the application of fuzzy techniques to obtain failure probability/risk of the system.   
The indexing models are commonly used in literature where scores and relative 
weights for items are employed in the risk assessment. The risk index of each pipe segment 
can be found based on its attributes. A pipe risk index is useful for prioritizing pipe for 
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maintenance work through highlighting the most significant pipes based on ranking 
(Muhlbauer, 2004). Researchers employed different risk indexing method for WDN. Fares 
and Zayed (2010) used 16 risk-of-failure factors with a Fuzzy Inference System to obtain 
the equivalent impact value for pipe prioritizing plan. Kabir et al. (2015) proposed to use 
the Bayesian Believe Network along with the updating process to obtain the aggregated 
risk indexes of each pipes in the system. Kleiner and Rajani (2010) developed a 
computational tool, an Individual Water mAin Renewal Planner (i.e. I-Warp), which is a 
risk indexing model, to predict the water main breaks within a given period, then the cost 
of replacement for a particular pipe is used to optimize the minimum budget for 
replacement.  
2.6. Summary 
In this chapter, various research methods employed toward maintaining the integrity 
of municipal water distribution network are briefly discussed. Researchers employed 
different approaches of reliability and risk assessments for water main maintenance 
planning. It is revealed that water main break data is mostly used for structural reliability 
assessment of water mains. The limitations of this method in reliability assessment are 
however identified and the use of a mechanics-based method is recommended. 
Another challenge is the assessment of effects water main breaks have on the overall 
network and on the individual pipe segment. Different risk assessment methods accounting 
for the water main breaks were proposed based on various simplifying assumptions.  
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In the current research, a framework for reliability assessment method for WDN 
using mechanics-based method is developed. An innovative risk assessment method is also 
developed using CNA and Fuzzy Inference System for complex WDN. 
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CHAPTER 3. A FRAMEWORK FOR MECHANICS-BASED 
RELIABILITY/RISK ASSESSMENT FOR WDN2 
3.1. Introduction 
Water main infrastructure is a high-value municipal asset that requires regular 
maintenance in order to ensure optimum performance. However, the municipal budget is 
often not sufficient to meet investment levels, needed for maintaining the integrity of the 
deteriorating water mains. Under the circumstances, municipalities focus on prioritizing 
the assets for maintenance with optimum utilization of resources. Therefore, a rational 
method is required for prioritizing the infrastructure for inspection and maintenance 
considering reliability and risk of the pipeline network. Reliability assessment for pipeline 
network has been used for decades for optimization of water main system. Hydraulic 
reliability, defined as the probability of providing the demand flow rates at a given point, 
is employed to design water distribution network and to determine the optimum pipe sizes 
(Fujiwara and De Silva, 1990; Wagner et al, 1988, Atkinson et al, 2014). Redundancy in 
the network (increase of connectivity with additional pipe segments) is often used to 
increase the hydraulic reliability. A reliability assessment with respect to the structural 
condition of the pipe (i.e., structural reliability) is used for structural integrity assessment 
of the pipelines. The structural reliability of water main system for inspection and 
                                                          
2 This chapter is based on the published work in a peer-reviewed journal: Hieu Chi Phan, Ashutosh Sutra 
Dhar, Rehan Sadiq (2018), “Prioritizing Water Mains for Inspection and Maintenance Considering System 
Reliability and Risk”, Journal of Pipeline Systems Engineering and Practice, ASCE, 9(3), p.04018009 
(https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)PS.1949-1204.0000324). The work was carried out, and the paper was 
drafted by the first author. The work was supervised, and the paper was reviewed by the co-authors. 
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maintenance planning is the major focus of this chapter and is intended for structural 
integrity management of the water main network. The presence of redundancy in the water 
distribution system is thus assumed to have no influence on the structural reliability of a 
pipe segment or the network. 
Historical pipe break data is often used for structural reliability assessment of a 
pipeline to prioritize water mains for renewal. With the historic data, statistical models are 
developed to identify the breakage pattern for different types of pipes under various 
environments. The records of pipe failures or repair events maintained by many water 
utilities are used in the development of the models. The statistical model avoids the 
complexity and can be used when data is not available for physical pipe deterioration. A 
number of research publications exist on reliability and/or risk assessments of the water 
main infrastructure using this approach (e.g., Rajani et al., 2001; Hu et al., 2013). In most 
of these publications, statistical deterministic and/or probabilistic models have been 
developed using historic break data to predict future break rate or failure probability of the 
pipeline. However, relatively low coefficients of determination are often observed with 
these models in various regression analyses (e.g., Kleiner and Rajani 2010; Hu et al., 2013). 
The other challenge with these models is complexity in model structure and unavailability 
of necessary data required for development of the models. Municipalities often lack 
resources to collect data that are required for the development of many of the models. Even 
if the data are available, these may not be perfect for the development of the prediction 
models. As a result, most of these models are not implemented in the municipal pipeline 
maintenance planning (Jenkins et al., 2015). Besides, the models assess the risk and/or 
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reliability for a group of infrastructure asset based on the failure data on similar 
infrastructure. The approach may be suitable for budget allocation or asset management 
planning but is not applicable for the maintenance of a specific pipe component in the 
network since the physical condition/deterioration of the component is not considered. A 
physical deterioration-based model would usually provide the service lifetime of a specific 
pipe component. 
Rogers (2011) proposed a failure model to apply for specific pipe components using 
the previous break record of the particular components. Weibull distribution function was 
employed to determine the time to next failure of the pipe component.  A minimum of three 
break records for a pipe component are required to develop the model. Jenkin et al. (2015) 
proposed a Weibull hazard rate model for water distribution network that is applicable even 
if the available data are incomplete. In their model, the expert opinion of a utility 
professional was elicited to fill the data gap in order to develop and validate the model. The 
model parameters are determined based on limited data and filling data gaps. A similar 
approach of using limited data and expert judgement is proposed for failure probability 
assessment of city gas transmission and distribution system when data information is 
limited in Liu et al. (2016). This approach thus predominantly employs pipe break data for 
the development of failure prediction model and does not account for the pipe’s mechanical 
reliability.  
However, it is challenging to assess the failure probability of the infrastructure for 
municipalities with no record of pipe break data. Park et al. (2015) developed a procedural 
framework for modelling the likelihood of failure for underground pipelines where they 
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proposed to use a non-probabilistic analysis and/or establish data collection strategy when 
no data is available to the municipality. Sadiq et al. (2004) and Tee et al. (2013) employed 
a stochastic method to determine the failure probability of pipeline through assessment of 
pipe wall stresses considering different established failure modes. The time-dependent 
reduction of pipe wall thickness is considered deterministically and/or stochastically in the 
development of the model. 
The failure probability of a pipeline can be expressed using either parametric or 
nonparametric models (Park et al., 2015). The parametric model is generally preferred 
since it assumes a probability distribution (e.g., Weibull, gamma, exponential etc.) of the 
reliability, which can be developed with a small sample size. Although the suitability of a 
distribution function depends on the type of assets and the environmental and operational 
conditions, Weibull distribution is widely used for infrastructure deterioration modeling 
including underground pipes (Park et al., 2015, Chookah et al. 2011). Sadiq et al. (2004) 
examined several distributions such as normal, lognormal, exponential, Weibull, and Hertz 
distributions to define the failure probability for a water main simulated using Monte Carlo 
(MC) simulation. The lognormal, Hertz, and Weibull distributions were found to fit well 
with the simulated data. The Weibull function has been considered in this chapter due to 
the versatility of the model in characterizing the life cycle of a component using a single 
equation. The Weibull model also has the flexibility to represent one of the other 
distribution types using suitable parameters. 
In this chapter, a stochastic approach using MC simulation is employed to predict 
corrosion as an input for the mechanics-based model to assess failure probability. The 
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failure modes established in the water main design codes (i.e., AWWA 2014) is used for 
physical assessment of the pipes for the development of the model. It is proposed that a 
Weibull model be used for each pipe component (based on available information and/or 
stochastic analysis), which could be updated with the availability of data in the future. A 
new reliability and risk management approach is proposed for prioritizing water mains for 
inspection and maintenance. Mechanical failure modes of the pipes are considered for the 
development of reliability model. The term “reliability” here thus corresponds to 
“mechanical reliability” 
3.2. Weibull Function 
A Weibull distribution function is proposed for failure prediction modelling of each 
pipe component in the network. The probability density function of failure according to 
Weibull distribution is given by (Eq.3.1): 
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From the Weibull model, reliability function and failure function are defined using 
Eq.3.2 and Eq.3.3, respectively: 
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Where: 
Ri(t): Reliability, at time t 
Fi(t): Failure probability, 
i:  Shape parameter, 
i Scale parameter, and 
i :  Location parameter. 
In this model, the location parameter () is proposed to be a variable that could be 
updated based on future inspection data or expert opinions on the pipe condition when 
available. For example, if the inspection data or expert opinion indicates a failure 
probability of a pipe (say “p”), the time (tE) corresponding to the failure probability is first 
determined from the Weibull function with =0. Then, the location parameter,  
corresponding to the pipe condition can be estimated from the relation, t - i = tE, where ‘t’ 
is the actual age of the pipe. The location parameter will be negative if the observed failure 
probability (p) is greater than the failure probability calculated using the initial Weibull 
function and vice versa. The Weibull function with the new location parameter can be used 
for subsequent prediction of the failure probability or reliability. Similarly, after 
undertaking any inspection or maintenance work on a pipe component, the component 
failure probability can be defined based on the actual pipe condition and the corresponding 
location parameter can be determined. Thus, the model can be used for future maintenance 
planning of the existing and the repaired/renewed components. The model parameters of 
the Weibull model can also be updated when sufficient data would be available. The use 
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of the model with a mathematical function (Weibull function) would make it easier for use 
by the water companies, since the failure function can be described using a single variable 
(i.e., time). 
3.3. Failure Function Development 
The failure function predicts the probability of failure of a pipeline over a period of 
time (i.e., with age). The cumulative probability distribution function (CDF) is often used 
to define the failure probability over time.  
The development of the failure function starts with identification of failure modes 
for a given class of pipeline under an operating environment. Three separate groups of 
factors leading to asset failure are identified as intrinsic factors, operational factors and 
operating environment (Park et al., 2015). The intrinsic factors include the pipe structural 
properties, material type, pipe-soil interaction, and the quality of installation. The 
operational factors include operating pressure (internal load) as well as the maintenance 
program undertaken by the municipalities. The operating environment includes 
temperature, corrosivity, and burial depth. However, it is very difficult to obtain data of 
these factors and establish relationships to calculate the reliability of the pipes using the 
factors. Under this situation, a deterministic approach for mechanical failure assessment in 
combination with a probabilistic method can be used for reliability assessment, which 
could be updated when information will be available. In this regard, selection of the 
significant factors leading to pipe failure and identification of the failure modes are 
required for the determination of the failure function. For metal pipes, corrosion is 
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considered as the most significant factor contributing to pipe failure. The corrosion can be 
due to steady and continuous deterioration mechanism of pipe material that may be 
triggered by the corrosive operating environment. Pipe wall thickness loss due to corrosion 
may lead to different modes of pipe failure. 
Tee and Khan (2013) investigated corrosion-induced failure modes for flexible non-
pressure metal pipes that included excessive deflection, buckling, wall thrust and bending 
stress. They revealed that failure due to wall stress from the thrust and/or bending is the 
most dominating failure mode. The pipe stress is considered as the major design criteria 
for water mains (AWWA 2014). AWWA (2014) recommend assessing the pipe wall 
stresses due to the internal pressure and external load. The stress due to the internal pressure 
can be expressed as (AWWA 2014): 
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Where: 
Pop: Internal pressure, 
0: Wall stress due to internal pressure Pop, 
D:  Pipe diameter, and 
tw: Pipe wall thickness. 
The stress due to external load (i.e., earth load and vehicle load) is calculated in terms 
of ring bending stress, b. The AWWA (2014) recommend calculating the ring bending 
stress as: 
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Where: 
b: Wall stress due to bending, 
Df: Shape factor, 
DL: Deflection lag factor, 
Wc: Vertical soil load on pipe, calculated as c sW H= , 
s: Unit weight of soil overburden, 
H: Burial depth to top of pipe, 
WL: Live load on pipe, calculated as 
1 2
p f
L
M PI
W
L L
= , 
Mp: Multiple presence factor, 
P: Wheel load, 
If: Impact factor, 
L1, L2: Load width parallel and perpendicular to direction of travel, 
Kx: Bedding coefficient, 
Ep: Young modulus of pipe material, 
Ip: Moment of inertia of unit length of pipe, 
Ms: Soil constrained modulus, 
r: Radius of pipe, 
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The combined stress is thus calculated as: 
0c b  = +  (3.6)   
The pipe wall stress calculated using Eq.3.6 provides the maximum circumferential 
stress, which would lead to longitudinal cracking on the wall.  However, ring fracture is 
the most common mode of failure generally observed for water mains, particularly for 
small diameter pipes. It is sometimes assumed that the ring fracture for a small diameter 
pipe is due to longitudinal bending stress resulting from low moment of inertia of the pipe 
cross-section. The assumption, however, is not proven. On the other hand, analysis of small 
diameter pipe with lack of bedding support using finite element analysis indicated higher 
circumferential stress than the longitudinal stress (Balkaya et al., 2011). Understanding the 
mechanism of the ring fracture in buried pipe is a subject of further research with the 
mechanics of soil-pipe interaction. The failure modes recommended in the design code 
(i.e., AWWA 2014) is considered here for the development of failure function. 
The equations for pipe wall stresses in the design code (e.g. Eq.3.4 and Eq.3.5) are 
based on uniform thickness of the pipe wall. A uniform corrosion depth over the entire 
length and the circumference of the pipe is therefore assumed for the failure probability 
assessment of water mains using the equation for wall stresses (Sadiq et al., 2004, Tee et 
al., 2013). The remaining thickness of the wall, calculated as the difference between the 
pipe wall thickness and the corrosion depth, is used in the calculation of pipe wall stress. 
However, corrosion generally causes thickness reduction within localized (corroded) areas, 
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resulting in the non-uniform wall thickness. The effect of localized wall thickness reduction 
on the failure probability assessment is considered here as discussed below. 
ASME (2012) expresses the remaining strength of corroded pipe with localized 
corroded area in terms of burst pressure, as: 
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Where:   
P0: Burst pressure of intact pipe, 
tw: Wall thickness, 
d: Corrosion depth, 
l: Corrosion length, 
M:  Folias factor, which is given by 
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The burst pressure apparently accounts for the pipe wall stress due to the internal 
pressure. With Eq.3.4, Eq.3.7 can be rearranged to calculate the time-dependent pipe wall 
stress due to internal pressure, as: 
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Where: 
0 ( )t : Wall stress in corroded pipe at time ‘t’ due to internal pressure Pop (MPa), 
t:  Time (year), 
d(t): Depth of corrosion at time t,  
M(t): The Folias factor at time t 
tw0: Wall thickness before corrosion, at time t=0. 
The time-dependent bending stress can be expresses, as: 
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tw(t): Remaining wall thickness at time t, calculate as 0( ) ( )w wt t t d t= −  
The time-dependent corrosion depth d(t) can be estimated from the corrosion rate, 
as: 
( ) ( ) rd t d t t C t= −  +   (3.10)
  
Where: 
Cr: Corrosion rate (mm/year). 
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Total stress, ( )c t , calculated using Eq.3.6 is then compared with the maximum 
allowable stress of the material (generally the yield stress of the material) to define the limit 
state function as shown below: 
( ) ( )y cz t t = −  (3.11)
 
Where: 
y : The maximum allowable stress or yield stress, 
 
z(t): Failure function. A pipe is considered to have failed when ( ) 0z t  . 
Monte Carlo simulation is employed considering the failure modes defined in 
Eq.3.11 to develop the failure function for each pipe component in the system. The random 
variables in MC simulation are the maximum allowable stress, corrosion depth, corrosion 
rate, corrosion length and pipe operating pressure. The depth of corrosion is a time-
dependent variable and is used for calculating the pipe failure probability with time. 
Fig.3.1 presents the flow chart used for the MC simulation process. In this algorithm, 
time ‘t’ is expressed in year that increases from 1 to a given time T. The number of trials 
within a particular year (time or age) is denoted as N. In each trial, random variables of 
pipe sizes, material capacity, corrosion sizes are generated. Failure can occur if the depth 
of corrosion is over 80% of the wall thickness as required in AWWA M45 (2014) for leak 
control condition. If the depth of corrosion is less than 80% of the wall thickness, then the 
combined stress is calculated, and the magnitude of failure function is checked (i.e. 
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Eq.3.11).  A failure is recorded if the failure function is negative. The probability of failure 
at that time t is determined by counting the number of failures in N simulation (Eq.3.12). 
( )
( )
failureN t
P t
N
=  (3.12) 
Where, P(t) is the failure probability of a pipe component at time “t”, Nfailure(t) is the 
number of failure (i.e. number of trials with z(t)<0) at time ‘t’ counted within N trials.  
The CDF of failure probability of pipeline from the MC simulation (CDF-MC) is 
thus obtained against the time (i.e., pipe age). A three-parameter Weibull model (Eq.3.1) 
is then fitted with the data from CDF-MC using Least Square Error (LSE) method.  
The failure probability of the overall system can then be calculated from the 
component failure probabilities as a combinatorial problem. The difficulties of defining 
system failure probability or reliability for real water main network is however well-
recognized due to the complexity of the problem. A balance is therefore sought for the 
reliability that is practical to compute with the one that is expected (Wagner et al. 1988). 
In this regard, the system configuration must be examined individually to determine how 
the component failures can lead to the failure of the system. Several techniques including 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), minimal cut sets, and conditional probability approach can be 
used to examine the pipeline network. FTA is one of the methods extensively used for 
analyzing complex system including water main network (Wagner et al. 1988, Tung 1985). 
A complex network can be simplified using network reduction method (Quimpo and 
Shamsi, 1991) and analyzed using the FTA or other methods. Tung (1985) examined the 
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method of FTA along with other techniques for evaluating reliability of a simple looped 
water distribution system with independent system components. All of the methods were 
found to provide practically same system reliability. Tung (1985) however indicated that 
the FTA is not widely used for topological type of system. The present research focuses on 
the structural reliability assessment for pipeline inspection and maintenance and does not 
involve any topological assessment of the water main network. FTA is therefore considered 
suitable for the system reliability assessment presented here. 
 
Figure 3.1. Flow chart for conducting Monte -Carlo simulations 
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3.4. Estimation of Risk 
Risk is a measure of the probability and for the consequence of undesired events to 
represent human, environmental or economic values. It is commonly expressed as the 
probability of occurrence times the consequences. 
In a system, the risk could be for each component, and for the overall system. The 
system risk can be calculated as the sum of the component risks when the system 
components behave independently. Due to the complexity with dependent system 
components, it is a common practice to idealize the components in water main networks to 
be statistically independent (Tung, 1985; Wagner et al, 1988; Quimpo and Shamsi, 1991). 
Independent water main components are also assumed in the current study for the system 
reliability and risk assessment. In real water main network, reliability and risk of pipeline 
components may be somewhat dependent on each other as the failure of one component 
may increase the loads to the others. However, the method based on the assumption of 
independent system components provides a practical basis for identification of critical pipe 
components for inspection and maintenance considering reliability and risk. In this regard, 
different reliability and risk acceptability criteria could be used for the system to 
compensate the error to some extent. 
If the failure probability of the ith component is Fi(t) within time ‘t’ and its 
consequences is denoted as Ci(t), the risk of the ith component can be calculated as 
(Eq.3.13): 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐹𝑖(𝑡) × 𝐶𝑖(𝑡)  (3.13) 
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The system risk, Risksys(t), can be defined as the sum of the component risks 
(Eq.3.14): 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑦𝑠(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖(𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1   (3.14)  
The consequence of failure is quantified by analyzing the economic loss of failures. 
The total consequence could comprise direct consequence (i.e., cost for replacing or 
repairing of a component) and/or indirect consequence (i.e., environmental and/or health 
loss). However, the quantification of actual consequence of water main failure is very 
difficult, if not impossible. 
Despite the challenges, the risk-based approach is gaining momentum in recent years 
for prioritization of water mains for inspection and maintenance. In this approach, a 
normalized cost is used to account for the consequence of failure. The normalized 
consequence method evaluates the relativity of each consequence with others, rather than 
quantifying any monetary value of the consequence. Park et al. (2010) employed rankings 
of the likelihood and the consequence of failure to develop a risk matrix for classifying 
potable water infrastructure into five priority groups. The likelihood of failure and the 
consequence for each asset were assigned a score ranging from 1 to 5. The assignment of 
the scores as well as the classification of infrastructure into the priority group requires 
subjective judgement. A similar approach is used in Baah et al (2015) for sanitary sewer 
pipe asset where more detailed impact factors were employed for the consequence (instead 
of using scores from 1 to 5). They provided up to 11 impact factors for different 
conditions/groups (Table 3.1).  Each impact factor has a corresponding weight factor 
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depending on its importance. Pipeline impact scores are then summed up, after multiplying 
the impact factor by corresponding weight factor, to obtain a score of consequence 
(Eq.3.15). 
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Where: 
Cofi: Consequence of failure (Cof) of pipe component ‘i’, 
Sij:  Impact score of pipe component ‘i’ with impact factor ‘j’, 
wj:  Weight of impact factor ‘j’, 
m: Number of impact factor counted for consequence. 
The Cof was then used to classify the failure consequence into five impact ratings that 
were used to develop a risk matrix (Baah et al., 2015). The risk matrix finally results in the 
subjective risk classification of a component or group of pipes (i.e. low risk, moderate risk, 
high risk etc.)  
It is difficult, however, to implement the subjective risk classes for the risk 
assessment of multi-component systems. To this end, a risk assessment method is proposed 
here, as an alternative to the commonly used risk matrix approach. The normalized 
consequence method is applied for calculation of the risk. The impact factors in Table 3.1 
(Baah et al., 2015) are assumed to be applicable for the failure consequence of water mains 
presented here.  
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The system risk is then calculated from the component failure probability and the 
consequences failure (Eq.3.16): 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑦𝑠(𝑡) = ∑ 𝐹𝑖(𝑡) × 𝐶𝑜𝑓𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  (3.16) 
Table 3.1. Consequence of failure (After Baah et al, 2015) 
No. Impact factor Sub-criteria 
Performance 
value 
Weight 
factor 
1 Road way type Road Classes 1 - 3 0.2 
2 Intersecting a railway track Yes/No 3/0 0.2 
3 Pipe size Diameter  300mm  
300mm < Diameter  600mm  
600mm < Diameter  900mm 
 900mm < Diameter 
1 
1.5 
2.25 
3 
0.16 
4 Pipe burial depth Depth  3m  
3m < Depth  10m  
10m < Depth 
1 
1.5 
3 
0.16 
5 Located downtown Yes/No 3/0 0.2 
6 Proximity to hospital Pipe distance  120m  
120m < Pipe distance 
3 
0 
0.2 
7 Proximity to school Pipe distance  200m  
200m < Pipe distance 
3 
0 
0.2 
8 Distance to building Distance  5m  
5m < Distance  10m 
10 < Distance 
3 
1.5 
0 
 
0.2 
9 Proximity to park  
or recreation areas 
Pipe distance  20m  
20m < Pipe distance 
3 
0 
0.16 
10 Proximity to bad  
storm water pipe 
Distance  10m  
10m < Distance 
3 
0 
0.2 
11 Proximity to river Pipe distance  15m  
15m < Pipe distance 
3 
0 
0.2 
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3.5. Procedure for Maintenance Decision 
Fig.3.2 presents a flow chart for the procedure proposed for decision making 
considering risk and reliability. At a given time, failure probability and risk are calculated 
for each pipe component and the system based on the component failure functions (Weibull 
functions discussed earlier) and the consequences. These are then compared with the 
corresponding threshold values. Assuming that the components were constructed at 
different times and have different location parameters, component failure probabilities are 
different in each calculation step.  
Whenever a system threshold (risk or reliability thresholds) is violated, an 
investigation is carried out to find out the component(s) (e.g., component(s) “j”), which 
has the most significant effect on the system reliability and risk. To identify a component 
influencing the system most significantly, the age of the component is first set such as to 
provide 100% reliability, while the other components are at their actual age. The reliability 
and risk are then calculated for the system. The procedure is continued for all the 
components. Subsequently, the components are ranked according to the calculated 
reliability and risk values. The component resulting in lowest system risk and highest 
system reliability corresponds to the one that has most significant influence on the system 
at that time. 
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Figure 3.2. Flow charts for reliability and risk-based method approach for decision 
making 
After ranking of the components, system reliability and associated risk are examined 
with consideration for repair/replacement of the component(s). Repair/replacement 
sequence is chosen from the most significantly influencing component, with subsequent 
addition of the next component according to the rank until the reliability and the risk criteria 
are met. The maintenance time and the identification of the “component(s) j” are then 
recorded and the location parameters for the components are set as discussed earlier. 
The above steps are repeated to determine the life cycle maintenance plan for the 
pipeline network. The pipeline can be first inspected based on the maintenance plan and if 
it is necessary, the component is repaired. After each inspection and maintenance work, 
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the location parameter for the component is adjusted according to the condition of the pipe 
for the determination of next maintenance plan.  
3.6. Modelling of Pipeline System  
FTA method is proposed here for modelling the water main network. The method is 
useful for developing quantitative means to model the interaction between the events. 
Lindhe (2008) proposed an FTA method for probabilistic risk assessment of an entire 
drinking water system. In this method, the water supply failure (top event) is broken down 
into three subsystems namely raw water failure, treatment failure and distribution failure. 
An FTA is then constructed to model the system failure based on occurrence and non-
occurrence of the subsystem failure using logic gates.  
FTA is a top-down analysis process, which focuses on the development of the 
relationship between top event (i.e. system failure) and a series of lower-level events (basic 
events causing the system failure). The relationship of top and the basic events is 
constructed through the logical connection between them. Thus, logical branches from the 
top event to the basic events are deductively developed. For application of the method in a 
pipeline network system, the top event (i.e. the system failure) can be defined as a 
connectivity failure to a node i.e. connectivity to the nodes with specific consumers is lost. 
The failure of each pipe component in the network can be considered as a basic event. The 
OR-gate and AND-gate are two most commonly used logical gates in FTA to relate a 
higher-level event to lower-level events. The OR-gate is used if the higher-level event is 
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caused when any one of the several lower-level events occurs. The AND-gate is used when 
all the lower-events must occur simultaneously to cause a higher-level event. 
For illustration purposes, a simple water main network consisting of seven pipe 
components is considered based on a small community water distribution system 
mentioned in Hickey (2008). The system is schematically shown in Fig.3.3. Water is 
supplied from the source to nodes A, B, C, and D through a network of pipelines. The 
pipelines of the system are assumed as independent. A fault tree illustrating the system 
failure is shown in Fig.3.4. The system failure is defined when the connectivity is lost to 
any of the nodes (A or B or C or D). Thus, any one of four events (i.e. connectivity loss to 
any of the nodes) would result in the system failure. Each of the events on the other hand 
is related to the failure of any of the pipeline components linked to the nodes.  For example, 
connectivity to node A will be lost for failure of any of the components 1, 2 and 4 (Fig.3.3). 
The OR-gate is used to model this situation.  
 
Figure 3.3. Schematic of a simple water pipeline system 
Based on the system definition from FTA (Fig.3.4), the system failure probability 
can be defined as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )sys A B C DF t F t F t F t F t= − −  −  −  −    (3.17) 
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Where:  
Fsys(t) is the failure probability of the system at time t,  
FA(t), FB(t), FC(t) and FD(t) are the failure probabilities of the events of connectivity 
loss to nodes A, B, C, and D, respectively, at time ‘t’. 
 
Figure 3.4. Fault tree analysis for system reliability 
The failure probability of the events can be obtained from the failure probability of 
the related pipe components as shown below. 
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( ) 1 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
( ) 1 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
( ) 1 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
( ) 1 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
A
B
C
D
F t F t F t F t
F t F t F t F t
F t F t F t F t
F t F t F t F t
= − −  −  −  
= − −  −  −  
= − −  −  −  
= − −  −  −  
 (3.18) 
Where: Fi(t) is the failure probability of the i
th component at time t. 
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The method presented for the simple network (above) can be extended for more 
complex water distribution system through application of FTA and/or graph theory (i.e., 
Tung, 1985; Shinstine et al., 2002) as discussed in subsequent chapters. 
3.7. Numerical Example 
3.7.1. Calculations of Reliability and Risk 
To illustrate a system analysis for pipeline maintenance prioritization, a numerical 
example is carried out in this section. A pipeline network consisting of the seven pipe 
components (Fig.3.3) is considered. Parameters for the MC simulation are assumed based 
on the typical values available in the literature. The deterministic parameters in the analysis 
are: Ep = 200 GPa, Ms = 19.3 MPa, Kx = 0.1, Mp = 1.2 and Dl= 1 (after AWWA, 2014). 
Pipes 1, 2, 3 are assumed to have 200 mm of diameter. All other pipes (pipe 4, 5, 6, 7) are 
assumed to have 150 mm of diameter. Table 3.2 provides the random input variables that 
include maximum allowable stress (yield stress) of pipe material (y), wall thickness (t), 
operating pressure (Pop), length of corrosion defect (Lo) and corrosion depth rate (Cr). In 
Table 3.2, the mean values are taken as the typical values for the variables and the 
coefficient of variance (COV) are arbitrarily chosen since the specific information on the 
variables is not available. The mean corrosion rate is varied from 0.14 mm/year to 0.25 
mm/year based on the information in Mohebbi and Li (2011) and Sridhar et al. (2001). The 
mean corrosion length is assumed to vary from 80 mm to 200 mm, estimated based on the 
information in Gajdoš and Šperl (2012) and Kleiner et al. (2012).  A sensitivity analysis 
with these parameters was conducted and the sensitivity was found to be time-dependent 
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which is  due to the use of a corrosion rate. In general, strength of the pipe material 
contributes most significantly followed by the wall thickness, loads and corrosion size.  
Table 3.2. Input variables for Monte Carlo simulation 
Input variable 
Type of  
distribution 
  Pipe component Nos. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Yield stress  
(MPa) 
Normal 
Mean 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
COV 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Thickness  
(mm) 
Normal 
Mean 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
COV 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Internal pressure 
(MPa) 
Normal 
Mean 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
COV 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Corrosion length 
(mm) 
Normal 
Mean 150 100 120 180 150 80 200 
COV 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.35 0.2 0.5 0.15 
Corrosion rate 
(mm/year) 
Lognormal 
Mean 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.2 0.14 0.19 
COV 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.2 
Burial depth  
(m) 
Normal 
Mean 2.5 2 2.5 2 2.5 2 2.5 
COV 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Unit weight of soil 
(kN/m3) 
Normal 
Mean 18.8 18.8 18.8 18.8 18.8 18.8 18.8 
COV 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Wheel load  
(kN) 
Normal 
Mean 71.3 71.3 71.3 71.3 71.3 71.3 71.3 
COV 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
Data from the MC simulation are then fitted with Weibull model, as discussed earlier. 
The resulting Weibull parameters and the coefficient of determination are included in Table 
3.3. The location parameters (i), representing the initial ages of components, are arbitrarily 
chosen for the example. Fig.3.5 compares the failure probability from MC simulation and 
the corresponding Weibull function. Comparisons over the full range of failure 
probabilities are shown in Fig.3.5 for overall demonstration, although the maintenance 
thresholds are set to low failure probability values. It is to be noted that over the lower 
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failure probability range (up to around 20%), the Weibull functions calculate higher failure 
probability with respect to MC simulation and thus provide conservative estimations.  
 
Figure 3.5. Failure probability of pipe components with Weibull functions 
Table 3.3. Weibull parameters 
Pipe component  
No. (i) 
Parameter Coefficient of 
determination, 
R2  
Scale 
i 
Shape 
i 
Location 
i 
1 44.252 4.690 -5 0.9994 
2 72.125 6.027 -20 0.9995 
3 58.173 7.007 -23 0.9996 
4 70.188 3.914 -24 0.9991 
5 57.249 2.919 -12 0.9984 
6 79.587 4.998 -25 0.9978 
7 58.748 4.081 -8 0.9992 
 
Normalized consequences of the pipe components are estimated based on the impact 
factors in Baah et al. (2015) for calculation of risk. Table 3.4 shows the impact factors and 
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the weight factors chosen for each component and the resulting consequence calculated 
using Eq.3.15.  
Table 3.4. Failure consequence estimation using Table 3.1 
# Impact factor 
Weight 
factor 
Component scores 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Road way type 0.2 2.4 2.4 1 1 1 1 1 
2 Intersecting a railway track 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 Pipe size 0.16 2.25 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 1 
4 Pipe burial depth 0.16 3 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 1.5 
5 Located downtown 0.2 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
6 Proximity to hospital 0.2 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 
7 Proximity to school 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 Distance to building 0.2 1.5 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 3 
9 Proximity to river 0.2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 
Proximity to park or  
recreation areas 
0.16 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 
11 
Proximity to bad storm  
water pipe 
0.2 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 
 Normalized Consequence   2.82 1.56 1.28 1.3 2.5 1.9 2.28 
 
3.7.2. Decision Making for Maintenance  
Decision making using reliability and/or risk-based method requires selection of 
thresholds. Alternatively, the risk minimization approach can be applied through analysis 
of risks for different selected inspection/repair intervals. The second approach is applicable 
for preventive maintenance policy where a unit is maintained at fixed time intervals. Cheng 
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and Pandey (2012), however, demonstrated multiple local minimums in the expected cost 
rate plotted against inspection intervals. The multiple local minimums are due to the fact 
that the selected interval may miss any maintenance requirement within the interval. On 
the other hand, the fixed time interval approach is applicable for a single component 
system. It is difficult to select one maintenance interval for a multi-component system. 
Therefore, use of reliability and risk thresholds is considered suitable for the maintenance 
of pipeline network. However, the selection of the thresholds is a major challenge for 
application of this method. To this end, a relationship between the risk and reliability can 
be established for the system through calculation of failure probabilities and the 
corresponding risks. Fig.3.6 shows a nonlinear relationship between the risk and failure 
probability developed for the system considered in this example. It is to note that the 
relationship of risk and failure probability of a pipe is usually linear when the consequence 
is constant. However, the system risk presented here is the summation of risks of 
components and the system failure probability is obtained from a nonlinear function of 
failure probability of components in Eq.3.17. This explains the nonlinear relationship 
obtained in Fig.3.6.  
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Figure 3.6. Relationship between system failure probability and system risk 
without maintenance 
The risk thresholds can be chosen from the relation that corresponds to a desired 
failure probability or reliability. The acceptable failure probability (i.e., the failure 
probability threshold) may vary from system to system depending on the system type. A 
failure probability threshold of 5% (reliability threshold of 95%) is often interpreted as 
“high” potential of occurrence for a system (Ebeling, 2010). The risk corresponding to this 
failure probability threshold of 5% is around 84.910-3 in Fig.3.6. 
An analysis of failure probability (reliability) based maintenance program with a 
failure probability threshold of 5% for the system (Fig.3.3) is presented in Fig.3.7. Fig.3.7 
presents the calculated results of failure probability with age for the components and the 
system. The failure probability of the system is always higher than that of the components. 
Thus, the system failure probability appears to control the maintenance program for this 
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case. The component failure probabilities are consistently below the threshold (i.e. 5%) in 
Fig.3.7. 
 
Figure 3.7. Failure probability in reliability-based method (failure probability 
threshold is 0.05) 
When the system threshold is reached or exceeded, a repair/maintenance is assumed 
for this component and a new location parameter is assigned to the component (as 
discussed earlier). A location parameter corresponding to 0% failure probability is used 
after each repair/maintenance identification for the examples presented here. This is 
indicated by the drops in the failure functions in Fig.3.7. Every drop for each component 
corresponds to a maintenance that also results in a drop to the system failure probability. 
The maintenance schedule and the number of maintenance requirements for the 
components can thus be obtained from Fig.3.7 using the elapsed time and the number of 
drops, respectively. For example, component 1 has 3 drops, shown in Fig.3.7, at the time 
(age) of year 12, 28 and 44, respectively. A total of three maintenance actions are therefore 
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expected for the component at the ages of year 12, 28 and 44, respectively, within the 
lifetime of 50 years. This lifetime maintenance schedule is developed based on the 
assumption that each maintenance work would bring the pipe component to the state of 0% 
failure probability (the location parameter selected to provide 0% failure probability). 
However, a different location parameter can be selected when the actual condition of the 
pipe after each inspection/maintenance work is known. The estimated maintenance 
schedule for the pipeline components for this system is summarized in Table 3.5, including 
the year to repair/maintain and the components to be repaired/ maintained. A total of 15 
maintenance counts are estimated over the period of 50 year for the system considered in 
this example. The risk for the system to be maintained using the reliability-based approach 
is also calculated as plotted in Fig.3.8. The maximum risk of the system is calculated to be 
101.610-3 at year 23. This risk magnitude is higher than the risk corresponding to the 5% 
failure probability in Fig.3.6 (i.e., 84.910-3). The difference is attributed to the differences 
in the components that contribute to the system reliability. For example, at year 23 
(Fig.3.8), component 5 contributes the most to the system reliability. The component 
(component 5) has a high consequence of failure (i.e., 2.5 in Table 3.4). A different 
component might contribute to the system reliability presented in Fig.3.6. Fig.3.6 thus 
provides only a guideline on the relationship between the system risk and system reliability 
when no maintenance is performed. The risk-reliability relationship could be somewhat 
different as the maintenance is performed throughout the lifetime of the system.  
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Figure 3.8. Risk in reliability-based method (failure probability threshold of 0.05) 
Table 3.5. Maintenance schedule based on reliability-based method 
Maintenance 
counts 
Year to 
maintain 
Component to 
maintain 
1 3 4 
2 5 5 
3 8 6 
4 9 3 
5 11 7 
6 12 1 
7 17 2 
8 23 5 
9 27 4 
10 28 1 
11 35 7 
12 38 5 
13 40 3 
14 43 6 
15 44 1 
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A risk-based maintenance planning (prioritization) is also investigated for the 
pipeline network. A risk threshold of 101.6x10-3 is chosen based on the maximum risk 
calculated in the failure probability-based approach discussed above. The calculated risk 
and a summary of the maintenance program with the risk-based method is shown in Fig.3.9 
and Table 3.6, respectively.  The total number of maintenance requirement using risk-based 
method is 14, which is less than the maintenance requirement in the reliability-based 
method discussed above. 
 
Figure 3.9. System risk and component risks with a risk threshold of 101.610-3 
The failure probability of the pipeline system and components corresponding to the 
risk-based maintenance is plotted in Fig.3.10. The maximum failure probability is 
calculated to be 9.9% (Fig.3.10), which is higher than the failure probability threshold 
assumed for the reliability-based maintenance program discussed above. This explains why 
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the number of maintenance requirements is found to be less (i.e., 14). A lower risk 
threshold could be chosen to develop a maintenance program for higher system reliability. 
Table 3.6. Maintenance schedule based on risk-based method 
Maintenance 
counts 
Year to 
maintain 
Component to 
maintain 
1 4 4 
2 5 5 
3 10 3 
4 12 6 
5 14 7 
6 15 1 
7 20 2 
8 23 5 
9 32 4 
10 33 1 
11 36 7 
12 40 5 
13 46 3 
14 49 6 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Failure probability with a risk threshold of 101.610-3 
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3.8. Conclusion 
A method for prioritizing water mains for maintenance considering failure 
probability and risk of pipeline system is developed here. The method can be used for 
municipalities with no available data for pipe failure probability assessment while the 
model could be updated when data would be available. In the proposed method, pipe failure 
probability is calculated based on a stochastic degradation analysis using MC simulation. 
The data from MC simulation is used to develop a simple Weibull function to model the 
failure probability. A method is proposed for expert opinions on the pipe conditions after 
an inspection and/or maintenance (repair/replacement) work without any requirement for 
data mining exercise. The model would thus be useful for existing and repaired/renewed 
pipe components. A risk assessment method is proposed, as an alternative to the commonly 
used risk matrix method, for calculation of risk for multi-component pipeline systems. The 
system failure of the pipeline network is defined using FTA. 
Thresholds for the reliability and risk are found to govern the decision process in the 
reliability and risk-based approaches. In this regard, a careful determination of the 
thresholds is required to optimize the decision process considering both the reliability and 
the risk. To this end, a relation can be developed between the risk and the reliability for a 
system defined using FTA. The thresholds can rationally be chosen based on this relation.  
The proposed method has been demonstrated through application to a simple water 
distribution network consisting of seven pipe components. Water main prioritization 
methods for more complex networks are presented in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPMENT OF A MECHANICS-BASED FAILURE 
ASSESSMENT MODEL3 
4.1. Introduction 
 Water mains are important infrastructure that transport water for both industrial and 
household purposes. While metal pipes are popularly used with up to 56% of length of 
water mains made of cast iron and ductile iron, corrosion is reported as the major cause of 
water mains breaks of these pipes (Folkman, 2018). Additionally, the cast iron pipes, which 
was popularly used prior to 1970s, are in the end of their life cycle (i.e. 50 years, Folkman, 
2018) indicating the need of replacing these pipes. Since pipeline deterioration is an 
inevitable process, it is desirable to optimize utilization of the structure through proper 
understanding of the remaining strength. In Chapter 3,5 and 6 of the thesis, the frameworks 
for risk and reliability assessment considering mechanical failure of the corroded pipes are 
presented. However, mechanical model for failure assessment of corroded water mains are 
not well developed. AWWA (2014) design code recommends evaluation of pipe wall 
strains due to internal pressure and bending, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and 
3. Pipe wall stress due to internal pressure is particularly responsible catastrophic failure 
such as bursting.  
                                                          
3 This chapter is based on the published work in a peer-reviewed journal: Hieu Chi Phan, Ashutosh Sutra 
Dhar and Bipul Chandra Mondal (2016), “Revisiting burst pressure models for corroded pipelines”, Canadian 
Journal of Civil Engineering, 44(7), pp.485-494. (https://doi.org/10.1139/cjce-2016-0519). The work was 
carried out, and the paper was drafted by the first author. The work was supervised, and the paper was 
reviewed by Dr. Ashutosh Sutra Dhar. Dr Bipul Chandra Mondal provided data from finite element 
modelling of energy pipelines. 
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Nevertheless, failure stress calculation method for corroded water main is currently 
not available. In the analysis presented in Chapter 3, a burst pressure model for energy 
pipelines is used to calculate the stress. This chapter focuses on developing a burst pressure 
model for cast iron water main. A number of predictive models for the burst pressure have 
been developed over the last 50 years, both for the intact (parent) pipes and the deteriorating 
energy pipes. However, no single model was found to be widely acceptable due to the 
limitations in predicting the burst pressures correctly (Zhu and Leis, 2012). Different 
models developed for burst pressure prediction of corroded pipes are described in the 
literature (i.e., Cosham and Hopkins 2004) and therefore not repeated here.  
The models were commonly developed based on simplified analytical results and/or 
on empirical fits to limited experimental data. Hasan et al. (2011) demonstrated through a 
probabilistic assessment of the remaining strength of corroded pipes that different burst 
pressure models provide significantly different failure strengths even with the same defect 
sizes for particular pipes. An evaluation of several design models using finite element (FE) 
analysis and laboratory burst tests also provided both underestimation and overestimation 
of the burst pressures for corroded pipes (Chen et al., 2015, Swankie et al., 2012).  For 
example, in 80 full-scale burst tests for pipes with diameters ranging from 88.9 mm to 
168.3 mm, Swankie et al. (2012) found the modified ASME B31G method to provide 
overestimation of the burst pressure for 35% of the pipes and underestimation for 50% of 
the pipes tested. The model error in several existing models was found to affect the burst 
probability assessment by several order of magnitudes (Zhou and Zhang 2015). An 
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improved burst pressure model is therefore desired for accurate failure assessment of the 
pipelines. 
Several experimental burst test results are available in the literature, which were used 
to develop or verify burst pressure models for corroded pipes (e.g., Coronin 2000, Swankie 
et al. 2012 and Zhou and Huang 2012). The burst tests for full-scale pipes are, however, 
very expensive and therefore avoided. Furthermore, the results from the burst tests could 
be affected by manufacturing defects in the test samples. The pipe samples could have non-
homogeneous material properties and/or non-uniform wall thicknesses that could vary 
from sample to sample. As a result, the burst pressures of similar pipe samples may be 
different when tested independently. To this end, Finite Element (FE) analysis could be 
used to develop a database with known dimensions of the pipes, the corrosion defects, and 
the pipe material properties for the development of a burst pressure model.  
FE analysis was used widely for the evaluation of the existing burst pressure models 
for pressure pipes (Chen et al., 2015, Swankie et al., 2012).  Netto et al. (2005) employed 
FE analysis to develop a simplified equation for the burst pressure of corroded pipeline. 
They calculated the burst pressures for a 406.4 mm diameter pipe with various dimensions 
of the corrosion defects. A dimensional analysis was then performed with the FE results to 
develop the model. Wang and Zarghamee (2013) also used dimensional analysis and 
developed simplified burst pressure models for a wider range of pipe sizes, where the basic 
variables in the model are the same as those in Netto et al. (2005). However, two different 
equations were developed in Wang and Zarghamee (2013) for two ranges of pipe diameters 
(i.e., < 610 mm and ≥ 610 mm). The structure of the models developed from the 
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dimensional analysis (Netto et al. 2005, Wang and Zarghamee 2013) is different from the 
structures of the equations in the existing pipe design codes (e.g. ASME B31G 2012, CSA 
Z662 2015 and DNV RP-F101 2012) and the one yielded from a theoretical study (Gajdoš 
and Šperl, 2012). Wang and Zarghamee (2013) and Netto et al (2005) considered a 
particular type of steel pipe for the development of the burst pressure model. The 
applicability of the model for pipes made of steel with different grades was not 
investigated. Ma et al. (2013) revealed that the error in the burst pressure predictions using 
different models depend on the strength grade of the steel. The error was found to be the 
lowest for high-strength grade steel and highest for low-strength grade steel (Ma et al. 
2013).  
In this chapter, the structures of three existing models are employed to revisit the 
burst pressure models for corroded pipes considering a wide range of pipe sizes and 
material strength grade. Model for high strength steel and cast iron are developed 
separately to revise/develop the burst pressure models for corresponding type of materials. 
A series of FE analyses are conducted to develop a database for the burst pressures of 
corroded pipes with known pipe geometries and material parameters. The FE database is 
then used to determine different coefficients and exponents of the models (model 
constants). An optimization algorithm based on differential evolution (DE) method is 
developed to determine the model constants through error minimization. For high strength 
steel, pipes with diameters ranging from 324 mm (12.8 in.) to 914 mm (36 in.) are 
considered with the corrosion patches varying in lengths from 150 mm (6 in.) to 528 mm 
(20.8 in.) and depths from 20% to 70% of the wall thicknesses. For cast iron, pipe diameters 
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ranging from 127mm (5.0 in.) to 441mm (17.36 in.) with depth of defects varies from 
0.25% to 90% of the wall thickness are considered. 
4.2. Finite Element Analysis (FEA) 
FE analysis is an effective tool for modelling complex mechanical problems 
including complex geometries and non-linear stress-strain behavior. A general-purpose FE 
code, ABAQUS 6.14 (Dassault Systemes 2014), is used in this study to calculate the burst 
pressure of corroded pipes. ABAQUS is one of the commonly used software that can be 
used to model the non-linear deformation during yielding of corroded pipelines under high 
pressures. ABAQUS/Explicit is used due to its capability of modelling highly non-linear 
problem effectively (Martin et al. 2007). 
In the FE analysis, the corrosion on the pipe wall is modeled through the reduction 
of wall thickness over a rectangular patch. The length of the rectangle is in the longitudinal 
direction of the pipe, which is varied. A constant width is used for the patch. Earlier 
research has revealed that the width of the corrosion patch does not have a significant effect 
on the burst pressure of corroded pipes (Mondal and Dhar, 2015). The depth of corrosion 
is assumed to be uniform. Although the actual geometry of corrosion patches is very 
complex, existing literatures reveal that the failure behavior of corroded pipeline generally 
depends on the maximum depth and the longitudinal extent of the corroded area (Mondal 
and Dhar 2016a). Rectangular idealization with a uniform depth for the corrosion patch is 
therefore considered reasonable for the analysis of pipes with corrosion defects. For the 
sides of the rectangles, Mondal and Dhar (2016 a, b) investigated pipes subjected to wall 
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corrosions with both sharp and smooth edges (Fig.4.1).  An ellipse with a ratio of the major 
to minor axis of 2 was fitted to produce the smooth edge. Calculated burst pressures with 
the two different edge conditions (sharp and smooth edges) were not found to vary 
significantly (Mondal and Dhar 2016a, b). This is due to the fact that the maximum von 
Mises stress and the maximum principle plastic strain at failure are not significantly 
affected by the edge conditions. Fig.4.2 shows the von Mises stresses around the corroded 
zone at the failure pressure of a pipe. However, the model development and analysis with 
smooth edge is complicated and time consuming. Sharp edge condition is therefore 
considered for the FE analysis presented here. The pipes under the loading of internal 
pressure are analyzed to calculate the burst pressure. 
 
Figure 4.1. Edge conditions of corrosion patch, after Mondal and Dhar (2016b) 
The pipe domain in the FE analysis is modelled using the eight-node continuum 
element (ABAQUS element “C3D8R”). A mesh sensitivity analysis was performed to 
determine the optimum mesh size. Fine mesh is applied within and around the corroded 
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area where stress concentration is expected. Coarse mesh is applied where uniform stress 
is expected. FE meshing around the corroded area for a pipe is shown in Fig.4.3. Fully 
restrained boundary conditions are used at the ends of the pipes. To avoid the effect of 
boundary conditions within the corroded zone, the length of the pipes is chosen to be longer 
than the minimum length recommended in Fekete and Varge (2012). The model lengths 
are 2500 mm, 3500 mm, 4500 mm and 3000 mm for pipes with diameters of 342 mm, 508 
mm, 762 mm and 914 mm, respectively.  The lengths are greater than 3 times the diameter 
of the pipes. Details of the FE modelling approach for corroded pipes are available 
elsewhere (Mondal and Dhar 2016 a, b). 
 
Figure 4.2. Contour of von Mises stresses around a corrosion patch for sharp and 
smooth edges (at the failure pressure of 11.43 MPa) 
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Figure 4.3. Typical FE meshing around a corrosion area 
Mondal and Dhar (2016b) investigated the effects of using non-linear and bi-linear 
stress-strain relations of pipe materials on the predicted burst pressures of steel pipes. The 
burst pressures predicted using the two approaches were within 2% of each other. 
Therefore, a bi-linear stress-strain model is used in this research to avoid the additional 
computational time required for the non-linear model. Strain based criteria is used to define 
the failure in order to define the burst pressure (after Mondal and Dhar 2016b). The failure 
pressure (burst pressure) is considered as the minimum internal pressure at which the 
maximum principal plastic strain on the pipe wall reaches the failure strain of the materials. 
The failure strains of the materials are obtained as the plastic strains corresponding to the 
ultimate stress using the true stress-strain relations presented in Fekete and Varga (2012). 
Table 4.1 shows different input parameters used in the FE analysis along with the 
calculated burst pressures. Material properties of the steel are provided in Table 4.2. The 
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FE model was validated using the experimental burst pressure results of Diniz et al (2006) 
(Mondal and Dhar 2016b).  Diniz et al, (2006) measures a burst pressure of 11.30 MPa for 
a 324 mm diameter pipe using full-scale laboratory tests. A burst pressure of 11.43 MPa is 
calculated using the FE analysis for the pipe (FEM No. 1, in Table 4.1), which is within 
1.1% of the measured burst pressure. After the validation, 27 other analyses were 
performed with different pipe diameter, wall thickness and corrosion dimensions to 
produce a database.  
Table 4.1. Pipe database for FE analysis for energy pipe 
FEM 
No. 
Diameter 
D 
(mm) 
Wall 
thickness 
t  
(mm) 
Corrosion 
depth 
d 
(mm) 
Corrosion 
length 
l 
(mm) 
Yield 
strength 
 (MPa) 
Ultimate 
strength 
 (MPa) 
Plastic 
strain at 
failure 
 u 
Burst 
pressure 
P 
(MPa) 
1 324 9.74 6.818 528 4521 5421 0.041 11.430 
2 324 9.74 6.818 300 452 542 0.041 12.708 
3 324 9.74 6.818 150 452 542 0.041 16.644 
4 324 9.74 1.948 528 452 542 0.041 29.586 
5 324 9.74 3.896 528 452 542 0.041 22.440 
6 324 9.74 3.896 300 452 542 0.041 23.300 
7 324 9.74 3.896 150 452 542 0.041 25.400 
8 324 9.74 1.948 300 452 542 0.041 26.520 
9 324 9.74 0 0 452 542 0.041 35.968 
10 508 14.6 10.22 500 4141 6001 0.093 13.260 
11 508 14.6 10.22 300 414 600 0.093 16.960 
12 508 14.6 10.22 150 414 600 0.093 24.650 
13 508 14.6 0 0 414 600 0.093 35.810 
14 762 17.5 8.75 300 4652 5642 0.059 18.110 
15 762 17.5 8.75 200 465 564 0.059 20.440 
16 762 17.5 4.375 200 465 564 0.059 24.330 
17 762 17.5 12.25 528 465 542 0.059 9.990 
18 762 17.5 7 528 465 542 0.059 17.770 
19 762 17.5 3.5 528 465 542 0.059 22.950 
20 762 17.5 12.25 300 465 542 0.059 12.840 
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FEM 
No. 
Diameter 
D 
(mm) 
Wall 
thickness 
t  
(mm) 
Corrosion 
depth 
d 
(mm) 
Corrosion 
length 
l 
(mm) 
Yield 
strength 
 (MPa) 
Ultimate 
strength 
 (MPa) 
Plastic 
strain at 
failure 
 u 
Burst 
pressure 
P 
(MPa) 
21 762 17.5 7 300 465 542 0.059 19.520 
22 762 17.5 3.5 300 465 542 0.059 23.760 
23 762 17.5 12.25 150 465 542 0.059 17.600 
24 762 17.5 7 150 465 542 0.059 22.250 
25 762 17.5 3.5 150 465 542 0.059 24.660 
26 762 17.5 0 0 465 564 0.059 27.640 
27 914 25.4 10.6 300 4521 5421 0.041 25.120 
28 914 25.4 0 0 452 542 0.041 33.510 
1Diniz et al. (2006), 2Oh et al. (2007)  
1 inch = 25.4 mm, 1 MPa = 145 psi 
 
Table 4.2. Material properties of steel 
Pipe 
Size 
(mm) 
Steel 
Grade 
(API 5L/ 
CSA 
Z245.1) 
Density 
(kg/m3) 
Modulus 
of 
Elasticity 
(GPa) 
Yield 
strength 
(MPa) 
Ultimate 
strength 
(MPa) 
Poisson’s 
Ratio 
Total 
strain 
at 
failure 
324 X65/448 7850 210.0 452 542 0.3 0.043 
508 X60/414 7850 210.0 414 600 0.3 0.095 
762 X65/448 7850 210.0 465 564 0.3 0.061 
914 X65/448 7850 210.0 452 542 0.3 0.043 
1 inch = 25.4 mm, 1 MPa = 145 psi 
4.3. Burst Pressure Model Development 
The existing burst pressure models employ a reduction factor to account for the 
corrosion defects.  For the development of a burst pressure model, a mathematical model 
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is required for the reduction factor through identification of the variables influencing the 
factor. Researchers employed dimensional analysis (Buckingham’s π theorem) in the 
development of the burst pressure model using data obtained from FE analyses (e.g., Netto 
et al. 2005, Wang and Zarghamee, 2013). The dimensional analysis provides a convenient 
tool to develop relationships between variables representing the physical phenomena when 
a mathematical model is not known.  Netto et al. (2005) and Wang and Zarghamee (2013) 
determined the basic variables contributing to the reduction of burst pressure for corroded 
pipe as d/t and l/D, where d is the depth of corrosion, l is the length of corrosion, t is the 
pipe wall thickness, and D is the pipe outer diameter. Based on the analysis, Netto et al 
(2005) developed a burst pressure model for corroded pipeline (Eq.4.1):     
1.6 0.4
0 1 0.9435
d l
P P
t D
    
= −    
     
 (4.1) 
The equations developed in Wang and Zarghamee (2013) are (Eq.4.2).  
1.00 0.3
1.15 0.3
0
1 0.886 610
1 1.12 610
d l
if D mm
t DP
P d l
if D mm
t D
   
−    
   
=
   
−    
   
 (4.2) 
The existing design codes, such as the modified ASME B31G (2012), CSA Z662 
(2015) and DNV RP-F101 (2010) codes also use the defect depth and the defect length in 
the calculation of the burst pressure reduction for corroded pipe. However, the structure of 
the equations in the design codes is different from those developed from the dimensional 
analysis (discussed above). Each of the three design codes (i.e., ASME B31G, CSA Z662 
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and DNV RP-F101) adopted an equation of similar structure, which is consistent with the 
model known as RSTRENG (Kiefner and Vieth 1989). Mondal and Dhar (2016b) revealed 
that the burst pressure models in the design codes (i.e., ASME B31G, CSA Z662 and DNV 
RP-F101) are essentially the same when a uniform corrosion depth is considered. The burst 
pressure models from these design codes can be expressed in a general form (Eq.4.3): 
0
1
1
d
tP P
d
tM
 
− 
=  
 −
 
 (4.3)          
Where M is known as Folias factor, which is given as (ASME B31G, CSA Z662): 
2 4 2
2 2
1 0.6275 0.003375 50
l l l
M for
Dt D t Dt
= + −  , and 
2 2
0.032 3.3 50
l l
M for
Dt Dt
= +    
The Folias factor in the DNV RP-F101 code is given by: 
𝑀 = √1 + 0.31 ∙ (
𝑙
√𝐷𝑡
)
2
  
The burst pressure reduction factors in the design codes thus depended on d/t and 
l2/Dt. 
Gajdoš and Šperl (2012) developed a theoretical equation to calculate the maximum 
stress in a corroded pipe. The equation is expressed as (Eq.4.4):  
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( )
1
4
H
dl
t t l



=
−
+
 (4.4) 
Where: 
: The maximum stress in circumferential direction 
H: Hoop stress  
2
H
PD
t
 =  
Eq.4.4 can be rearranged for the burst pressure as: 
2 41
1
flow
d
t tP
tD
l


 
  
= −  
   +
 
 (4.5)           
In Eq.4.5, parameters contributing to the burst pressure reduction appear to be d/t and 
t/l. 
The structures of the equations discussed above (Eq.4.1, Eq.4.3 and Eq.4.5) for the 
burst pressure are different from each other, even though some of the parameters 
contributing to the burst pressure reduction are common. Each of the three model structures 
are evaluated here to revisit the models. The burst pressure equations are expressed in terms 
of the basic variables of the models, as shown in Eq.4.6, Eq.4.7 and Eq.4.8, keeping the 
similar structures of the equations as in Eq.4.1, Eq.4. 3 and Eq.4.5, respectively (called 
herein as Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3, respectively): 
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t D
    
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 
 
=  − 
 +
 
    (4.8)          
In Eq.4.6, Eq.4.7 and Eq.4.8 constants k1, k2, and k3 (k1 and k2 for Model 3) are 
determined through fitting with the FE database (Table 4.1).  The optimum values of the 
constants, ki, are obtained through minimization of model errors.  
4.4. Determination of Model Constants 
The Sum of the Squares of Errors (SSE) is minimized to obtain the model parameters. 
The error is defined as the difference between the predicted data and the observed data.  
For a database with n observation data (n = 28 for 28 FE analysis performed in this study, 
in which, 4 are for un-corroded (intact) pipes and 24 are for corroded pipes) and each 
observation having m independent variables (basic variables identified for each model), the 
database can be expressed as (xij, x*i) (i = 1, 2,…n; j = 1, 2,…m). Here, xij are the 
independent variables and x*i are the dependent variables (the burst pressure from FE 
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analysis). In this study, the independent variables (basic variables) include pipe diameter, 
wall thickness, depth of defects, length of defects and so forth, as described in Table 4.1. 
Consider a model relating the independent variables with the dependent variables as 
(Eq.4.9):  
X’i = f(xi1, xi2…, xim |k1, k2,…, kq)   (4.9)  
where:  
X’i: The ith predicted value of the dependent variable (i.e. the predicted burst 
pressure) with a set of ‘q’ model parameters (k1, k2,…, kq) and ‘m’ independent variables. 
q: Number of parameters in the models (q = 3 for Model 1 and Model 2; q = 2 for 
Model 3). 
The error in the ith observation is given by (Eq.4.10): 
ei = x*i – X’i (4.10) 
The sum of the squares of the error is (Eq.4.11) 
SSE=∑ ei2 (4.11) 
Differential Evolution (DE) method (Storn and Price 1997) is used to determine of 
the model parameters with the minimum of the sum of the squares of the errors as the 
objective function. In this method, the material parameters are obtained through a direct 
search approach to improve the candidate solutions with regards to the objective function. 
The method is suitable for optimization of discontinuous function or problems with more 
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than one local minimum (Vincenzi et al. 2013). The algorithm used in the optimization 
using DE is presented as a flow chart in Fig.4.4. The variables used in Fig.4.4 are 
described in the following section. For the optimization, the Sum Squares of Error (SSE) 
is the objective function and the parameters k1,…,kq are the optimization variables. The 
method involves several steps of evolution simulating process to generate and adjust 
population through generations, as discussed below. 
 
Figure 4.4. The flow chart of the optimization 
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4.4.1. Generating the Initial Generation 
Let us assume that the main population [X]g is composed from NP individuals. Each 
individual contains ‘n’ observations (in this study, n = 24). The population of the gth 
generation with NP individuals is defined as (Eq.4.12): 
 [X]g = (xi1, …, xim, x*i, k1sg,…, kqsg,  x'isg ) (4.12)   
Where: 
i= 1, 2, …, n  (the ith observation of the database);  
s=1, 2, …, NP (the sth individual of the population); 
In the initial step (first generation) g = 1, and then the initial population is (Eq.4.13): 
 [X]1 = (xi1,…, xim, x*i, k1s1,…, kqs1,  1x'is ) (4.13) 
The first part of the expression (xi1,…, xim, x*i) is the FE database and is constant 
during the optimization process. The second part (k1sg,…, kqsg) contain the vector of the 
parameters to be optimized (k1sg,…, kqsg), which changes from individual to individual 
within a generation but remains constant within observations of each individual. The last 
part is the predicted values (i.e. predicted burst pressure, x'isg ) that changes from 
observation to observation. These predicted values are obtained from Eq.4.9.  
The vector of the variables to be optimized (k1s1,…, kqs1) is randomly chosen for ‘n’ 
observations in the first generation.  As mentioned above, 1x'is  is the predicted value of the 
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dependent variable x*i, which is obtained from a model with a vector of (k1s1,…, kqs1). The 
objective function or the SSEsg corresponds to g
th generation and sth individual is then 
calculated as (Eq.4.14):  
( )
22
,1 ... , 1,s, ,s,
1 1
x*  x' x*  f x , , x | k ,  ...,  k
n n
sg i isg i i i m g q g
i i
SSE
= =
  = − = −       (4.14)  
Where: q = 3, 3, and 2 for model 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  
For the 1st generation the SSE is (Eq.4.15): 
  ( )
22
1 1 1 ... 1s1 s1
1 1
x*  x' x*  f x , , x | k ,  ...,  k
n n
s i is i i im q
i i
SSE
= =
 = − = −     (4.15)                            
Storn (2008) suggests the NP to be approximately equal to 10q as a rule of thumb. 
While the choice of NP/q would depend on the type of problem, a value between 5 and 10 
is “a reasonable choice” (Qing, 2009). NP = 30 is chosen for the three models discussed 
here. The initial k1 k2 and k3 are randomly chosen from -5 to 5 with a uniform distribution. 
4.4.2. Mutation and Crossover 
In gth generation, the mutation step is carried out by randomly choosing three 
optimized vectors within the main population [X]g, such as:  
1
1 11
( ,..., )r g r g qr gKV k k= ;  
2
2 21
( ,..., )r g r g qr gKV k k= ; 
3
3 31
( ,..., )r g r g qr gKV k k=   
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Where: r1, r2, r3 are the integer random numbers chosen between [1: NP]. 
The mutation vector of the variables (to be optimized) is then defined as (Eq.4.16): 
1 2 31sg qsg(kv , ,  kv ) ( )sg r g r g r gKV KV F KV KV=  = +  −  (4.16)  
The factor F is the mutation scale factor, commonly ranging from 0.5 to 1 (Storn, 
2008). In this study, F = 0.75 is considered. 
The sgKV is used to calculate the corresponding predicted value xv'isg  and Sum 
Squares of Error SSEsg of the mutation population [V]g. The mutation population [V]g can 
be written as: 
[V]g = (xi1, …, xim, x*i, kv1sg,…, kvqsg,  xv’isg)  
Consequently, the crossover step takes place by generating a crossover population 
[U]g from randomly combining the main population [X]g and the mutation population [V]g, 
as in Eq.4.17: 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
sg sg s
g
sg sg s
U X if r Cr
U
U V if r Cr
= 
=
= 
 (4.17)  
Where: 
[U]sg: The s
th individual of the crossover population [U]g  
[X]sg: The s
th individual of the main population [X]g  
[V]sg: The s
th individual of the mutation population [V]g  
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rs: Random number corresponding to s
th individual, chosen from 0 to 1. 
Cr: The cross over probability, ranging from 0 to 1 (Storn, 2008). Cr = 0.9 is 
used here. 
4.4.3. Selection and Reborn 
From the selected individuals of crossover population [U]g and the main population 
[X]g, the population [Y]g can be found using Eq.4.18: 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
sg sg sg sg
g
sg sg sg sg
Y X if SSEU SSE
Y
Y U if SSEU SSE
= 
=
= 
  (4.18) 
Where: SSEUsg: The objective function (Sum Squares of Error) corresponding to g
th 
generation and sth observation of the crossover population [U]g 
The population is then used as the main population [X]g+1 in the next generation 
(g+1): 
[X]g+1= [Y]g 
These steps (mutation, crossover, selection and reborn) are repeated until the 
difference of SSEsg in the main population [X]g is less than the terminal criterion 
(Eq.4.19). 
1
,
NP
sg
s
g min
SSE
SSE
NP
=− 

 (4.19)  
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 : The termination criterion ( 0.001 = is used); 
SSEg,min: The minimum value of SSE among NP individuals of the g
th main 
population 
4.5. Results and Validation 
Table 4.3 shows the model constants (parameters) obtained using the optimization 
method, along with the coefficient of determination (R-squares). The coefficients of 
determination are very high (greater that 99%) for each of the models, indicating that the 
models fit very well with the FE database.  
Table 4.3. The results of optimization for the model parameters for high strength 
steel 
Model k1 k2 k3 Generation R2 
1 -0.88555 0.98077 0.31053 164 0.99490 
2 -0.92126 0.06361 -2.75485 379 0.99577 
3 1.24678 12.67390 - 73 0.99698 
 
 
It reveals that the optimization method for model parameter determination provides 
a useful tool for the development of the burst pressure model. Each of the models 
investigated here (Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3, respectively) are found to be reasonable 
with the parameters estimated using the optimization method. Model 3, with the structure 
of the model of Gajdoš and Šperl (2012), provided the highest value of the coefficient of 
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determination. The resulting burst pressure models obtained from the investigation are 
shown in Eq.4.20, 4.21 and 4.22, respectively. 
Model 1: 
0.98077 0.31053
0 1 0.88555
d l
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t D
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 (4.20)  
Model 2: 
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Model 3: 
0
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1
1 12.6739
d
tP P
t
l
 
 
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 +
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 (4.22) 
The burst pressure reduction factors calculated using the developed models (Model 
1, 2 and 3) are compared with those calculated using the FE analysis in Fig.4.5. The data 
coalesce around the 1:1 line in the figure, indicating a good correlation between the 
predictions using the models and the FE calculations.  Each of the model provides some 
un-conservative estimation (overestimation) for lower values of the factor (<0.5). For the 
higher values of the factors, Model 1 (with the structure based on the dimensional analysis 
of Netto et al., 2005) and Model 2 (with the structure based on ASME B31G code) provided 
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both conservative and un-conservative estimations. Model 3 (with the structure based on 
the theoretical model of Gajdoš and Šperl, 2012) provided the most reasonable estimation. 
 
Figure 4.5. Comparison of the burst pressure models (Model 1, 2 and 3) with FE 
data for high strength steel 
Fig.4.6 compares the burst pressure reduction factors calculated using the existing 
models such as Netto et al. (2005), ASME B31G (2012) and Gajdoš and Šperl (2012) with 
those from FE calculations. The data points in Fig.4.6 are widely scattered about the 1:1 
line. Netto et al. (2005) and ASME B31G models generally provided over-estimations of 
the factor. The model of Gajdoš and Šperl (2012) generally provided underestimation of 
the factors (except for a few points).  
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Figure 4.6. Comparison of the existing burst pressure models with FE data for high 
strength steel 
The comparison in Fig.4.3 and 4.4 reveals that the model developed in this research 
based on the structures of the existing models provided an improvement to the models. The 
calculated results based on the developed models match with the FE data more closely than 
the calculations using the existing models. 
The models are then evaluated with a number of burst test results available in the 
literature. Ma et al (2013) collected 79 burst test data from different sources. The database 
collected in Ma et al (2013) is used to evaluate the burst pressure models. Fig.4.7 plots the 
burst pressures from the tests against the burst pressures calculated using Models 1, 2 and 
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3, respectively.  Since the test database does not include the burst pressure of intact pipes 
(P0) for all cases, the burst pressures for intact pipes are estimated assuming the hoop stress 
as the ultimate strength of the material (H = u). The tests without defects are removed 
(i.e. 8 data points), and only defected pipes are focused.   
In Fig.4.7, most of the data points are below 1:1 line (55, 48, 71 out of 71 data points 
for model 1, 2 and 3, respectively), indicating that the models provide the lower bound 
values. The models thus under-estimate the burst pressures with respect to the test results. 
It is to be noted that the experimental test results may be affected by various uncertainties 
including those with the defect shape, material non-homogeneity and/or other 
manufacturing defects, which may be the cause of overestimation by the models for a few 
cases. However, the models predict the experimental burst pressure reasonably. 
  
Figure 4.7. Comparison of the models with test results for high strength steel 
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4.6. Failure Analysis 
The burst pressure models developed based on the study could be used for fitness-
for-service assessments of pipelines. In this section, a failure analysis is carried out through 
calculating the probability of failure of a pipeline using the models. The limit state 
functions for the failure probability assessment can be written as follows (Eq.4.23): 
g(X) = P - Pop (4.23) 
Where P is the burst pressure calculated using the models and Pop is the operating 
pressure.  The failure function (g(X)  0) is used for evaluating the probability of failure 
(Pf) based on Monte Carlo simulation. The parameters used in the analysis are summarized 
in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4. Random input variables for failure probability assessment 
Parameters 
Yield Stress  
y  
(MPa) 
Thickness 
t  
(mm)  
Diameter 
D 
(mm)  
Internal 
pressure 
Pop 
(MPa) 
Defect 
length 
l 
(mm) 
Corrosion 
rate 
Cr 
(mm/year) 
Mean 452 14.6 508 8 150 0.25 
COV* 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.2 
Distribution Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal 
*Coefficient of variance, 1 inch = 25.4 mm, 1 MPa = 145 psi 
Fig.4.8 compares the failure probability obtained using different burst pressure 
models. Failure probabilities over a period of 20 years of design life are calculated. As 
reported in Hasan et al. (2011), the Pf values obtained from the current design codes are 
significantly different in Fig.4.8.  The failure probabilities calculated using Model 1, Model 
2 and Model 3 presented in this paper are relatively close to each other.  Thus, the causes 
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of variabilities in the existing models are minimized in the revisited models (Model 1, 
Model 2 and Model 3). Among these models, Model 3 provides higher failure probability 
and therefore can conservatively be used.  
 
Figure 4.8. Failure probability within the design life of the analyzed pipeline 
4.7. Burst Pressure Model for Cast Iron Water Main 
Previous sections provide methodology for developing burst pressure models for 
energy pipelines with validation using test results. Test results for cast iron water main are 
not available. However, the study conducted for energy pipeline reveals that FE modelling 
can successfully be used to develop burst pressure model for cast iron water main. In this 
section, analysis for cast iron pipe is provided to develop a model for water mains.   
4.7.1. Finite Element Analysis for Cast Iron Pipe 
FE model for cast iron pipe is developed in a similar way as discussed above. Pipe 
diameters ranging from 127mm to 441.96mm are used based on the common pipe 
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diameters in the WDN at the city of Mount Pearl. Ali (2017) conducted tensile test with 
specimens extracted from an exhumed cast iron pipe collected from the city. The material 
properties from Ali (2017) are used in the analysis (Table 4.5). The results of FE analysis 
are shown in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.5. Material properties of cast iron (After Ali, 2017) 
Density 
(kg/m3) 
Modulus 
of 
Elasticity 
(GPa) 
Ultimate 
strength 
(MPa) 
Poisson’s 
Ratio 
Total 
strain 
at 
failure 
7850 150.0 205 0.3 0.0039 
1 Ali, 2017. 
 
Table 4.6. Pipe database for FE analysis with cast iron water mains 
FEM 
No. 
Diameter 
D 
(mm) 
Wall 
thickness 
t  
(mm) 
Corrosion 
depth 
d 
(mm) 
Corrosion 
length 
l 
(mm) 
Burst 
pressure 
P 
(MPa) 
1 335.28 12.2 0 0 15.705 
2 335.28 12.2 10.980 200 2.838 
3 335.28 12.2 3.050 200 15.177 
4 335.28 12.2 6.100 200 10.079 
5 335.28 12.2 9.150 200 5.495 
6 335.28 7.874 0 0 10.039 
7 335.28 7.874 1.969 200 8.129 
8 335.28 7.874 3.937 200 5.495 
9 335.28 7.874 5.906 200 3.597 
10 335.28 7.874 7.087 200 1.825 
11 441.96 8.636 0 0 8.290 
12 441.96 8.636 2.159 200 6.634 
13 441.96 8.636 4.318 200 5.495 
14 441.96 8.636 6.477 200 2.838 
15 441.96 8.636 7.772 200 1.825 
16 175.26 6.35 0 0 15.705 
17 175.26 6.35 4.763 200 6.634 
18 175.26 6.35 1.588 200 15.177 
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FEM 
No. 
Diameter 
D 
(mm) 
Wall 
thickness 
t  
(mm) 
Corrosion 
depth 
d 
(mm) 
Corrosion 
length 
l 
(mm) 
Burst 
pressure 
P 
(MPa) 
19 175.26 6.35 3.175 200 10.052 
20 175.26 6.35 5.715 200 2.838 
21 127 12.192 0 0 46.044 
22 127 12.192 3.048 200 37.943 
23 127 12.192 6.096 200 25.129 
24 127 12.192 9.144 200 14.450 
25 127 12.192 10.973 200 7.094 
26 335.28 12.2 0 0 0.000 
27 335.28 12.2 10.980 100 4.356 
28 335.28 12.2 3.050 100 15.177 
29 335.28 12.2 6.100 100 10.052 
30 335.28 12.2 9.150 100 8.343 
31 335.28 7.874 0 0 0.000 
32 335.28 7.874 1.969 100 8.770 
33 335.28 7.874 3.937 100 6.634 
34 335.28 7.874 5.906 100 4.356 
35 335.28 7.874 7.087 100 2.838 
36 441.96 8.636 0 0 0.000 
37 441.96 8.636 2.159 100 7.062 
38 441.96 8.636 4.318 100 6.634 
39 441.96 8.636 6.477 100 3.597 
40 441.96 8.636 7.772 100 2.838 
41 175.26 6.35 0 0 0.000 
42 175.26 6.35 4.763 100 6.634 
43 175.26 6.35 1.588 100 15.177 
44 175.26 6.35 3.175 100 10.052 
45 175.26 6.35 5.715 100 3.597 
46 127 12.192 0 0 0.000 
47 127 12.192 3.048 100 37.943 
48 127 12.192 6.096 100 25.129 
49 127 12.192 9.144 100 16.586 
50 127 12.192 10.973 100 7.094 
 
4.7.2. Development of Model for Cast Iron Pipe 
With simulated burst pressures in Table 4.6, DE algorithm is conducted to obtain 
optimized parameters for Model 1, 2 and 3, discussed above. Table 4.7 shows the model 
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parameters obtained. Resulting burst pressure models for corroded cast iron pipes are 
shown in Equations 6.24, 6.25 and 6.26. Burst pressures calculated using the equations are 
then plotted against the burst pressure calculated using FE in Fig.4.9. In Fig.4.9, data points 
are closely scattered around the 1:1 line, the R-square values of all three models are 
consistently higher than 0.97. These implied that the models are reasonably fitted with 
simulation results. Any of these equations can therefore be used to calculate the pipe wall 
stress due to internal pressure as outlined in Chapter 3. 
Table 4.7. The results of optimization for the model parameters for cast iron  
Model k1 k2 k3 Generation R2 
1 -0.94342 1.22143 0.10441 173 0.98659 
2 -0.87921 20.72021 -8.13933 329 0.97051 
3 -0.88313 0.05024 - 87 0.97082 
The explicit developed models for cast iron can be expressed as: 
Model 1  
1.22143 0.10441
0 0.941 342
d l
P P
t D
    
=          
−  (4.24)  
Model 2 
8.139330
2
0.87921
0.87921 20.7202
1
1 1 1
d
tP P
l
Dt
−
−
 
 
 
=  
  + 
 
− 
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 (4.25) 
 
95 
 
Model 3 
0
0.88313
0.0502
1
41
d
tP P
t
l
 
 
=  + 
 +
 
 (4.26) 
 
Figure 4.9. Comparison of the burst pressure models (Model 1, 2 and 3) with FE 
data for cast iron 
4.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, burst pressure models for corroded cast iron water main are developed 
to facilitate calculating pipe wall stress due to internal pressure. Three existing burst 
pressure models for corroded energy pipeline are first revisited for a range of pipe sizes 
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and material strength grades. A series of FE analysis is conducted to develop a database 
that is used to revisit different coefficients and exponents of the models (model 
parameters). An optimization algorithm based on differential evolution (DE) method is 
used to determine the model parameters through minimization of model errors. 
The study reveals that FE analysis along with optimization algorithm can suitably be 
used to develop improved models for burst pressure predictions. Using this approach, three 
models are developed based on the model structures of Netto et al. (2005), ASME B31G 
(2012) (or CSA Z662 2015, DNV RP-F101 2010) and Gajdoš and Šperl (2012) for high 
strength steel and cast iron pipe, separately.  
For high strength steel pipes, the models provide the burst pressure reduction factors 
that match well with the values calculated using FE analysis. However, the values 
calculated using the existing models vary widely from the FE calculations. Among the 
developed models, the model based on Gajdoš and Šperl (2012) provides the most 
reasonable estimation of the burst pressure reduction factor for high strength steel with 
respect to the FE results. The models provide lower bound (conservative) values of the 
burst pressure with respect to the experimental burst test results available in the literature.  
The FE analysis then applied to develop burst pressure model for corroded cast iron 
pipe. Three burst pressure models for cast iron are proposed that match reasonably with FE 
results.   
  
97 
 
CHAPTER 5. EFFECTS OF WATER MAIN BREAKS ON OVERALL 
NETWORK4 
5.1. Introduction  
In Chapters 3 and 4, a mechanics-based model for failure assessment and a 
framework for mechanics-based reliability assessment have been developed. This chapter 
focuses on developing a consequence assessment method for risk assessment of water 
distribution system due to water main break. A water main break may disconnect a part of 
the network or may reduce the redundancy of the network. To provide uninterrupted 
service to community, the water distribution network (WDN) is designed with an amount 
of redundancy using looped networks to provide alternative paths for the situations if one 
or more links go out of service. It is, however, difficult to assess all possible paths from the 
source to the demand points for a municipal WDN containing thousands of demand nodes 
and pipes. The performance of the WDN in providing an acceptable level of service to 
consumers is assessed in terms of system reliability (Tung 1985). Over the last few 
decades, considerable research has focused on system reliability assessments of the WDN. 
However, no universally accepted definition and measure of system reliability has been 
used.  Wagner et al. (1988) developed analytical methods for system reliability assessment 
using network connectivity and approachability. Wagner et al. (1988) and Quimpo and 
                                                          
4 This chapter is based on the published work in a peer-reviewed journal: Hieu Chi Phan, Ashutosh Sutra 
Dhar, Prem Thodi, and Rehan Sadiq (2018), “Probability of network disconnection of water distribution 
system for maintenance prioritization”, Journal of Water Supply: Research and Technology-Aqua,  
p.jws2018097 (https://doi.org/10.2166/aqua.2018.097). The work was carried out, and the paper was 
drafted by the first author. The work was supervised, and the paper was reviewed by the co-authors. 
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Shamsi (1991) incorporated multiple connections from several source nodes to demand 
nodes for estimating the system reliability. The connectivity and approachability are 
defined as the connection of all demand nodes to the source nodes, and the connection of 
a demand node to its source, respectively.  
Su et al. (1987) and other researchers employed hydraulic failure as the reliability 
measure for WDN design optimization, which is based on the measure of hydraulic 
availability of the system needed to provide an acceptable level of service. This approach 
is rigorous and provides a precise description of a WDN. However, analysis of hydraulic 
availability involves extensive system simulations and is therefore computer time-
intensive. To overcome the computational problem, several heuristic measures of system 
reliability were developed (Goulter and Coals 1986, Shamir and Howard 1981, Awumah 
et al. 1991), which are criticized for not evaluating the hydraulic availability (Cullinane et 
al. 1992). Cullinane et al. (1992) attempted to balance the two types of measures where the 
hydraulic failure is evaluated for selected conditions. This approach still relies on heuristics 
and judgement. Shinstine et al. (2002) demonstrated that availability measure provides a 
means of examining the robustness of a WDN during design, rather than relying on implicit 
judgement. They employed a hydraulic simulation model (i.e., KYPIPE) to obtain the 
values of a pressure head at each demand node by closing a pipe or a combination of pipes, 
which was repeated until all the combinations of the pipes were examined. Pipes were 
considered as repairable components and an average time to repair of one day was assumed. 
In this study, a WDN containing up to 109 pipes and 89 nodes were analyzed. However, 
repeated hydraulic simulation of a larger WDN containing thousands of nodes would be 
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tedious. Aydin et al. (2014) reported 7 days of simulation of a WDN using the EPANET 
model. Moreover, this approach only simulates the network conditions when valves are 
closed immediate after pipe breaks. Water disruption due to leaks in water mains is not 
simulated. 
Despite the limitations, the hydraulic based approach is desired for the design 
optimization of WDN, since it provides water availability at the demand nodes. On the 
other hand, for repairing deteriorating water mains in an existing WDN, the pipe breaks 
causing isolation of part of the system should be given priority. If isolated from the 
network, the demand nodes will not have any available supply. The focus of the present 
study is the prioritization of water mains for repair/maintenance and to identify the pipes 
and combinations of pipes causing isolation (disconnection) of parts of the WDN.  The 
failure probability of the system is defined as the probability of disconnection. Although 
breaks of other pipes may also cause water to be unavailable at certain demand nodes due 
to low pressure, this is not considered here, to avoid computationally expensive hydraulic 
simulations.  
To identify a pipe and combinations of pipes causing isolation, the minimal cut-set 
method is used. In the conventional minimal cut-set method, pipes causing system failure 
are rigorously examined, requiring complex and extensive computation. Yannopoulos and 
Spiliotis (2013) employed graph theory using a connectivity matrix to identify minimal 
cut-sets. The computational time required in this method is also significantly high. To 
overcome this computational limitation, this study employs Complex Network Analysis 
(CNA) to find the minimal cut-sets of the network. CNA has been used for the 
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quantification of structural properties of networks and to improve understanding of   
network connectivity and robustness. Complex network models have been applied in 
various areas including WDNs (Yazdani and Jeffrey, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Nazempour et 
al., 2016). Yazdani and Jeffrey (2010) discussed the metrics for CNA to evaluate the 
robustness and vulnerability characteristics of a WDN. Among several metrics for CNA, 
Algebraic Connectivity (AC) has been proposed and analyzed by Fiedler (1973). AC is a 
well-known measure for evaluating the well-connectedness of a graph (Fiedler, 1973; 
Capocci et al., 2005; Ghosh and Boyd, 2006; Newman, 2006, Yazdani and Jeffrey, 2011a, 
b). The network with higher AC is more robust and more tolerant to the breakage of links. 
AC provides information on graph partitioning that is closely related to the disconnection 
of nodes due to pipe breaks (Phan et al., 2017a). Fiedler (1973) pointed out that an event 
of disconnection in a system would lead to the increase of AC. On the other hand, decrease 
of AC corresponds to a reduction of redundancy in the network (Phan et al., 2017a). AC 
has been used to develop a framework to evaluate the redundancy or robustness of WDNs 
(Fiedler, 1973; Yazdani and Jeffrey, 2010; Phan et al., 2017a). However, no such 
comprehensive modeling has ever been performed to take advantage of the characteristics 
of the AC for network reliability assessment.  
The novelty of the current study is the development of a method for finding minimal 
cut-sets of complex WDNs using AC. The proposed approach is computationally more 
efficient than the existing methods of finding minimal cut sets. A reliability framework is 
then developed based on AC and the failure probability of pipe components. The proposed 
method is applied to a real water distribution network. 
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5.2. Reliability with Minimal Cut-sets 
This study assumes that network disconnection is equivalent to system failure and is 
denoted as an event, E. The probability of system failure can be determined using the 
minimal cut-set approach (Tung, 1985; Yannopoulos and Spiliotis, 2013). The minimal 
cut-set is a combination of a minimum number of component failures that lead to system 
failure (i.e., disconnection, in the current study). If Ek is an event of system failure due to 
a set of k pipes, k ranges from 1 to m-1 where m is the number of pipes in the network, the 
relationship between event E and events Ek can be written as: 
𝐸 = 𝐸1𝐸2…𝐸𝑚−1 (5.1) 
Because the events Ek are mutually exclusive, then: 
𝑃(𝐸) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐸𝑘)
𝑚
𝑘=1  (5.2) 
Where, P(E) is the probability of system failure and P(Ek) is the probability of event 
Ek to occur. 
A variable, pk is defined as the number of minimal cut-sets consisting of k pipes in 
the network, and event Ek is the union of pk events corresponding to pk minimal cut-sets: 
𝐸𝑘 = 𝐸𝑘.1𝐸𝑘.2…𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑…𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑘 (5.3) 
𝑃(𝐸𝑘) = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃(𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑))
𝑝𝑘
𝑝𝑑=1  (5.4) 
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Ek.pd  is the event of the pd
th minimal cut-set to occur, where pd ranges from 1 to pk. 
The relationship of system failure and the event of minimal cut-sets occurring is provided 
in the fault tree analysis diagram shown in Fig.5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1. FTA of the event of disconnection occurrence in the network 
Here, Ek.pd is the intersection of k basic events Ek.pd.i with i = [1:k]. In other words, 
Ek.pd.i is the event of the i
th pipe break in the pdth minimal cut-set, and thus: 
𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑 = 𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑.1𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑.𝑝𝑑.2…𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑.𝑖 …𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑.𝑘 (5.5) 
𝑃(𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑) = ∏ 𝑃(𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑.𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1  (5.6) 
Eq.5.4 could be rewritten as: 
𝑃(𝐸𝑘) = 1 − ∏ (1 − ∏ 𝑃(𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑.𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1 )
𝑝𝑘
𝑝𝑑=1  (5.7) 
Ek
OR
Ek.1 Ek.pd... Ek.pk...
AND ANDAND
... ...
Ek.pd.1 Ek.pd.i Ek.pd.k... ...
Minimum cut-sets
contain k pipes
E1.1.1 E1.p1.1 AND
E2.1.1 E2.1.2
AND
E2.p2.1 E2.p2.2
AND
...
AND
...
E1
E
OR
OR
...
E2
OR
Em-1
OR
Em-1.1 Em-1.p(m-1)...
...
E1.1 E1.p1 E2.1 E2.p2...
Minimum cut-sets
contain 1 pipe
Minimum cut-sets
contain 2 pipes
Minimum cut-sets
contain m-1 pipes
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Since Ek.pd.i is the event of an individual pipe breakage, the probability of these basic 
events can be found directly using the component reliability model.  
From Eq.5.2 and 4.7, the probability of disconnection (i.e. system failure) in the 
network can be estimated as:  
𝑃(𝐸) = ∑ [1 − ∏ (1 − ∏ 𝑃(𝐸𝑘.𝑝𝑑.𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1 )
𝑝𝑘
𝑝𝑑=1 ]
𝑚
𝑘=1  (5.8) 
The failure probability of a simple hypothetical network with its connection of nodes 
and lengths of pipes as presented in Fig.5.2 is examined using this approach. For the system 
failure probability assessment, reliability of the components (the pipes in the current study) 
in the network is required. Researchers have investigated several risk factors, including 
age, diameter, length, pipe material, corrosiveness of soil, and operating pressure for the 
prediction of water main breaks and developed relationships with the time-to-failure 
(Goulter and Coals 1986, Kleiner et al. 2010). The major challenge with this approach is 
the lack of availability of data to develop the model. Municipalities often lack resources to 
collect data, except for break records. Historic break records are therefore used to predict 
subsequent breaks using a homogeneous or non-homogeneous Poisson model (Goulter and 
Kazemi 1988, Kleiner et al. 2010). While failure probability assessment using a mechanics-
based method is discussed in Chapter 3, the historic break record-based model is 
considered here for the hypothetical network as an example. The reliability model is 
developed using the average break per year (Br) of the network, which is readily available 
to a city. The average break rate for each pipe segment is assumed to be proportional to the 
length of the segment. The event of a water main break is assumed to be a Poisson process, 
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which is commonly used to forecast the break patterns in individual water mains (e.g. 
Goulter and Coals, 1986; Kleiner et al., 2010; Yannopoulos and Spiliotis, 2013). A 
homogeneous Poisson process with a constant annual failure rate is considered. Note that 
the annual break rate is not necessarily constant for a WDN. In this case, a non-
homogeneous Poisson model or other models can be developed for pipe break assessments. 
The development of a component failure model is not within the scope of the current study. 
 
Figure 5.2. Example of a hypothetical network 
Based on these assumptions, the average annual break rate for pipe linking node i 
and node j (from now on, written as pipe ij) can be found as follows: 
𝜆𝑖𝑗 =
𝐵𝑟
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑙𝑖𝑗 (5.9)   
Where, Br is the average annual break rate in the WDN, ltotal is total length of pipes 
in the network, lij is length of pipe ij and ij is break rate of pipe ij. 
Since the pipe breaking is assumed to be a Poisson process, the annual pipe failure 
probability can be estimated using an exponential model with a constant failure rate. This 
comes from the assumption that the average annual break rate is a constant. Therefore, the 
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component reliability of pipe ij at time t, Rij(t), is the probability of a pipe to function at a 
desired level within the period of time [0:t], where:  
𝑅𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑒
−𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑡 (5.10) 
Thus, 
𝑃𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑡 (5.11) 
For the hypothetical network in Fig.5.2, the average break per year (Br) is randomly 
chosen as 3 breaks per year. From Eq.5.9 and 4.10, the failure probability of each pipe 
within 1 month (t = 1/12) is calculated and given in Table 5.1. Consequently, the network 
disconnection probability is found as 0.063 with the details of calculating process given in 
Table 5.2. E5 (empty) and E13 (empty) in Table 5.2 indicate that there are no minimal cut-
sets with 5 and 13 pipes, respectively. 
In Table 5.1, the pipe is named for the first and second nodes that it links. For 
example, pipe 5-6 means the pipe connects nodes 5 and 6. The numbers alongside in Fig.5.2 
indicate the assumed geometric length of the corresponding pipe. For example, pipe 5-6 
has 2.5 units length. 
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Table 5.1. Failure probability of pipes in a period of 1 month 
Pipe Length ij Pij(t)* 
1-2 1.0 0.169014 0.014085 
1-3 0.5 0.084507 0.007042 
1-5 1.5 0.253521 0.021127 
2-4 0.75 0.126761 0.010563 
2-5 2.5 0.422535 0.035211 
3-4 2.0 0.338028 0.028169 
4-5 1.75 0.295775 0.024648 
5-6 2.5 0.422535 0.035211 
6-7 2.0 0.338028 0.028169 
6-8 0.5 0.084507 0.007042 
7-8 0.75 0.126761 0.010563 
8-9 0.5 0.084507 0.007042 
9-10 1.5 0.253521 0.021127 
*t = 1 month 
It can be observed from Table 5.2 that P(E1) ≫  P(E2)  ≫ P(E3)  ≫ P(E4). In 
general, P(Ek) ≫ P(Eh)  (where h>k). This is due to the fact that P(Eh) requires an 
intersectional condition for h (i.e., larger than k) simultaneous pipe breaks. Similarly, the 
intersectional condition indicates the fact that P(Ek−1) ≪ P(Ek), since the failure 
probability of each component is less than 1. The difference of P(Ek) and P(Eh) is more 
significant when components P(Ek.pd.i) in Eq.5.7 are relatively small. The average failure 
probability, PBr.av, is useful to quantify this difference. The average failure probability can 
be obtained by taking the ratio of expected pipe breaks per total number of pipes in the 
network. This ratio is positively correlated with the breakage probability of the pipe 
components. Assuming that the pipe break is a Poisson process, the average failure 
probability within a period t can be written as: 
𝑃𝐵𝑟.𝑎𝑣(𝑡) =
𝐵𝑟×𝑡
𝑚
 (5.12) 
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Where: 𝐵𝑟 is the average annual break rate in the WDN and m is the number of pipes 
in the network. 
Table 5.2. Calculations of disconnection probability of network in a period of 1 
month 
Min. cut-sets 
contain k  
Pipes Ek 
pk 
Min.  
cut-set 
(Ek.pd) 
Pipes in the min.  
cut-set Ek.pd 
(Ek.pd.[pd.1]; … ; Ek.pd.[pd.k]) 
P(Ek.pd) P(Ek)  
E1 3 
E1.1 5-6 0.035211 
0.0622 E1.2 8-9 0.007042 
E1.3 9-10 0.021127 
E2 4 
E2.1 1-3; 3-4 0.000198 
7.6849×10-4 
E2.2 6-7; 6-8 0.000198 
E2.3 6-7; 7-8 0.000297 
E2.4 6-8; 7-8 7.439×10
-5 
E3 6 
E3.1 1-2; 1-3; 1-5 2.0955×10
-6 
4.3219×10-5 
E3.2 1-2; 1-5; 3-4 8.3820×10
-6 
E3.3 1-2; 2-4; 2-5 5.2387×10
-6 
E3.4 1-3; 2-4; 4-5 1.8336×10
-6 
E3.5 1-5; 2-5; 4-5 1.8336×10
-6 
E3.6 2-4; 3-4; 4-5 7.3342×10
-6 
E4 5 
E4.1 1-2; 1-3; 2-5; 4-5 8.6082×10
-8 
7.8458×10-7 
E4.2 1-2; 1-5; 2-4; 4-5 7.7474×10
-8 
E4.3 1-2; 2-5; 3-4; 4-5 3.4433×10
-7 
E4.4 1-3; 1-5; 2-4; 2-5 5.5339×10
-8 
E4.5 1-5; 2-4; 2-5; 3-4 2.2136×10
-7 
E5 (empty) 0 - -  0 
   …    
E13 (empty) 0 - -  0 
   Sum:  0.0630 
 
If the first component in Eq.5.2 (i.e., P(E1)) significantly overwhelms the summation 
of the others, then network disconnection probability P(E) can be approximated by P(E1). 
That is: 
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𝑃(𝐸) ≈ 𝑃(𝐸1) (5.13) 
To investigate the relationship of PBr.av and the difference between P(E1) and P(E), 
the network in Fig.5.2 has been investigated by changing the average break (Br) within a 
fixed period of time, t. Fig.5.3 compares the results. Fig.5.3a shows that P(E) is very 
close to P(E1). This is supported by Fig.5.3b, in which the ratio between P(E1) and P(E) 
is consistently larger than 0.89. This demonstrates that P(E1) accounts for more than 89 
percent of P(E) in all cases. It also implies that the approximation in Eq.5.13 can be more 
accurate with small PBr.av. In other words, the smaller the PBr.av, the closer the distance 
between P(E1) and P(E) becomes. It is observed from Fig.5.3 that P(E1) can be used to 
predict P(E) within an acceptable small value of PBr.av. In the case of a WDN, containing 
thousands of pipes combining with relatively small Br, the system PBr.av is expected to be 
small. This leads to the approximation presented in Eq.5.13 being reasonable. 
a) b  
Figure 5.3. The difference between P(E) and P(E1) with the change of 
PBr.av. a) Comparison of  P(E) and P(E1), b) Ratio of P(E1)/P(E) 
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5.3. Algebraic Connectivity 
One of the major limitations of using the minimal cut-set approach for evaluating the 
disconnection probability of a large network is the high computational cost needed to 
determine all minimal cut-sets. Although applying the approximation presented in Eq.5.13, 
the computational cost can be significantly reduced. The conventional approach to solve 
the minimal cut-set problem is to count all the paths connecting two different nodes of the 
network. Yannopoulos and Spiliotis (2013) used the connectivity matrix from graph theory 
to record all the paths. If any element of the connectivity matrix is zero, then there is a 
disconnection between the concerned nodes. Subsequently, the minimal cut-sets are found 
by removing (idealized for breaking) a set of pipes and recalculating the resulting 
connectivity matrix. If the connectivity matrix of the break-containing network comprises 
zero elements, then a disconnection occurs. However, computational cost of such an 
approach may be significantly increased when the size of the network is large. In the 
following sections, the characteristic of the algebraic connectivity is investigated to 
determine the minimal cut-sets for a single pipe break and multiple pipe breaks. 
5.3.1. AC for Single Pipe Breaks  
Algebraic Connectivity (AC) is a parameter used in graph theory to determine the 
strength of connection between the nodes in a network. Mathematically, it is defined as the 
second smallest Eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of the connected graph (Fiedler, 1973). 
Municipal WDNs can be considered as graphs of connected network, where a number of 
pipes connect the nodes at their intersections. Then, the graph of WDN can be described 
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as G=G(V,P), where V is a set of n nodes (intersections) and P is a set of m pipes. An 
adjacent matrix A of G is used to describe the link between the nodes, where:  
𝐴 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗  (5.14)  
aij = 1, if there is a link (pipe) between node i and node j. 
aij = 0, if there is no link (pipe) between node i and node j. 
The node-degree matrix is a diagonal matrix, which contains the information about 
the number of connections (node-degree) at each node, and is defined as: 
𝐷 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑑𝑖)  
di = number of connection (node-degree) of node i, where: 
𝑑𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1   
Then, the Laplacian matrix is given by Eq.5.15: 
𝐿 = 𝐷 − 𝐴 (5.15) 
The Laplacian matrix L for the undirected network is usually symmetrical and the 
sum of rows (and columns) is zero. This characteristic leads to the fact that the first (i.e. 
smallest) Eigen-value (1) of the matrix is zero, corresponding to the Eigen vector of 
(1,1,...,1)T. The second smallest Eigenvalue (2) of the Laplacian matrix is the AC, which 
is greater than 0 if G is a connected graph. The Eigenvalues of a network with n nodes of 
connected graph are: 1 = 0 ≤ 2 = AC ≤ 3 ≤ ⋯ ≤ n. 
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A network with higher AC implies that the network is better connected (Newman 
2010; Costa et al., 2007; Yazdani and Jeffrey 2010 and 11a). The addition of links to a 
network has been observed to increase the AC, as reported in Ghosh and Boyd (2006) and 
Phan et al. (2017a). Ghosh and Boyd (2006) have reported a method to maximize the AC 
with a set of pipes to increase the redundancy of the network when the number of nodes 
remains the same. On the contrary, the process of pipe breakage may be considered as a 
reverse process of decreasing the AC with the break or removal of pipes from the network. 
As long as the disconnection has not occurred, the AC tends to decrease, implying that the 
redundancy of the network is reduced after a break event. This indicates if a break does not 
isolate a node or cluster of nodes, the AC will decrease from the value prior to the break. 
However, when a node or a cluster of nodes is isolated due to pipe breakage, the 
Laplacian matrix of the network becomes a combination of two (or more) non-connected 
sub-networks. Then, the AC will be higher. For example, assume a network has two 
clusters; Cluster 1 includes nodes from 1 to i-1, and Cluster 2 includes nodes from i+1 to 
n. The clusters of nodes are only linked by ith node. If links to this node are all broken, then 
the network Laplacian matrix will have the following form: 
𝐿 =
[
[𝐿𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 1] [0] [0]
[0] 0 [0]
[0] [0] [𝐿𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟2]
]
𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑖 − 1
𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖
𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛
𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑖 − 1         𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖        𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛                   
 
 (5.16) 
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The separation above is called graph partitioning. In the case of graph partitioning, 
the AC of the network is a combination of the isolated clusters. Fiedler (1973) 
mathematically proved that: 
2(𝐺) ≤ 2(𝐺𝑟𝑛) ≤ 2(𝐺𝑟𝑝) (5.17) 
Where: 2(G) is the AC of the connected network, 2(Grn) is the AC of the network 
after the disconnection with removal of nodes, and 2(Grp) is the AC of the network after 
the disconnection with removal of pipes. 
The disconnection may be viewed as the direct failure of the network, considering 
the system failure as the state of not properly serving water to every demand node (i.e. the 
communities). The reduction of redundancy might lead to the disabling of service to 
demand nodes but might not directly result in a network failure event. Thus, the AC will 
change with the removal of a pipe in the network, where:  
1. AC will increase (ΔAC is positive) if an isolation of nodes occurs, and 
2. AC will decrease (ΔAC is negative) if the redundancy is reduced. 
Now, if the removal of a pipe leads to disconnection of the network (e.g., AC 
increases), such a pipe is considered as a minimal cut-set. Thus, observing the change in 
AC by removing pipes one by one within the network, all minimal cut-sets can be 
determined. 
For illustration, the AC for a hypothetical network shown in Fig.5.2 is estimated to 
demonstrate the numerical values of the parameter in describing robustness of the network. 
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The network consists of 10 nodes and 13 links (i.e. pipes) with the AC of 0.19781 (i.e. 
ACintact=0.19781). It is representative of a WDN connecting two distinct communities. 
Community 1 contains nodes 1 to 5 and Community 2 contains nodes 6 to 10. The 
communities are connected by pipe 5-6. In other words, pipe 5-6 has a high betweenness. 
Table 5.3 ranks 13 events corresponding to the removals of 13 pipes from the 
network. The difference between AC before and after removal of a pipe is presented in a 
descending order. There are 3 events with AC increases, resulting in the network 
disconnection. These are events 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, with the removals of pipes 5-6, 8-9 and 
9-10, respectively. These three pipes are the minimal cut-sets that contain only one break 
corresponding to events E1.1, E1.2 and E1.3, shown in Table 5.2. 
As seen in Fig.5.2, the removal of pipes 5-6, 8-9 and 9-10 will result in the 
disconnection of a node or cluster of nodes. Removal of pipe 5-6 caused the highest 
increase (i.e. ranked first) since it has high betweenness. Pipe 9-10 has the least increase 
because the removal of 9-10 leads to the isolation of a single node (node 10). Phan et al. 
(2017a) have concluded from a previous study that the size and number of disconnected 
clusters greatly affect the increase of the AC.  
The other 10 events (i.e., event 1.4 to 1.13) in Table 5.3 show a decrease of the AC 
with removal of a single pipe, indicating no disconnection. However, the redundancy of 
the network is decreased, and thus the change in the AC shows a positive correlation to 
redundancy. Similar observations were reported in previous studies (Yazdani and Jeffrey, 
2011a and b). These 10 events can further be divided into two groups; the first group 
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consisted of events 1.4 to 1.10 with the removal of pipes in Community 1. The second 
group is the events 1.11 to 1.13 with the removal of pipes in Community 2 which has a 
higher absolute change in AC (AC) compared to the first group. This difference is because 
Community 2 (with AC=0.5188) has less redundancy compared to Community 1 (with 
AC=2.000).  
Table 5.3. AC with removal of a link 
Sub-
Event 
Removed 
Pipe ID AC 
 Change in AC 
AC = AC-
ACintact 
Type of Network 
Struct. Change 
Grouped 
as Note 
1.1 5-6 0.518806 0.32100 Disconnection Group 1 E1.1 
1.2 8-9 0.351227 0.15342 Disconnection Group 1 E1.2 
1.3 9-10 0.266187 0.06838 Disconnection Group 1 E1.3 
1.4 1-2 0.197626 -0.00018 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.5 2-4 0.197626 -0.00018 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.6 1-3 0.193938 -0.00387 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.7 3-4 0.193938 -0.00387 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.8 2-5 0.186393 -0.01141 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.9 1-5 0.182328 -0.01548 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.10 4-5 0.182328 -0.01548 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.11 7-8 0.181990 -0.01582 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.12 6-7 0.167151 -0.03066 Less redundancy Group 2  
1.13 6-8 0.134125 -0.06368 Less redundancy Group 2  
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From the analysis it can be observed that the AC can be used for: 
1. Identifying the disconnection and reduction of redundancy by observing the sign 
of AC, where a positive sign (+) denotes network disconnection and a negative sign (-) 
indicates reduction of redundancy; 
2. Identifying the components causing most significant disconnection based on the 
highest positive AC;  
3. Identifying the components causing the most significant decrease in redundancy, 
based on the highest negative AC. 
The AC based method to determine the minimal cut-set involving a single pipe break, 
as discussed above, is based on solving the Eigenvalue problem. This is basically different 
from the method of counting paths as described in Yannopoulos and Spiliotis (2013). To 
identify whether a single pipe or a set of pipes breaking is a minimal cut-set or not, the 
method reported in Yannopoulos and Spiliotis (2013) requires finding the associated 
connectivity matrix B, as presented below: 
𝐵 = 𝐴𝐴1 + 𝐴𝐴2 +⋯+𝐴𝐴𝑛−1  (5.18) 
Where: AA is the adjacent matrix A (see Eq.5.14) with the removal of the concerned 
pipe or set of pipes. 
Since the computational cost of multiplying two matrices with size n x n is O(n3) for 
a naive algorithm, the computational cost of the last component of matrix B will be O(n4). 
Even for the improved algorithm proposed by Coppersmith and Winograd (1990), the 
116 
 
computational cost of estimating An−1 will be approximately (n-2) × O(n2.375477) = 
O(n3.375477). However, using the Eigenvalue problem, it can be reduced to O(n2) for each 
step of the interaction, for calculating only Eigenvalues (Flannery et al., 1992), compared 
to the cost of O(n3) otherwise. Thus, calculating the last component in Eq.5.18 itself is 
more computationally expensive than the Eigenvalue problem. Consequently, this method 
of counting paths is more computationally expensive than the method based on the 
Eigenvalue problem. Using the available functions of MatlabR software to solve the 
Eigenvalue problem consisting of 5000 nodes and 5000 pipes, which is close to the size of 
the WDN in the city of Mount Pearl in Newfoundland and Labrador, the time required for 
the Eigenvalue problem is just 130 seconds and calculating component AAn−1 only takes 
430 seconds. 
5.3.2. AC for Multiple Pipe Breaks 
However, for multiple breaks, it is challenging to compare ACs. Firstly, the number 
of computations increases significantly since many more sets of pipes are to be considered 
when the size of minimal cut-sets (i.e. number of pipes in the minimal cut-set) is large. For 
example, if finding the minimal cut-sets containing one pipe break requires to solve m 
Eigenvalue problems, approximately m(m-1)/2 Eigenvalue problems need to be solved to 
determine all the minimal cut-sets containing two simultaneous pipe breaks. Secondly, a 
combination of breaks can lead to a “noisy” situation, in which both the disconnection and 
reduction of redundancy may occur. Once this “noise” happens, the AC may decrease 
(e.g., E2.3 in Table 5.2) or increase (e.g., E2.1 in Table 5.2), depending on the network 
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structure. If AC decreases, it may fail to recognize the disconnection. This is further 
demonstrated below through application of the hypothetical network in Fig.5.2. 
Table 5.4 presents the ACs for all possible minimal cut-sets of the network shown in 
Fig.5.2. In Table 5.4, minimal cut-set E2.3 lead to disconnection of node 7; however, the 
change in AC is negative. Thus, the AC based method would fail to identify E2.3. This 
phenomenon is termed herein as “noise”. The reason for the negative AC is that the 
increase of AC due to disconnection of node 7 is less than the decrease of AC due to loss 
of redundancy.  
Note that all the pipes within the set of a minimal cut-set must break simultaneously 
to cause disconnection of the network or to increase the AC. Removal of only one pipe 
from the set does not lead to disconnection or an increase in AC. Thus, the AC of a network 
with removal of a pipe from the set of a minimal cut-set is always lower than the AC of the 
network with removal of all pipes in the minimal cut-set. This characteristic can be used to 
eliminate the noise, as discussed below. 
To implement this, when AC decreases with a set of b breaks, the AC of the network 
is calculated with removal of each of the pipes within the set, i.e. ACu* for removing u
th 
pipe (u=[1:b]). If the largest ACu* is less than the AC with removal of the full set of pipes, 
then disconnection occurs. For example, removal of the set of pipes 6-7 and 6-8 causes a 
negative AC value in Table 5.4, with an AC of 0.1823. The AC of the network with the 
break of pipes 6-8 and 6-7 (AC1* and AC2*) are 0.1341 and 0.1672, respectively. These 
two values are lower than the AC of the event E2.3 (0.1823). Therefore, the set of pipes 6-
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7 and 7-8 is a minimal cut-set that leads to disconnection. In this manner, the noise removal 
is applied to the network (Fig.5.2) and the minimal cut-sets of the network based on the 
change in AC are successfully determined and tabulated in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Minimal cut-sets and associated AC values 
Min. cut-set 
(Ek.pd) 
Pipes in the min. cut-set 
Ek.pd 
(Ek.pd.[pd.1];…; Ek.pd.[pd.k]) 
AC AC 
E1.1 5-6 0.5188 0.3210 
E1.2 8-9 0.3512 0.1534 
E1.3 9-10 0.2662 0.0684 
E2.1 1-3; 3-4 0.2230 0.0252 
E2.2 6-7; 6-8 0.5858 0.3880 
E2.3 6-7; 7-8 0.1823 -0.0155 
E2.4 6-8; 7-8 0.4384 0.2406 
E3.1 1-2; 1-3; 1-5 0.2051 0.0073 
E3.2 1-2; 1-5; 3-4 0.2509 0.0531 
E3.3 1-2; 2-4; 2-5 0.2104 0.0126 
E3.4 1-3; 2-4; 4-5 0.2509 0.0531 
E3.5 1-5; 2-5; 4-5 0.4131 0.2153 
E3.6 2-4; 3-4; 4-5 0.2051 0.0073 
E4.1 1-2; 1-3; 2-5; 4-5 0.3004 0.1026 
E4.2 1-2; 1-5; 2-4; 4-5 0.3004 0.1026 
E4.3 1-2; 2-5; 3-4; 4-5 0.2137 0.0159 
E4.4 1-3; 1-5; 2-4; 2-5 0.2137 0.0159 
E4.5 1-5; 2-4; 2-5; 3-4 0.3004 0.1026 
 
5.4. Reliability Assessment Using AC  
The exact solution of the network disconnection probability can be obtained 
theoretically by rigorously examining the minimal cut-sets using FTA, as discussed above. 
However, this process requires tedious and complex computations for a large-scale 
network. Therefore, a practical approach is required, using with assumptions to overcome 
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the difficulties. This section develops a framework to estimate network disconnection 
probability based on the change of AC. It is revealed earlier that a single event-based failure 
probability provides a reasonable approximation of the system failure probability (i.e., 
P(E) ≈ P(E1)). Both single event-based and multiple-event-based failure probabilities are 
considered here for the AC based reliability assessment. For the failure probability of the 
pipe components, a constant failure rate-based model, a failure function (i.e., exponential 
function) and Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) are considered.   
5.4.1. Single Event Based Approximate Failure Probability 
When the pipe breaking is assumed as a Poisson process with a constant failure rate, 
which depends on the length of the components, the mean pipe failure rate of a component 
can be related to the length of the component using Eq.5.9.  It can be expressed for the 
minimal cut-set containing one pipe as: 
−𝜆1.𝑝𝑑 = −
𝐵𝑟
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑙1.𝑝𝑑  (5.19) 
Where: l1.pd is the length of pipe corresponding to the pd
th minimal cut-set containing 
only one pipe.  
Approximating P(E)  P(E1), as described in Eq.5.13, the failure probability of the 
system can be defined as: 
𝑃(𝐸) ≈ 𝑃(𝐸1) = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃(𝐸1.𝑝𝑑))
𝑝1
𝑝𝑑=1 = 1 −∏ (𝑒
−𝜆1.𝑝𝑑×𝑡)
𝑝1
𝑝𝑑=1   
= 1 − 𝑒𝑡
∑ (−𝜆1.𝑝𝑑)
𝑝1
𝑝𝑑=1  (5.20)    
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Substituting Eq.5.19 with Eq.5.20: 
𝑃(𝐸, 𝑡) ≈ 1 − 𝑒
(−
𝐵𝑟×𝑡
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
∑ (𝑙1.𝑝𝑑 )
𝑝1
𝑝𝑑=1 )  (5.21) 
For a group of pipes with minimal cut-set, the total length of the group is given by 
𝑙𝑔1 = ∑ (𝑙1.𝑝𝑑 )
𝑝1
𝑝𝑑=1   (5.22) 
Using the length of the group of pipes, the failure probability of the system can be 
defined as: 
𝑃(𝐸, 𝑡) ≈ 1 − 𝑒
(−
𝑙𝑔1×𝐵𝑟×𝑡
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
)
 (5.23)  
However, the pipe breaking is not necessarily a Poisson process with or without a 
constant failure rate. Particularly, the WDN is a system containing a mixture of pipes 
ranging from newly installed segments to wear-out segments. The age-dependent 
degradation of WDN pipe segments is an unavoidable mechanism, because these structures 
are exposed directly to a hazardous environment, leading to corrosion and cracking. Once 
a pipe is at its wear-out stage, the assumption of a constant break rate may no longer be 
adequate. The degrading pipe segments would need a more precise failure function with 
sufficient input data to describe the failure process with an increasing failure probability. 
For any other component failure model, the failure probability of the system can be defined 
based on the assumption of P(E)  P(E1) as: 
𝑃(𝐸, 𝑡) ≈ 𝑃(𝐸1, 𝑡) = [1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃(𝐸1.𝑝𝑑.[𝑝𝑑.1], 𝑡))
𝑝𝑘
𝑝𝑑=1 ]  (5.24) 
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A detailed failure probability estimation procedure using either Poisson process-
based failure functions or any other failure functions are illustrated in Fig.5.4.  
5.4.2. Multiple Event Based Failure Probability 
Fig.5.5 illustrates the detailed procedure of calculating system failure probability 
considering rigorous multiple events (i.e., minimal cut-sets). As discussed earlier, “noise” 
may appear in the failure probability assessment for minimal cut-set containing multiple 
pipes. Thus, there can be some disconnection events with negative AC. A sub-algorithm 
(Fig.5.5) discussed in Section “AC for multiple pipe breaks” can be applied to avoid the 
noise problem. For calculation of failure probability of the components, application of a 
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is used. 
The methods discussed above are applied to the network presented in Fig.5.2 through 
development of codes using MatlabR software. The calculated failure probabilities are 
compared in Fig.5.6. For the failure function, an equivalent exponential model is 
considered for illustration. The failure probability based on rigorous investigation of the 
network using FTA (without the use of AC) is also calculated and included in the figure. 
Among AC based methods, the approximate failure probabilities calculated using a Poisson 
process based and exponential component failure model are the same in Fig.5.6, since 
equivalent reliability models are used for the components. In the developed framework, 
different reliability models can be used (e.g. Weibull or lognormal distribution) instead of 
an exponential model, if the distribution is known.  
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Figure 5.4. Flow chart for single event based approximate failure probability 
(P(E)  P(E1)) 
The MC simulation conducted using 10000 trials each time provides multiple event-
based failure probabilities, which is very close to the failure probabilities calculated using 
single event-based approximation. Note that the MC simulation without the “noise” 
removal sub-algorithm fails to predict the failure probability (Fig.5.6). 
 
Develop the ranked table of   AC
Start
Compute the total length
of the network  (ltotal)
Compute the total length
of Group 1 (lg1)
Estimate component failure
probability for each pipe
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End
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Use Eq.24
Using any failure function
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Figure 5.5. Flow chart for multiple event-based failure probability calculation 
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Figure 5.6. Comparison of network disconnection probability with different 
approaches 
In Fig.5.6, the failure probability calculated using the FTA and AC methods is not 
significantly different. The network disconnection probability reaches close to one hundred 
percent after 26 months, according to the rigorous FTA solution. The AC based method 
with reliability algorithms predicts the failure probability as 97 percent (after 26 months).  
5.5. A Case Study of the City of Mount Pearl 
The developed method is applied to the network in the city of Mount Pearl, which is 
a community with a population of approximately 25,000. The water main system contains 
130km of pipe network (see schematic shown in Fig.5.7). Thus, on average, 192 people 
are served by each kilometer of water main, which is comparable to common WDNs in the 
USA and Canada, which serve 164 people per kilometer (Folkman, 2018). Diameters of 
the pipes in the city range from 150 to 450mm. Water is bought from St John’s – a neighbor 
city – to two water tanks located at the North (S1) and South West (S2) parts of the city. 
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The water distribution system to support the entire city is based on gravity flow. The 
locations of the sources are ignored in this study, for simplification. However, they could 
be useful for further study, which defines system failure as the disconnection of the source 
to nodes or reachability of the network. A sample of a raw database for the network is 
presented in Table 5.5. The table is included to show the typical WDN data that can be 
used for the AC based method. After reorganizing the database, it is found that the WDN 
of the city of Mount Pearl contains 4848 nodes and 5046 pipes (Table 5.5).  
This pipe system generally comprises ductile iron (91%), cast iron pipe (5%) and 
other materials (4%). Based on the annual water main break records of the city, the annual 
break rate is 6.931 breaks/year/100km. This break rate is comparable to the average break 
rate of 6.77 breaks/year/100km reported in Folkman (2018). It is understood that the break 
rate based on limited records is not sufficient for failure assessment but is acceptable for 
the purpose of illustration.  
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Figure 5.7. Schematic of water main network in city of Mount Pearl 
Table 5.5. Water main database for city of Mount Pearl 
Node 
ID 
Shape Pipe ID Material 
Diameter 
(mm) 
X Y 
1 Point 1 Ductile Iron 150 320991.62230 5264475.70150 
2 Point 1 Ductile Iron 150 321007.09150 5264498.97460 
3 Point 2 Ductile Iron 200 321048.28280 5265709.24110 
… … … … … … … 
8564 Point 9474 Ductile Iron 150 320423.51620 5263016.32110 
 
 
 
 
S1
S2
Source 
Node 
Pipe (link)
N
Node ID 4497
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Table 5.6. Complex network system parameters for the city of Mount Pearl (After 
Phan et al. 2017a) 
Parameter Equation  Calculated value Reference values* 
Total length ltotal =∑∑lij
n
j=1
n
i=1
 
 
129.837 (km)  
Number of pipes -  5046 769-3065 
Number of nodes -  4848 755-2799 
Link-per-node e =
m
n
 
 1.041 1.01-1.10 
Average node degree ka =
2m
n
 
 
2.082 2.04-2.23 
Link density q =
2m
n(n − 1)
 
 
4.29×10-4 7.83×10-4– 2.7×10-3 
Independent loop f = m− n + 1  197 - 
Meshedness coefficient rm =
f
2n − 5
 
 
0.0203 9.97×10-3 – 5.86×10-2 
Threshold for random  
removal of node 
fc  = 1 −
1
mean(k2)
ka
− 1
 
 
0.1770 0.22 – 0.42 
Route factor g =
1
1 − n
∑
s,i
s,i
n−1
i=1
 
 
1.7560 1.45 -1.67 
Characteristic path length l =
1
1 − n
∑dij
i≠j
 
 
88.378 25.94 – 51.44 
Algebraic connectivity  -  1.5625×10-5 6.09×10-5– 2.43×10-4 
Spectra gap -  2.55×10-2 9.08×10-3– 7.27×10-2 
       * From Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011a)  
Phan et al. (2017a) calculated different parameters used in complex network analysis 
to assess the robustness and redundancy of the network for the WDN of the city. Yazdani 
and Jeffrey (2011a) provided a summary of the parameters used to assess the redundancy 
and robustness of networks. The parameters calculated for the network in the city of Mount 
Pearl are provided in Table 5.6 and are compared with values for different other cities as 
reported in Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011a). In Table 5.6, the parameters for the city of Mount 
Pearl are mostly within the ranges of those for the other cities, indicating that the 
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redundancy, connectivity and robustness of the city network are similar to those for other 
cities reported in Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011a). The redundancy, connectivity and 
robustness parameters of the Mount Pearl network range from the average to lower bound 
values of the parameters in the networks reported in Yazdani and Jeffrey (2011a). The low 
well-connectivity can be observed since the network contains high betweenness pipes, the 
removal of which could lead to the separation of the network.  
5.5.1. Identification of the Critical Pipes 
For identification of critical pipes using AC, the pipes can be ranked according to the 
change in AC (AC) with and without removal of a pipe from the network. Sample results 
of ranking of the pipes in the city of Mount Pearl’s WDN are presented in Table 5.7. The 
histogram of the AC is presented in Fig.5.8. According to this table, there are 2061 out 
of 5046 pipes belonging to Group 1 that directly lead to disconnection, and the remaining 
pipes belonging to Group 2 cause a reduction of redundancy. From Fig.5.8, the AC 
generally ranges from -2.5×10-6 to 2.5×10-6 with some outliers that have significantly high 
positive values of up to 40×10-5. This sudden jump in AC marks the most critical pipes, 
the failures of which would lead to an overall structural change in the network (i.e. 
disconnection on a large scale). Group 2 does not contain such outliers. Even though Group 
2 has no outliers, it is helpful to understand the reduction of redundancy on a macro scale. 
To investigate the groups of pipes further, a set of the top 50 ranked pipes from Group 1 is 
analyzed in more detail. The most important pipes of Group 2 (first 100 ranked pipes) have 
also been analyzed as, illustrated in Fig.5.9.  
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The critical pipes in the network are also identified using the Shortest Path (SP) 
method for comparison. In the SP method, the shortest path to all pairs of nodes within the 
network is investigated. The method is thus computationally more demanding than the AC 
based method. A pipe component appearing in the highest number of the shortest path is 
most critical, since water is expected to flow through this pipe component to a maximum 
number of destinations. The pipes are therefore ranked according to the number of their 
appearances on the shortest paths. The pipes with higher rank are more critical. Fig.5.10 
shows the top 100 highest ranked pipes (shown in pink color) in the city of Mount Pearl’s 
network. As seen in the figure, the critical pipes connect the northern and southern 
communities. The highest ranked pipe is the one laid between the Southern community, 
S1, and Northern community, S2 (Fig.5.10). Note that the sub-communities are not 
disconnected with removal of the pipe, since there are several other paths (redundancy) to 
connect the two sub-communities. An alternative path is shown as bold black lines in 
Fig.5.10. Thus, the SP method provides information for the important pipes (critical pipes), 
which may or may not lead to the separation of part(s) of the network. The method cannot 
be applied to identify the pipes that may lead to network disconnections.  
The top ranked pipes based on the AC (Fig.5.9) matched well with the shortest path 
results presented in Fig.5.10. Thus, the AC could effectively classify the critical pipes in 
Group 1 and Group 2. The ranked AC table can also be used to identify the alternate path 
of connecting two points, which cannot be obtained from the shortest path method. 
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Figure 5.8. Histogram of the AC with single break from Table 5.7 
Table 5.7. The changes of AC for the city of Mount Pearl WDN 
Removed pipe ID AC   AC = AC-ACintact 
Type of network 
structural change 
Grouped as 
1734-1735 5.52×10-5 3.96×10-5 Disconnection Group 1 
1734-3518 5.52×10-5 3.96×10-5 Disconnection Group 1 
1733-3518 5.52×10-5 3.95×10-5 Disconnection Group 1 
... ... ... ... ... 
2373-2631 1.21×10-5 -3.56×10-6 Less redundancy Group 2 
1655-2631 1.21×10-5 -3.57×10-6 Less redundancy Group 2 
1655-1656 1.21×10-5 -3.57×10-6 Less redundancy Group 2 
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Figure 5.9. Top ranked pipes of Group 1 and Group 2 
 
Figure 5.10. Results for shortest path analysis 
Pipe 1734-1735
Pipe 1655-1656
1st positive AC
Top 50 pipes with positive AC (group 1)
1st negative AC
Top 100 pipes with negative AC (group 2)
(The first ranked pipe has largest absolute AC)
Top 100 pipes ranked by shortest
path (SP) algorithm
Northern community
Southern community 1
Highest ranked pipe
A potential alternative path to connect two
communities if the top ranked pipe is broken
Southern community 2
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5.5.2. Estimating the System Disconnection Probability  
Disconnection probability of the city of the Mount Pearl WDN is analyzed using the 
methods discussed above.  The results are presented in Table 5.8 and Fig.5.11. Time 
periods of 1, 2, 6 and 12 months are used in the analysis. From Table 5.8, the PBr.av of the 
network is significantly low compared with the example in Fig.5.2. Thus, the calculated 
failure probabilities using the single event-based approach and the multiple even based 
approach are almost the same in Fig.5.11. 
Table 5.8. Comparison of failure probabilities 
t 
(month) 
Average 
number of 
breaks 
PBr.av 
P(E1, t) 
Single event based 
P(E, t) 
Multiple 
event based 
1 0.716 1.486×10-4 0.243 0.229 
2 1.518 2.973×10-4 0.427 0.436 
6 4.479 8.918×10-4 0.812 0.814 
12 8.834 17.836×10-4 0.964 0.973 
5.6. Conclusion  
In an existing water distribution system, pipe breaks causing isolation of part of the 
system should be avoided, to provide uninterrupted service to the dwellers. Studying the 
disconnection probability of WDN is therefore important for optimizing 
repair/maintenance prioritization planning. A pipe or combination of pipes causing 
network isolation can be identified using the minimal cut-sets method. In the conventional 
minimal cut-set method, pipes causing system failure (i.e., isolation) are rigorously 
examined to determine a combination of the minimal number of components’ failure 
leading to the system failure. The process of finding minimal cut-sets is very complex and 
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requires extensive computation. This chapter presents a method of finding minimal cut-
sets using algebraic connectivity (AC) for complex network analysis. The AC based 
approaches reduced the amount of computation required compared to the existing methods 
including the graph theory used in Yannopoulos and Spiliotis (2013). The AC is a network 
parameter which is determined by solving Eigenvalue problems that avoids the counting 
the paths, as described in Yannopoulos and Spiliotis (2013). The decrease of AC due to a 
pipe break indicates a reduction of redundancy and the increase of AC indicates 
disconnection (isolation) of parts of the network. For the events with multiple pipe breaks, 
some break might cause an increase in AC while others might cause a decrease in AC, 
resulting in a “noisy” situation. A methodology is developed to eliminate the “noise” for 
multiple pipe breaks through scrutinizing the pipes in the minimal cut sets. A failure 
probability estimation framework is developed using the AC based minimal cut-sets. 
 
Figure 5.11. System disconnection probability 
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The proposed method employs removal of pipes one by one from the network and 
subsequent estimation of the change in AC (AC) for estimating the network failure 
probability and ranking pipes within the network according to their importance level. Based 
on these steps, the critical pipes in the network can be identified. The suitability of the 
proposed method is demonstrated through application, first to a simple hypothetical 
network and then to a medium sized real water distribution system. The study reveals that 
the single event based approximate failure probability can reasonably be used for system 
probability assessment, saving extensive computational time. The critical pipes identified 
using the AC based method are validated through comparison with the results of the 
shortest path (SP) method. The SP method is a distance related measurement in CNA, 
which is useful for identifying high betweenness pipes or nodes (Newman 2010). However, 
the SP method cannot be used for identification of network isolation. 
The proposed reliability model presented in this chapter considers the probability of 
disconnection only. Hydraulic availability of the demand nodes is not considered. Thus, 
lower bound values of the system failure probability are obtained. The developed model 
examines constant annual break rate-based component failure functions. Further 
observation on the properties of the AC and the effects of individual pipe failure on the 
overall network are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6. RISK ASSESSMENT OF WDN DUE TO WATER MAIN BREAKS5 
6.1. Introduction 
Water distribution network (WDN) is a valuable infrastructure that is essential for 
the human community. WDNs are often operated in highly hazardous environments, 
resulting in corrosion and breaks. Maintenance of the infrastructure is required to reduce 
the frequency of water main breaks and hence to protect the public health and safety. The 
annual maintenance cost of a WDN is often significant (Fares and Zayed, 2010). A strategy 
with risk based prioritizing or ranking pipes/components within a WDN can provide a 
proper maintenance plan with optimal utilization of resources. Risk is mathematically 
defined as the multiplication of failure probability and consequence. Quantifications of the 
probability and consequence of water main failure are very complex, as these depend on a 
number of uncertain factors. Fuzzy techniques are often successfully used for risk 
estimation especially when the inputs contain the uncertainty (Fares and Zayed, 2010). Yan 
and Vairavamoorthy (2003) used a fuzzy technique to combine numerical inputs (i.e. 
diameter, age and material) and linguistic inputs (i.e. road loading, soil condition and the 
surrounding environment). Based on this combination, crisp indicators for pipe conditions 
are obtained for prioritizing pipe inspections. Kleiner et al. (2004) introduced a fuzzy-based 
failure probability assessment and then used a risk matrix for estimating the time-
dependent risk. However, the consequences in Kleiner et al. (2004) are arbitrarily assumed. 
                                                          
5 This chapter is based on an article submitted for publication in a peer-reviewed journal: Hieu Chi Phan, 
Ashutosh Sutra Dhar, Guangji Hu, Rehan Sadiq (2018), “Managing Water Main Breaks in Distribution 
Networks – A Risk-Based Decision Making”. The work was carried out, and the paper was drafted by the 
first author. The work was supervised, and the paper was reviewed by the co-authors. 
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Fares and Zayed (2010) proposed a hierarchical fuzzy expert system and Fuzzy Inference 
System (FIS) to evaluate the risk score by considering various environmental, physical, 
and operational deterioration factors and post-failure consequences. However, the 16 sub-
factors in this approach require subjective assessments. The relationship between pipe age 
and break records was considered separately without properly modelling.  
However, estimating the overall consequence of failure by a non-fuzzy method is 
difficult. It is hard to unify different types of consequences into a general unit even though 
many studies attempted to convert different consequences into one outcome. Moglia et al. 
(2006) provided a decision support system for prioritization of water pipelines based on 
the risk of a pipe failure with the consequence in terms of cost. Roger (2011) proposed 
using a simple scoring system involving pipe diameter, material, age and break history 
factors to rank pipes within a network. Baah et al. (2015) also used a system of 11 factors 
to produce the general consequence based on pipe diameters, burial depths and other 
parameters.  
Both of these approaches involve different types of consequence parameters. 
Combining various types of consequences into an aggregated one is important for 
simplifying the consequence estimating process. A fuzzy inference system (FIS) could be 
used to combine various consequences using a reasoning framework. In this method, 
different types of inputs (in crisp or fuzzy form) are converted by a combination of a fuzzy 
knowledge base (i.e. fuzzy rules and membership functions of fuzzy sets used in rules) and 
an inference engine, to obtain a crisp and aggregated output. The inputs could be in 
different units such as currency, importance level, and scores. Fares and Zayed (2010) 
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conducted a FIS analysis to aggregate the factors of cost of repair, damage to the 
surroundings, loss of production, traffic disruption and type of service area in a 
consequence model. Roozbahani et al. (2013) aggregated consequences of unsafe water 
supply, economical losses, negative social impacts and human losses into a unified 
consequence. In the application of FIS, the definitions of fuzzy rules and membership 
functions play important roles in the consequence assessment. 
Determining consequence parameters for a WDN, where the pipes are interacting 
with each other, is a challenging task. The interaction of pipes within a network was 
discussed in many reliability studies as the connectivity and the reachability (Tung, 1985; 
Wagner et al., 1988; Quimpo and Shamsi, 1991), which are defined as the connection of 
all demand nodes to the source nodes and the connection of a demand node to its source, 
respectively. The interaction of pipes can be modelled as the effects of a pipe’s breaking 
on the whole network’s integrity using graph theory. The complex network analysis in 
graph theory has recently been used for the assessment of well-connectedness of a WDN 
(Yazdani and Jeffrey, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Yannopoulos and Spiliotis, 2013; Nazempour 
et al., 2016; Phan et al. 2018a). Phan et al. (2018a) proposed a method of using Algebraic 
Connectivity (AC) to estimate the disconnection probability of the network.  
AC is a parameter that measures the well-connectedness of a graph (Fiedler, 1973; 
Capocci et al., 2005; Ghosh and Boyd, 2006; Newman, 2006, Yazdani and Jeffrey, 2011a, 
b). A network with a higher AC is more robust or more tolerant to breakage of pipes. Phan 
et al. (2018a) took the advantage of the property of AC and observed the change of a 
network’s connectivity with and without a single water main break to highlight the 
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important pipes within the network. This approach considers only the effects on network 
connectivity as the consequence and does not account for other consequences such as the 
economic consequence and the impact of service disruption to the community. For 
example, the impact of water service disruption within a school zone is different from the 
impact of service disruption to a hospital. This effect can be determined by incorporating 
an importance factor for the pipes based on their location. As for the economic 
consequence, pipe diameter can be used as the consequence parameter, as the breaking of 
a larger diameter pipe is expected to have a higher cost than the breaking of a smaller 
diameter pipe. This research develops a risk-based prioritization method of water mains in 
a WDN, combining the impact on system connectivity with other consequences. An FIS is 
developed to obtain an aggregated consequence and then, a simple risk based prioritizing 
plan.   
6.2. Algebraic Connectivity 
As discussed in Chapter 5, AC is defined as the second smallest Eigen-value of the 
Laplacian matrix (Fiedler, 1973). If a municipal Water Distribution Network (WDN) is 
modeled as a graph of G=G(V,P), where V is a set of n nodes (intersections) and P is a set 
of m pipes, then an adjacent matrix A of G is used to describe the link between the nodes, 
where:  
𝐴 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (6.1)  
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 1 if there is a link (pipe) between node i and node j. 
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𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 0 if there is no link (pipe) between node i and node j. 
The node-degree matrix is a diagonal matrix, which contains the information about 
the number of connections (node-degree) at each node, and is defined as: 
𝐷 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑑𝑖)  (6.2) 
di:  number of connections (node-degree) of node i, where: 
𝑑𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1   (6.3) 
Then, the Laplacian matrix is given by Eq.6.4: 
𝐿 = 𝐷 −  𝐴 (6.4) 
The Laplacian matrix, L, for the undirected network is usually symmetric and the 
sum of rows (and columns) is zero. This characteristic leads to the fact that the first (i.e. 
smallest) Eigen-value (λ1) of the matrix that corresponds to the Eigen vector of (1,1,...,1)T 
is zero. The second smallest Eigen-value (λ2) of the Laplacian matrix is the AC, which is 
greater than 0 if G is a connected graph. The Eigen-values of a network with n nodes of 
connected graph are: 𝜆1 = 0 ≤ 𝜆2 = 𝐴𝐶 ≤ 𝜆3. . . ≤ 𝜆𝑛. 
If the AC of the network with the removal of the ith pipe and the intact network are 
denoted as ACi and ACo, respectively, the changing AC (ΔAC) due to the removal of the 
ith pipe can be found as: 
𝛥𝐴𝐶𝑖 = 𝐴𝐶𝑖  −  𝐴𝐶𝑜 (6.5) 
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ACi was used to rank water mains in a WDN according to their impacts on the 
robustness of the network and the potential of causing isolation (disconnection) (Phan et 
al., 2018a). In this method, the topology of WDN (measured as ΔAC) was considered for 
ranking the importance of pipes (called herein a topological consequence). The AC 
approach is different from the existing pipe ranking method, which measures the 
importance of pipes based on hydraulic availability. Yoo et al. (2014) employed a method 
for priority determination of water mains considering hydraulic importance. They 
employed the original water flows within the segment of the WDN, consisting of a set of 
pipes that was disconnected by a water control valve after failure of a particular pipe, 
including the failed pipe (in the event of a failure) to define a hydraulic importance factor 
(HIF), after Walski (1993) and Jun et al. (2008). The HIF for a pipe is defined as (Eq.6.6): 
𝐻𝐼𝐹𝑖 =
(𝑄𝑖+𝑄𝑖,𝑠𝑒𝑔)
𝑄𝑠𝑢𝑚
 (6.6) 
Where Qi and Qi,seg are the flows in the i
th pipe and in the pipes within the affected 
segment, respectively, if the ith pipe breaks. Qsum is the summation of flow in all pipes 
within the WDN. HIFi reflects the hydraulic importance of the i
th pipe, where a higher HIFi 
value indicates a higher importance of the pipe.  
The capability of priority determination using AC is examined with the comparison 
of priority determined using the hydraulic importance (Yoo et al., 2014) for a hypothetical 
series-parallel system, shown in Fig.6.1. The network is organized with a combination of 
pipes at different importance levels. Sub-system 1 has pipes 1-2 and 9-12 in series. It is 
also in parallel with pipes 2-10-11-9 and Sub-system 2. In Subsystem 2, pipes 4-7 and 5-6 
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are parallel. Node 1 is a source and node 2 is an isolated destination. As seen in the figure, 
pipe 1-2 is most important as failure of this pipe would cause complete disruption of water 
service. Pipe 10-11 is relatively less important since its failure will not cause any disruption 
of service at any of the nodes except node 11. However, the redundancy of the network 
will be reduced due to the failure of pipe 10-11.  
AC and HIF of the pipes in the network shown in Fig.6.1 are calculated for 
comparison. AC is calculated through development of a MatlabR code. For HIF, hydraulic 
analysis is performed to calculate the flow in each of the pipes in the intake network using 
EPAnet software (Shang et al., 2008). The HIF is then calculated using Eq.6.6. A Breadth-
First search algorithm (Moore, 1959) was used to identify the affected segment for any 
breakage of pipe. 
 
Figure 6.1. A hypothetical water distribution network 
Table 6.1 shows a comparison of ranking of the pipes according to AC and HIF. In 
this table, the group of pipes having positive ΔAC (group 1) is placed first, followed by the 
group of pipes with the corresponding negative ΔAC (group 2). In groups 1 and 2, pipes 
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are ranked in the descending and ascending order according to the ΔAC values, 
respectively. This order implied that disconnection is more important than reduction of 
redundancy, and that the important level of a pipe within a group is positively correlated 
to its corresponding absolute ΔAC. In Table 6.1, the ΔAC is ranked from pipes [1-2; 9-12], 
pipe 10-11 to pipe [4-7; 5-6] in descending order.    
As seen in Table 6.1, the rankings of pipes according to HIF and AC are different, 
even though these are common for some pipes, particularly the most critical pipes (i.e., 1-
2). The AC-based approach ranks pipes 1-2 and 9-12 at the same level, while the HIF 
approach ranks pipe 9-12 in the 6th place, while pipe 1-2 is ranked it in the first place. This 
is because the AC-based approach focuses on the topological changes of the system 
regardless of the direction of flow, while the HIF-based method accounts for the direction 
of the flow. Failure of pipes 9-12 located on the downstream side has less impact on the 
upstream pipes. Thus, the major difference between the hydraulic and the AC based 
approaches is that the hydraulic method considers the direction of flow while the AC based 
method focuses on the change of network well-connectedness due to a pipe breakage. One 
of the limitations of the hydraulic based method is that it requires a detailed hydraulic 
analysis of complex WDN. Additionally, the hydraulic-based prioritization does not 
provide any indication of whether a pipe break would cause disconnection. In comparison, 
a positive increase of AC indicates that the failure of the pipe would lead to disconnection 
in the network. AC is therefore employed here to account for the topological consequence.   
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Table 6.1. Important level of pipe in the hypothetical network 
Removed 
Pipe ID AC*   ΔAC 
Type of Network  
Structural Change 
Group HIF 
ΔAC 
Rank 
Hydraulic 
Rank* 
1-2 0.27716  0.00921 Disconnection 1 1.0000 1 1 
9-12 0.27716  0.00921 Disconnection 1 0.1480 1 6 
3-13 0.07608 -0.19187 Less Redundancy 2 0.3890 3 3 
8-14 0.07608 -0.19187 Less Redundancy 2 0.1297 3 7 
2-3 0.08154 -0.18640 Less Redundancy 2 0.4535 5 2 
8-9 0.08154 -0.18640 Less Redundancy 2 0.0065 5 13 
9-11 0.09453 -0.17342 Less Redundancy 2 0.0835 7 10 
2-10 0.09453 -0.17342 Less Redundancy 2 0.1480 7 4 
10-11 0.09679 -0.17116 Less Redundancy 2 0.1670 9 5 
6-14 0.18639 -0.08156 Less Redundancy 2 0.0326 10 14 
5-13 0.18639 -0.08156 Less Redundancy 2 0.0977 10 8 
7-14 0.18639 -0.08156 Less Redundancy 2 0.0326 10 14 
4-13 0.18639 -0.08156 Less Redundancy 2 0.0977 10 8 
4-7 0.22429 -0.04366 Less Redundancy 2 0.0651 14 11 
5-6 0.22429 -0.04366 Less Redundancy 2 0.0651 14 11 
* If two or more pipes have the same value, they are placed in the same order number, 
but the next order number is skipped.  
6.3. Risk Assessment Methodology 
Risk calculation requires development of models for failure probability and 
consequence assessments. A simple failure probability model for the pipes in a WDN can 
be established based on break records, pipe age and other information or using a mechanics 
based stochastic method discussed in Chapter 3. However, it is difficult to estimate the 
consequence, since a general rule of consequence applicable for all water main systems is 
not available (Walski and Pelliccia, 1982). Relative consequence is therefore used to rank 
the pipes based on their corresponding consequence. Roger (2011) proposed an implicit 
risk table for pipes based on the sum-up score, in which the final score is linearly added 
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from diameter, installation date, material and break records. Baah et al. (2015) conducted 
a risk analysis based on a composed consequence of different types of impact factors, 
including location factors (i.e. factor related to the location of pipe with respect to other 
construction, buildings, area etc.) and size factor (i.e. diameter). Although these studies 
employ relative consequences to compare the risk of failure among pipes in the network, 
the scoring system requires subjective judgement. This study proposes using a FIS for 
consequence assessment accounting for the topological consequence (using AC) with other 
consequences based on available information. Fig.6.2 presents the framework for the risk 
assessment. As shown in the figure, the failure probability of each pipe at time t is 
established while the relative consequences corresponding to the break of each pipe are 
fuzzified and aggregated to obtain a crisp overall consequence. After calculation of the 
risk, the priority order of each individual pipe in the network is determined for prioritization 
planning.  
 
Figure 6.2. Flowchart of evaluating risk for each pipe 
Risk of pipe
Aggregated Consequence
Defuzzification
Fuzzy rule and
Fuzzy Inference Engine
Fuzzification
Consequences
(C   )
Fuzzy Inference System
Break records;
Pipe ages
Fitting Process
Failure Probability Model
i,k
Failure Probability
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6.4. Failure Probability Modeling  
A number of different approaches, including physical and statistical models, are 
proposed in the literature for failure probability modelling of a WDN (Rajani and Kleiner, 
2001; Kleiner and Rajani, 2001). A statistical fitting process can be conducted based on 
the pipe age and break records of the network. This is a simple approach, which can be 
improved using different techniques. For example, where the data are annually collected, 
an updating step using Bayesian theory could be applied to train the model with new break 
records. The failure probability model can also be developed using a mechanically based 
approach if the information on the pipe degradation is available (Phan et al., 2018b).  
The Weibull distribution for failure probability modeling is used because of its 
flexible property and suitability for a WDN (Large et al., 2014). It is widely used for 
modeling pipe breakage (e.g. Sadiq et al.,2004; Rogers, 2011; Park et al., 2015; Phan et al., 
2018b). Sadiq et al. (2004) observed various distributions to define the failure probability 
for a water main and the Weibull distribution was found to fit well with the simulated data. 
Nonetheless, Park et al. (2015) conducted a statistical goodness of fit test on different 
distributions and the Weibull distribution was found to have an insignificant difference 
from lognormal, gamma and logistic distributions.  
The probability density function according to Weibull distribution is given by Eq.6.7: 
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Reliability and failure probability functions are defined as: 
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Where Ri(t) is reliability and Fi(t) is failure probability at time t; βi is shape parameter, 
ηi is a scale parameter and γi is the location parameter indicating the year of construction; 
t is the current observing year. Thus, (t- γi) is the age of the ith pipe. The parameters can be 
determined using a fitting process with available data. 
6.5. Relative Consequences  
The selection of consequence parameter depends on the available information about 
the pipes and the water distribution system. Information about pipe diameters is generally 
available to the municipalities, where the diameter is a common factor appearing in various 
cost models (Walski and Pelliccia, 1982; Kim and Mays, 1994; Loganathan et al., 2002; 
Dandy and Engelhardt, 2006; Montalvo et al., 2008; Alvisi and Franchini, 2009; 
Marchionni et al. 2016) or mentioned as an important factor of consequence (Male et al., 
1990; Li et al. 2014). The failures of large diameter pipes incur more significant 
consequences in the form of financial losses, social impact and environmental impact (Ji 
et al 2017).  Diameter is not only related directly to the cost for repair/replacement of a 
pipe but also partly implies to the volume of water transported. Thus, it provides an 
indication of the volume of water that may be affected by the failure. While the diameter-
related consequences account for the cost of failure without concerning the interaction of 
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pipes within the network, the ΔAC could be used to account for the topological 
consequence. In addition, location parameters could be used, if the information is available, 
to account for the consequence based on the location of the pipes.  
Because the aim of prioritizing is comparing a pipe with others to choose the most 
significant pipe set, the ratio of input parameter with the maximum value can be used to 
obtain the relative magnitude of the input values for each pipe, up to the maximum one in 
the network. For example, the crisp input for diameter and topological (AC) consequences 
of the ith pipe can be calculated as (Eqs.5.10 and 5.11): 
𝐶𝑖,𝑑𝑖𝑎 =
𝐷𝑖
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥
 (6.10) 
𝐶𝑖,𝑠𝑦𝑠 =
Δ𝐴𝐶𝑖
ΔAC𝑚𝑎𝑥
 (6.11) 
Where: Ci,dia and Ci,sys are the diameter-related and system-related consequences of 
the ith pipe; Di and Dmax are the diameters of the i
th pipe and the maximum diameter of all 
pipes in the network, ΔACi and ΔACmax are the change of AC for the ith pipe and the 
maximum change in AC of all pipes in the network.  
6.5.1. Fuzzification of Consequences  
Assuming that the severity level of consequence of a pipe failure can linguistically 
be evaluated as Low, Medium Low, Medium, Medium High and High, a set of Triangular 
Fuzzy Numbers, 𝐴𝑖,𝑘, with the 5 grades or subsets 𝐴𝑗
𝑖,𝑘
 (j=1,2,…,5), can be used 
correspondingly. If the consequence of the failure of the ith pipe is denoted as 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 (k can 
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both be diameter and system-related consequence), then 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 can be a member of subset 
𝐴𝑗
𝑖,𝑘
 at a certain degree of membership µ𝑗 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘) which ranges between [0, 1].  
In this study, the subset 𝐴𝑗
𝑖,𝑘
, which corresponds to the linguistic severity grade of 
consequence, is assumed as a triangular fuzzy number (TFN) and shown in Table 6.2. The 
TFN can be assigned subjectively or obtained from expert elicitation. Note that the 
maximum of 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 is 1 for all k and that the fuzzy set A can be generally used for diameter, 
location and system related consequences. 
Fig.6.3 illustrates the relationship of uncertain relative consequence 𝐶𝑖,𝑘, subset 𝐴𝑗
𝑖,𝑘
 
and the membership function µ𝑗 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘). For example, if the ith pipe has the system related 
consequence 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 of 0.7, the corresponding µ3 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘) and µ4 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘) are 0.2 and 0.8, 
respectively. The other µ𝑗 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘) (j=1, 2, 4, 5) are equal to zero. That is: 
 𝐴𝑖,𝑘 = [µ1 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘), µ2 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘), µ3 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘), µ4 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘), µ5 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘)] = [0,0, 0.2, 0.8, 0] 
Table 6.2. Triangle fuzzy numbers and their corresponding qualitative scale of 
fuzzy set A 
Subset Qualitative scale TFN 
A1 Low (0, 0, 0.25) 
A2 Medium Low (0, 0.25, 0.5) 
A3 Medium (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) 
A4 Medium High (0.5, 0.75, 1) 
A5 High (0.75, 1, 1) 
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Figure 6.3. The 5-grade fuzzy subsets A for relative consequence 
The membership function µ corresponding to the kth relative consequence of the ith 
pipe, 𝐶𝑖,𝑘, is given in Eq.6.12: 
µ1 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘) = {
1 − 4𝐶𝑖,𝑘       0 ≤ 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ≤
1
4
0,                  
1
4
≤ 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 1
  
µ𝑗 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘) =
{
  
 
  
 0,                            0 ≤ 𝐶
𝑖,𝑘 ≤
𝑗−2
6
 
4𝐶𝑖,𝑘 − (𝑗 − 2),         
𝑗−2
4
≤ 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ≤
𝑗−1
4
𝑗 − 4𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ,                  
𝑗−1
4
≤ 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ≤
𝑗
4
0,                              
𝑗
4
≤ 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 1   
      j=2, 3, 4  (6.12) 
µ5 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘) = {
 0,                             0 ≤ 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ≤
3
4
4𝐶𝑖,𝑘 − 3,                  
3
4
≤ 𝐶𝑖,𝑘 ≤ 1
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6.5.2. Fuzzy Inference System for Aggregating Consequences 
Once the relative consequences are fuzzified, the aggregation process can be 
conducted based on a set of fuzzy rules with a fuzzy set for aggregated consequence (Hu 
et al., 2018). In this study, the fuzzy set for aggregated consequence is assumed to be the 
same as the relative consequence, as illustrated in Fig.6.3. A fuzzy rule is presented with 
the combination of the linguistic expressions and logic operations such as AND or OR as 
in the example below.  
Rule p: IF (diameter-related Consequence) is High OR (system-related 
Consequence) is High, THEN (Aggregated Consequence for Rule p) is High. 
A set of m fuzzy rules R = [𝑅1 , . . ., 𝑅𝑝 , . . . , 𝑅𝑚] is evaluated and a set of output 
consequences corresponding to each rule,  [𝐶1
𝑖 , . . . , 𝐶𝑝
𝑖 , . . ., 𝐶𝑚
𝑖 , ], is found. The output 
consequences are then aggregated to obtain the fuzzy form of the aggregated consequence. 
The aggregated consequence for the ith pipe, 𝐶𝐴
𝑖  is then obtained by a defuzzification 
method to produce a crisp value. In this study, the Center of Gravity defuzzification method 
is used.  
Fig.6.4 illustrates a simple example of the aggregating process. For simplicity 
purpose, a fuzzy set of 3 grades corresponding to Low, Medium and High is applied. 
Fig.6.4a defines the grades (i.e., severity) of two assumed relative consequences used for 
illustrating the FIS. A set of 3 fuzzy rules is used: 
Rule 1: IF Consequence 1 is Low OR Consequence 2 is Low, then Aggregated 
Consequence is Low; 
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Rule 2: IF Consequence 1 is Medium OR Consequence 2 is Low, then Aggregated 
Consequence is Medium; 
Rule 3: IF Consequence 1 is High OR Consequence 2 is Medium, then Aggregated 
Consequence is High. 
As an example, the ith pipe with Consequence 1 = 0.7 and Consequence 2 = 0.35, the 
membership functions, µ𝑗 (𝐶
𝑖,𝑘), corresponding to Low, Medium and High grades are 0, 
0.05 and 0.25 (i.e., 𝐴𝑖,1 = [0,0.5, 0.25]) for Consequence 1 and 0.125, 0.625 and 0 (i.e., 
𝐴𝑖,2 = [0.125, 0.625,0]) for Consequence 2 (Fig.6.4a). The corresponding membership 
function for the aggregated consequence can be found using the highest value of the 
consequence (i.e., the OR operation) as shown by the dotted line in the Rule Output column 
of Fig.6.4b. Fig.6.4c shows the membership value of aggregated consequence obtained 
using superposition of the rule outputs in Fig.6.4b. Consequently, the aggregated 
consequence is obtained as the center of gravity of the shaded area in Fig.6.4c, which is 
0.594 in the figure for the case considered, indicating a medium aggregated consequence. 
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 a)   
b)   
c)  
Figure 6.4. Example of the aggregation process for consequences. a) The 3-grade 
fuzzy subsets A for Consequence 1 and 2; b) Aggregating process table; c) Aggregated 
consequence 
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6.6. Case study 
The proposed method was applied for the WDN of the City of Mount Pearl, a 
community with a population of approximately 25,000 in Newfoundland and Labrador, 
Canada. The water main system consists of 107 km of pipes (Fig.6.5). The diameters of 
the pipes range from 150 to 450 mm (Fig.6.6a) and the age of the pipes varies from less 
than 20 years to over 50 years (Fig.6.6b). Water is brought from a neighboring city to a 
water tank located in the South-West of the community. The water distribution system to 
support the entire city is based on gravity flow. Topologically, the network is divided into 
2 communities, the southern and the northern. These communities are linked by a bridge 
pipe (bolded in Fig.6.5). The northern community is mostly used for residential services, 
and the southern community is used for both industrial (the western part) and residential 
(the eastern part) purposes.  
6.6.1. AC and HIF Based Ranking 
The water mains of Mount Pearl’s WDN were ranked using AC and HIF-based 
approaches. Table 6.3 presents the typical data with GIS coordinates for the WDN, 
showing up to 8558 nodes and 9474 pipes. These raw data required filtering for analysis, 
as there exist duplicated points and pipes or gaps between pipes at the connections. Filtered 
data were analyzed to calculate AC using the developed MatlabR code. The hydraulic 
analysis was conducted using EPAnet 2.0 software through development of an interface in 
the Python programming language. For the hydraulic analysis, parameters such as 
elevation, node demand etc. vary significantly from network to network. For the example 
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presented here it is assumed that all demand nodes are at an elevation of 0 m and the 
elevation of the tank is at 50 m with the water level at 100 m. The demand for each node 
is assumed to be the same.  
Table 6.3. Data of WDN at the city of Mount Pearl 
Node 
ID 
Pipe  
ID 
Material 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Year Street name 
X 
(coordinate) 
Y 
(coordinate) 
1 1 DI 150 1971 
Spruce 
Avenue  
320991 5264475 
2 1 DI 150 1971 
Spruce 
Avenue  
321007 5264498 
3 2 DI 200 2012 
Stonegate 
Crescent 
321048 5265709 
4 2 DI 200 2012 
Stonegate 
Crescent 
321046 5265710 
… … … … … … … … 
8557 9474 DI 150 2016 Third Street 318867 5263849 
8558 9474 DI 150 2016 Third Street 318866 5263854 
DI: Ductile Iron 
 
Figure 6.5. WDN of the city of Mount Pearl 
Northern Community
Southern community
Bridge pipes
Tank
Industrial
Area
Residential
Area
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a) b)  
Figure 6.6. a) Pipe diameter and b) Pipe age distributions of WDN from city of 
Mount Pearl 
Fig.6.7 plots the AC and HIF for the city water mains. As seen in Fig.6.7, both the 
hydraulic and AC based approaches successfully highlight the most important pipes (pipes 
with the high absolute magnitude of AC and HIF) which connect northern and southern 
communities. In general, the AC based ranking reasonably corresponds to the HIF based 
ranking of the pipes. A similar result from AC based analysis and from the “shortest path” 
algorithm was reported earlier in Phan et al. (2018a) to highlight the most important pipes. 
These two methods are not directly providing a powerful value for evaluating the topology 
change of the network after a break appeared. The AC based method can be used to assess 
the network connectivity directly and finally yield a parameter to relatively estimate the 
important of pipe in the network. 
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a)    b)   
Figure 6.7. a) AC and b) HIF maps of WDN at the city of Mount Pearl 
6.6.2. Failure Probability  
The failure probability model of pipes in the city of Mount Pearl was established 
based on materials, break records and the ages of the pipes. Water main break data are 
collected from the city for development of the failure probability model. Fig.6.8 shows the 
CDF of the failure probability for the two types of pipe materials mostly used in the city 
(i.e., cast iron and ductile iron). After 35 years of age, the failure probability of both cast 
iron and ductile iron pipes significantly increases with different rates. In less than 60 years, 
cast iron pipes appear to reach the failure probability limit of 1 while the ductile iron pipes 
reach the failure probability of 1 after 90 years of age. The Weibull function is fitted with 
the CDF in Fig.6.8. The details of Weibull parameters for different cases obtained through 
curve fitting with the CDF in Fig.6.8 using least-squares method are given in Table 6.4. 
Based on these parameters and age, i.e. (t- γi), the failure probability of each pipe per 
kilometer is calculated. The calculated failure probability of the pipes in the city’s WDN 
corresponding to the year of 2018 and 2028 are shown in Fig.6.9. The maximum 
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probability of failure of the pipes appears to be low (5.14×10-5/m and 1.06×10-4/m in 2018 
and 2028, respectively). These failure probabilities are estimated based on limited pipe 
break data from the City of Mount Pearl and require updating using additional information 
when information will be available. 
 
Figure 6.8. CDF of water mains based on statistical failure records 
 
Table 6.4. Parameters of fitted Weibull distribution with different materials 
Model type   
Ductile Iron 13.41778 52.36 
Cast Iron 6.04686 69.59 
* In Eqs. 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 
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a)   b)   
Figure 6.9. Failure probability per km length of pipe in a) 2018 and b) 2028 
Table 6.5. Consequence assessment 
Pipe ID  
Node i 
Pipe ID  
Node j 
Year  
Installed 
Material 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Cij,dia ACij ΔACij Cij,sys 
0 1 2012 Ductile Iron 200 0.4444 1.8579×10-5 1.1462×10-7 0.0009 
1 2 2002 Ductile Iron 200 0.4444 1.8596×10-5 1.3107×10-7 0.0010 
2 12 1987 Ductile Iron 200 0.4444 1.8415×10-5 -4.9676×10-8 -0.0004 
… … … … … … … … … 
*879 *1907 1991 Ductile Iron 300 0.6667 1.4904×10-4 1.3057×10-4 1.0000 
… … … … … … … … … 
**2611 **3766 1993 Ductile Iron 450 1.0000 1.6512×10-5 -1.9528×10-6 -0.0150 
3987 166 1987 Ductile Iron 200 0.4444 1.8314×10-5 -1.5032×10-7 -0.0012 
3988 167 1987 Ductile Iron 200 0.4444 1.7364×10-5 -1.1008×10-6 -0.0084 
3989 223 1987 Ductile Iron 300 0.6667 1.8383×10-5 -8.1560×10-8 -0.0006 
*: Maximum Cij,sys; **: Maximum Cij,dia 
6.6.3. Consequence Assessment  
The diamater and topological consequences calculated for the city of Mount Pearl’s 
water mains are shown in Table 6.5. Based on the calculated relative consequence, the 
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membership functions are defined as shown in Fig.6.3. The two types of consequences 
were classified into 5 catagories, including Low, Low-Medium, Medium, Medium-High 
and High, and then the two consequence categories were aggregated to one output.  
Table 6.6 presents the rule set used for calculation of aggregated consequence using 
FIS. Aggregated Consequences are grouped into 5 categories, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, 
corresponding to Low, Low-Medium, Medium, Medium-High and High. An “AND” 
operation is used in the rule set to yield aggreagted consequence. For example, rule 14 in 
Table 6.6 with [3,4] means “IF the System-related Consequence is Medium (3) AND 
Diameter-related Consequence is Medium-High (4) then the Aggregated Consequence is 
Medium-High (4)”, which is A4 according to Table 6.2. 
Table 6.6. Rules for FIS 
Rule number 
Input relative 
Consequences 
Aggregated 
Consequence 
Corresponding 
Subset 
(in Table 6.2) 
1 [1,1] 1 A1 
2 [1,2] 1 A1 
3 [1,3] 2 A2 
4 [1,4] 3 A3 
5 [1,5] 5 A5 
6 [2,1] 1 A1 
7 [2,2] 2 A2 
8 [2,3] 2 A2 
9 [2,4] 3 A3 
10 [2,5] 5 A5 
11 [3,1] 2 A2 
12 [3,2] 2 A2 
13 [3,3] 3 A3 
14 [3,4] 4 A4 
15 [3,5] 5 A5 
16 [4,1] 3 A3 
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Rule number 
Input relative 
Consequences 
Aggregated 
Consequence 
Corresponding 
Subset 
(in Table 6.2) 
17 [4,2] 3 A3 
18 [4,3] 4 A4 
19 [4,4] 4 A4 
20 [4,5] 5 A5 
21 [5,1] 3 A3 
22 [5,2] 3 A3 
23 [5,3] 4 A4 
24 [5,4] 4 A4 
25 [5,5] 5 A5 
 
The aggregated consequence calculated for the water mains for the city’s WDN is 
plotted in Fig.6.10. The aggregated consequence ranges from 0.08 to 0.92. The most 
significant consequences are again for the pipes as those connecting northern and southern 
communities (the bridge pipes). The less significant pipes are those in small streets that 
deliver water to households. 
  
Figure 6.10. Aggregated consequence of WDN at the city of Mount Pearl 
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6.6.5. Risk Assessment  
Based on the failure probability and the aggregated consequence, the failure risks of 
pipes in the WDN are calculated. Since the failure probability is a function of age, the risks 
corresponding to a particular year are calculated. A map of pipe risk is shown in Fig.6.11 
for two different years separated by a decade (i.e., 2018 and 2028). The risk ranges from 0 
to 9.82×10-6/m in the year of 2018, and from 0 to 20.10×10-6/m in 2028. The maximum 
calculated risk value of the network is, thus, almost double after a decade.  
This time dependent feature of the risk map provides a tool for prioritizing pipes in 
the network for maintenance. It is to be noted that, the failure probability models were 
developed for the pipes using limited available data that predict lower failure probability. 
As a result, estimated risks are also less. However, this chapter presents a framework for 
risk calculation and can be used with updating of failure probability models when 
additional information will be available. 
Even though a risk map is successfully developed, as in Fig.6.11, choosing a risk 
threshold for maintenance scheduling is difficult which requires a subjective decision that 
depends on the decision makers. A method for selecting thresholds is currently not 
available for WDN. In Chapter 3 a relationship is developed between risk thresholds versus 
corresponding failure probabilities to provide a guideline when choosing the threshold for 
decision making (Phan et al, 2018b). In this method, a number of risk thresholds are 
arbitrarily chosen and the maximum failure probabilities corresponding to these risks are 
calculated to develop the relationships. A system risk and a system failure probability are 
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considered in that study (Phan et al. 2018b). A similar relationship is developed here, 
however, with consideration of risks and failure probabilities of each pipe component. 
Furthermore, to provide a guideline for understanding the maintenance/replacement works 
for pipes with highest risks, a relationship of risk threshold and corresponding total length 
of pipes having risks higher than the threshold is provided. 
To develop these relationships, various risk thresholds are first chosen and the set of 
pipes which have risk higher than the threshold is selected. The total length of the pipes 
with higher risks is calculated. The maximum failure probabilities of all other remaining 
pipes are then found. The risk threshold against maximum failure probability and the total 
pipe lengths with risks higher than threshold are plotted in Fig.6.12. As shown in the 
figures, the risk of the WDN can be reduced from 9.82×10-6/m to 3.51×10-6/m through 
replacing about 5.57km of pipe. The corresponding failure probability reduce from 
5.14×10-5/m to 1.83×10-5/m. Thus, the developed relationship could be used for carefully 
selecting the risk threshold for maintenance prioritization planning.  
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a)    
b)    
Figure 6.11. Risk maps of WDN at the city of Mount Pearl in the year of a) 2018 
and b) 2028 
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a)    b)   
Figure 6.12. Relationship of a) Risk versus maximum failure probability in the 
year 2018 and b) Risk versus total length of need-to-replaced pipe 
6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter presents a simple risk assessment framework for developing a 
prioritizing plan for maintenance of a WDN. While the failure probability of water mains 
can be estimated based on break records or any other method for risk assessment, the 
determination of consequences of water main breaks is a challenging task. In this study, 
the use of AC from complex network analysis is proposed to consider the topological 
consequences that account for redundancy reduction and network isolation due to water 
main breaks. To demonstrate the capability of using AC, pipes in a water distribution 
network are ranked using AC and using a hydraulic importance factor calculated using 
hydraulic analysis. The AC based ranking was found to reasonably correspond to hydraulic 
importance-based ranking, particularly for the most critical pipes, indicating that the 
change in AC can be related to the topological consequence. A pipe diameter related 
consequence is proposed to account for the economic consequence. A break of a large 
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diameter pipe is expected to have a higher economic consequence than small diameter 
pipes, justifying the use of diameter for economic consequence. A fuzzy inference system 
is proposed here to combine different consequences to obtain aggregated consequences for 
risk calculation. The application of the risk calculation method is demonstrated considering 
an AC based consequence and a diameter-based consequence. However, the developed 
framework would be useful to account for any other consequence (e.g. location factor) if 
information is available. Based on the risk level of each pipe, a risk map for prioritizing 
water mains is developed for decision making. A relationship for risk, total length of pipe 
with higher risk can be developed for decision maker for selecting the risk threshold 
knowing the corresponding failure probability. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1. Introduction  
Water mains represent a significant part of the modern asset which are used to 
provide portable water to the communities. The water mains in municipalities are aging 
and experiencing leaks and breakages. Maintaining the integrity of the aging water mains 
has been a challenge for municipalities. A reliability and risk-based maintenance planning 
can be used to maintain the infrastructure with optimum utilization of resources. However, 
reliability and risk assessments for complex water distribution network are computationally 
challenging. Researchers are employing different approaches for reliability and risk 
assessment of WDN. Different limitations of these approaches are identified. This thesis 
develops an improved framework for prioritizing plan for water main maintenance 
considering reliability and risk modelling. 
7.2. Contribution of the Thesis  
In this thesis, reliability assessment method of water mains is developed accounting 
for the physical failure mechanism of pipelines. A method for overall reliability assessment 
of complex WDN is then developed using the parameter from graph theory. Risk 
assessment methods for WDN are also developed considering the effect on individual pipes 
as well as the WDN system. The following presents the specific findings from the research: 
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- Develop a framework for mechanics-based reliability/risk assessment for 
WDN  
A method for prioritizing water mains for maintenance considering failure 
probability and risk of pipeline system is developed. For reliability assessment, a 
mechanics-based model of corroded water main is used, which would be useful for 
municipalities with no available prior break data. The pipe failure probability model is 
established based on a stochastic degradation analysis using MC simulation to develop a 
Weibull failure distribution function. A method is proposed for updating the model using 
expert opinions on the pipe conditions after an inspection and/or maintenance 
(repair/replacement) work without any requirement for data mining exercise. The model 
would thus be useful for existing and repaired/renewed pipe components. A risk assessment 
method is proposed for calculation of risk for small pipeline systems. The system failure 
of the pipeline network is defined using FTA applicable for small network. 
Thresholds for the reliability and risk are found to govern the decision process in the 
reliability and risk-based approaches. In this regard, a careful determination of the 
thresholds is required to optimize the decision process considering both the reliability and 
the risk. To this end, a relation has been developed between the risk and the reliability for 
a system defined using FTA. The thresholds can rationally be chosen based on this relation.  
- Development of a mechanics-based failure assessment model  
For mechanics-based reliability assessment of water mains, a remaining strength 
assessment method for corroded pipelines is required. While stress assessment methods for 
168 
 
intake pipeline are available in AWWA design code, a method for assessment of corroded 
water main is not available. Remaining strength assessment methods available for energy 
pipelines are examined here to develop a stress calculation method for corroded water main 
due to internal pressure. Three existing burst pressure models for corroded energy pipeline 
are first revisited for a range of pipe sizes and material strength grades. A series of FE 
analysis is conducted to develop a database that is used to revisit different coefficients and 
exponents of the models (model parameters). An optimization algorithm based on 
differential evolution (DE) method is used to determine the model parameters through 
minimization of model errors.  
Existing models for energy pipelines are examined with the results of FE analysis to 
revisit the existing models. FE analyses are then used to develop burst pressure models for 
corroded cast iron water mains. 
- Effects of water main breaks on overall network  
Studying the disconnection probability of WDN is important for optimizing 
repair/maintenance prioritization planning. The conventional method of finding a pipe or 
combination of pipes causing network isolation is very complex and requires extensive 
computation. This study presents a novel method for finding minimal cut-sets using 
Algebraic Connectivity (AC) determined by solving Eigenvalue problems of the Laplacian 
matrix.  
It is observed that the decrease of AC due to a pipe break indicates a reduction of 
redundancy and the increase of AC indicates disconnection (isolation) of parts of the 
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network. A failure probability estimation framework is developed using this property of 
the AC to find the minimal cut-sets. This method is found to provide significant saving of 
computational time in determining the cut-sets.  
It is also revealed that the importance level of pipe to the network corresponds with 
the change in AC, and the pipes in the network can be ranked according to this importance 
level. The critical and high betweenness pipes identified using the AC based method are 
validated through comparison with the results of the Shortest Path method.  
- Risk assessment of WDN due to water main breaks  
A framework for risk assessment of complex WDN is developed for prioritizing plan 
for maintenance. For determination of consequence of water main breaks, the use of 
Algebraic Connectivity (AC) from complex network analysis is proposed as the topological 
consequences of redundancy reduction and network isolation due to water main breaks. 
Pipes in a WDN are ranked using the changing amount of AC before and after break has 
occurred. This approach was found to reasonably correspond to hydraulic importance-
based ranking, particularly for the most critical pipes, indicating that the change in AC can 
be related to the topological consequence. A pipe diameter related consequence is proposed 
to account for the economic consequence. The Fuzzy Inference System is proposed to 
aggregate different consequences to the final consequences for risk assessment. A risk map 
for prioritizing water mains is developed for decision making based on the risk level of 
each pipe. A relationship for risk, total length of pipe with higher risk can be developed for 
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decision maker for selecting the risk threshold knowing the corresponding failure 
probability. 
7.3. Limitations of the study 
This research develops a framework for reliability/risk-based maintenance planning 
of water distribution network. The following presents some limitations of the study that 
might be addressed through future research. 
- In the mechanics-based reliability assessment model developed, a stochastic 
method using Monte Caro simulation is used for corrosion prediction. However, a 
corrosion monitoring program can be undertaken to develop more realistic corrosion model 
using realistic data for reliability assessment of the pipes.  
- The mechanics-based model for corroded water mains is developed considering the 
internal pressure only, while conventional method of stress calculation (neglecting 
localized corrosion) is used for the external loads. Although internal pressure typically 
dominates the stresses in pressure pipes, a stress calculation method for external loads can 
be developed considering local corrosions.    
- The AC can only assess the topological consequence.  The effects of the location 
of water source and the direction of the water flow cannot be accounted using the AC.  
- Although there is no limitation in term of the size of the WDN for application of 
AC, it may require tedious work to define the nodes and the network for large water 
distribution system.  
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7.4. Recommendations for Future Research Work 
The thesis develops a framework for prioritizing water mains for maintenance 
considering reliability and risk levels. The framework can be applied to develop reliability 
and risk assessment methods for water mains. The following presents a list area for 
potential further work. 
- In the current research, a framework for failure probability assessment considering 
physical failure mechanism is proposed. In this method, corrosion models available from 
published literature are employed. It is recommended to conduct a corrosion study with 
both cast iron and ductile pipes to develop improved corrosion models for water mains. 
Using the corrosion models, new failure probability models can be developed for municipal 
WDN. It is also recommended to inspect the municipal water mains based on the 
assessment of the failure probability and update the model for future failure probability 
assessment. For updating the failure models, a Bayesian updating process can be used. 
- Understanding the physical failure mechanism of municipal water mains is area of 
study required for the development of failure assessment model. The physical failure 
models used in the current study are based on conventional stress assessment methods 
without detail understanding of the soil-pipe interaction. However, water mains are buried 
structures whose behavior is governed by the interaction between the pipe and the soil. It 
is recommended to perform detail pipe soil interaction analyses to develop improved 
physical model for failure assessment of water main. In this regard, fracture mechanics 
approach should be applied accounting for the reduction of fracture toughness due to long 
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exposure of water mains in corrosive environment (known as stress corrosion cracking). 
The modelling work should be supplemented by experimental work to validate the 
developed model.  
- Further research is expected to develop more rational method of consequence 
assessment of water main breaks for risk calculation. In this thesis, Algebraic Connectivity 
is used as a parameter for the assessment of consequence on overall network and 
hypothetical approaches are used to account for other consequence. It is recommended to 
investigate the other consequences using real-time data from the municipalities. This 
method should be examined through application to different WDNs. 
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